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Abstract
Despite the rapid development of NGOs in China in the last two decades and 
the growing interest in them in both academic and policy circles, research on 
Chinese NGOs has suffered from a lack of both detailed qualitative data and 
sophisticated analytical frameworks. The present thesis is an attempt to address 
both gaps in existing research. It draws on a large amount of information 
generated by in-depth case studies of NGOs, and it replaces the 
state-versus-society dichotomous framework that has underpinned most 
existing studies of Chinese NGOs with a new approach that disaggregates both 
the "state" and "society" and emphasizes their inter-penetration.
The thesis challenges a number of existing analyses of Chinese NGOs. Contrary 
to common belief that Chinese NGOs lack autonomy from the state, it argues 
that many of them have in fact enjoyed a remarkable degree of de facto autonomy. 
Whilst Chinese NGOs are widely perceived as lacking many basic skills that 
urgently need to be developed by means of organizational capacity building 
programmes, the thesis suggests that many NGOs already possess sophisticated 
skills which may be different from those taught by standard NGO training 
programmes but which are well suited to the specific institutional context of 
transitional China. The thesis looks at how Chinese NGOs operate in this context 
and examines the key factors that have limited their usefulness both as service 
providers and as advocates for vulnerable and disadvantaged members of 
society. It concludes with some reflections on the evolution of state-society 
relations in post-reform China as revealed by this study of NGOs. It summarizes 
change and continuity in state-society relations in the notion of dependent 
autonomy. This means that social forces have gained substantial autonomy from 
the state, but they continue to depend on the state for various vital support and 
resources.
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1. Introduction
My original plan for this thesis was to conduct an assessment of the performance of 
social welfare NGOs (sometimes also called "third sector organisations") that had 
emerged in China in recent years. This was to be compared with the performance of 
both public and private sector social welfare organisations. I hypothesized that 
NGOs were able to develop because they displayed some comparative advantages 
vis-a-vis organisations in the other two sectors. After starting the fieldwork, 
however, I quickly realized that such a research project was unlikely to yield 
interesting results, as the following case helps to illustrate.
The case involved a family in a big coastal city that had an autistic child. The child's 
mother divorced her husband and abandoned the child. The father therefore had to 
care for the child on his own. He had a salary of 1,400 yuan or so per month. At the 
time the minimum living standard in the city was set at around 300 yuan per person 
per month,1 which meant that this man did not qualify for financial assistance from 
the government. The man needed to work full-time in order to earn the salary to 
support himself and his son. Since it was impossible to look after an autistic child all 
by himself while working full-time, he tried to find a residential home for the child. 
There were very few residential homes for mentally disabled children in the city, 
whether publicly- or privately -owned. He learned about a private institution which 
was said to be good, but it charged over 1,000 yuan a m onth—obviously beyond the 
means of this man. With considerable efforts he finally obtained a place for his son 
in a private non-profit institution which also charged fees for its service but whose 
fees he could afford. However, its service was rather poor. After some time the 
child's condition worsened. During my fieldwork I interviewed a friend of this man
1 Minimum living standard is a poverty line set by the government. The government distributes 
financial assistance to households whose incomes are below this line. The minimum living
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who had visited the child at the residential home. She was so shocked by its poor 
quality of care that she wanted to make complaints to the management. However, 
the man begged her not to do so. Even though it was far from ideal, obtaining a 
place in that home for his son had not been easy, since it had a long waiting list. 
Besides, he had no other place to go. Given that "exit" was not an option, the man 
thought that complaining would only make things worse for his son in the future.2
This case was not unique. Everywhere I visited I gained the impression that 
low-quality service provided by NGOs had been the norm, while even fee-paying 
clients were in no position to demand better services owing to a lack of alternatives. 
It soon became clear to me that social welfare NGOs were still at such an early stage 
of development in China that the majority of them would not even measure up to a 
minimum standard of good performance.3 Later, I extended my fieldwork to NGOs 
in other sectors, such as education, human rights, and health. In these fields, too, it 
seemed that the performance of Chinese NGOs had left much to be desired. 
Therefore, if I were to stick to my original research plan, I did not see how I could 
produce anything particularly interesting or illuminating about Chinese NGOs in 
the end, other than delivering a scathing criticism of their performance. On the other 
hand, the fact that many NGOs were giving such poor performances raised a 
number of questions. For example: Why is their performance so unsatisfactory? 
How can NGOs continue to receive donations and other forms of support on the 
basis of such poor performance? Why do they have so little accountability? Why is 
there no effective external supervision to ensure standard? These questions 
eventually made me change the direction of my research to examine how NGOs 
were created, how they carried out their activities, how they mobilized support, and 
how they managed their external relations—in short, how NGOs survived and
standard varies from city to city, reflecting the difference in local prices.
2 Interview, 26 March 2000.
3 For example, in many NGO social welfare organisations clients were still subjected to verbal 
and physical abuse by the staff. Interviews, March, May, and July 2000.
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operated in contemporary China.
The output of my revised research agenda, the present thesis, describes the way 
NGOs function in a country whose economy, state, and society are all in transition. 
Although there is no denying the positive roles Chinese NGOs have played in 
numerous arenas—such as pioneering new services, defending the rights of 
disadvantaged people, raising public awareness of critical issues, providing 
opportunities for people with similar concerns to network with each other, and 
mobilizing donations for charitable causes, to name just a few—in this thesis I have 
focused more on the problems of NGOs than their achievements. I highlight their 
behaviour that runs counter to what is supposed to be the proper behaviour of 
NGOs, e.g., forging patron-client ties with government officials, then using 
bureaucratic protection to evade supervision by the public and the media. I argue 
that much of the dysfunctional behaviour of Chinese NGOs can be explained by the 
way they function in contemporary China: Frequently, when NGOs are good at 
"getting things done" and are successful in ensuring their own organisational 
survival and growth, this simultaneously creates the condition for their 
dysfunctionality, i.e., their inadequate performance in helping the disadvantaged 
and powerless or serving the interests of their members.
Although studies of NGOs in other countries and general theories of NGO 
development provide useful references for my research, it is essentially grounded in 
analyses of the characteristics of the Chinese state and society and the patterns of 
their interaction in the reform era. The research in turn is intended to shed some 
light on the evolution of state-society relations in post-reform China. For this reason, 
the most relevant literature for this study is not the NGO literature but the political 
science literature on contemporary China.4 It is the latter literature that has
4 As an example of the relatively limited relevance of the NGO literature compared to the China 
studies literature, consider the following statement in a frequently-cited book in the NGO 
studies field:
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informed the analysis in this thesis.
D efin ing NGOs in China
Although the word NGO is already widely used in China, the official term which 
currently conveys the notion of an NGO is "popular organisation" (minjian zuzhi). 
Popular organisation contains two categories: "social organisation" (shehui tuanti or 
shetuan) and "private non-enterprise unit" (minban feiqiye danwei). Social 
organisations are officially defined as "non-profit organisations which are formed 
voluntarily by Chinese citizens in order to realise the shared objectives of their 
members and which carry out activities according to their charters" (State Council 
1998a).5 Private non-enterprise units are defined as "non-profit social service 
organisations which are set up by enterprises, service units,6 social organisations, 
other social forces, or individual citizens using non-state assets" (State Council 
1998b). The main difference between a social organisation and a private 
non-enterprise unit is that the former is a membership organisation whereas the
Traditionally, most NGOs have been suspicious of governments, their relationships varying 
between benign neglect and outright hostility. Governments often share a similarly 
suspicious view of NGOs, national and international, and their relationship, at least in 
Africa, has been likened to cat and mouse (Edwards and Hulme 1992:16).
Even where NGOs and states work together, one influential study found that they were best 
described as "reluctant partners" (Farrington and Bebbington 1993). As two leading NGO 
scholars observed, this description "appears to characterise the situation in many countries" 
(Hulme and Edwards 1997:13). Obviously, NGO-state relations which exist in many parts of the 
world and which have been carefully documented and analyzed in the NGO literature stand in 
sharp contrast to those that exist in China, where the majority of NGOs are termed 
"officially-organized NGOs". Instead of being "suspicious of the government" and behaving as 
"reluctant partners" of the government, China scholars note "the semi-official, semi-popular 
nature" of Chinese NGOs (Sun 1994), their "overlapping with the state" (He 1997: 8), and their 
"symbiotic" relationship with the state (Saich 2000). At best Chinese NGOs are part of a 
"state-led civil society" (Frolic 1997). At worst they are "embedded within state agencies" (Foster 
2002). To analyse NGO-state relations in China, therefore, I find it more useful to consult studies 
of state-society relations in China by China scholars than the generic NGO literature.
5 In addition to individual members, all organisations other than state organs may also join social 
organisations as institution members.
6 Service unit (shiye danwei) is defined in the Chinese administrative and legal systems as a type 
of organisation that is distinct from an administrative agency, an economic enterprise, or a 
popular organisation. See the next paragraph for more information on the service unit.
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latter is not.7
"Private non-enterprise unit" (PNEU) is a fairly recent invention. Before 1998, the 
Chinese administrative and legal systems only recognised four types of 
organisations: administrative agencies (xinzheng jiguan), economic enterprises (cjiye), 
social organisations, and service units (shiye danwei). Prior to the economic reforms, 
service units were state-owned organisations that provided services to the public on 
a non-commercial basis, such as schools, hospitals, research institutes, publishing 
houses, theatres, and museums. Service units used to be fully funded by the state. 
After the economic reforms, as part of the effort to alleviate the fiscal burdens of the 
state, service units were encouraged to set up income-generating ventures, to charge 
fees for their services, and even to be "managed like business enterprises" (qiyehua 
guanli), i.e., not only achieving financial self-sufficiency but also becoming 
profit-making entities. In addition, the government also adopted the policy of 
encouraging "various social forces" and individual citizens to set up service units.8 
As a result, alongside fully state-funded and state-owned service units, other types 
of service units also emerged, including privately owned service units with no state 
funding, which came to be known as "private service units" (minban shiye danwei) 
(see, e.g., Zhang, Ma and Yang 1998; Huang 1998; Liu 1993; Su et al 1999).
Before 1998, while social organisations had to be approved and registered by Civil 
Affairs departments, there was no regulation concerning the approval and 
registration of service units. As reform progressed, service units of all types of 
ownership also proliferated, whether with or without the approval of any state 
agency. To bring the chaotic situation back under control, the State Council finally 
promulgated two regulations in 1998: the "Provisional Regulations on the
7 For management and registration purposes foundations are also classified as social 
organisations at present even though they are not membership organisations.
8 According to "Plans for Reforming Party and Government Organisations" jointly issued by the 
Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee and the State Council in 1993. The document is 
quoted in Zhang, Ma and Yang 1998: 94.
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Registration and Management of Private Non-Enterprise Units" and the 
"Provisional Regulations on the Registration and Management of Service Units." 
The policy makers who drafted the regulations coined the term "private 
non-enterprise unit" to replace the old expression "private service unit", and 
created separate registration and supervision requirements for them. Service units 
are defined in the 1998 Provisional Regulations as "public-benefit social service 
organisations...set up by state organs or other organisations using state-owned 
assets" (State Council 1998c). The main difference between a service unit and a 
PNEU, therefore, is that the former is state-owned whereas the latter is not.
Popular organisations must be approved and registered by Civil Affairs 
departments at the county level or above in order to exist legally. This requirement, 
however, does not apply to eight big national social organisations which are often 
referred to more specifically as "people's organisations" (renmin tuanti) or "mass 
organisations" (qunzhong tuanti). These organisations, which include the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions, the All-China Women's Federation, and the 
Communist Youth League, were in fact created by the state and perform 
administrative functions on its behalf.
Current regulations also exempt from the registration requirements "organisations 
formed within administrative agencies, social organisations, enterprises, or service 
units which are approved by these organisations and which only carry out activities 
internally" (State Council 1998a). For example, university student unions do not 
need to be approved and registered by Civil Affairs departments as long as they 
have been approved by their universities. Many so-called "internal social 
organisations within work units" (danwei neibu tuanti), however, do not really 
confine their activities to the premises of their mother organisations. For example, a 
very active student environmental group at Beijing Forestry University has jointly 
organised many public events with other environmental organisations, student
12
associations in other universities, and the media, such as conferences and fora, 
environmental awareness raising campaigns, tree planting trips, and wild animal 
protection activities (Hu 2001). In other words, apart from their legal status, many 
internal social organisations are not very different from independently registered 
popular organisations, therefore they need to be studied alongside the latter in any 
full-scale investigation of Chinese NGOs.9
Similar to internal social organisations, there is also a type of NGO known as 
"second-level social organisations" (erji shetuan) or "branches" (fenzhi jigou) of 
registered organisations. Before 1998, as subsidiaries of registered organisations, 
these NGOs did not need to be approved and registered by Civil Affairs 
departments. As a result, some NGOs which could not meet the prerequisites for 
registration had managed to gain a quasi-legal status by persuading registered 
NGOs to let them "hang under" (guakao) as their second-level organisations. In 
exchange, they would pay an annual "management fee" (guanlifei) to their host 
organisations. Some registered NGOs have survived mainly on the management 
fees they receive from their second-level organisations.10 Like internal organisations, 
second-level organisations cannot enjoy "legal person" (fareri) status, i.e., they are 
not considered fully independent legal entities. While not being legal persons might 
cause some inconveniences11 to second-level organisations, those that enjoyed good 
relations with their host organisations often had more freedom and autonomy than 
registered NGOs, since unlike registered NGOs, they were not under the direct 
supervision of Civil Affairs and other concerned government departments. In effect, 
second-level NGOs constituted a loophole in the government's NGO management 
system. The new government regulation promulgated in 1998, therefore, plugged 
this hole by requiring second-level NGOs to be registered by Civil Affairs as well.
9 This view is commonly held by Chinese researchers. See, e.g., Liu 2001; Deng 2001a; Gao 1999.
10 Telephone interview with a Chinese NGO researcher, 17 June 2002.
11 For example, second-level organisations may not be allowed to have their own bank accounts, 
which means they have to use the bank accounts of their host organisations. However, this is not 
always the case. Some second-level organisations do have their own accounts.
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However, the registration requirements are less stringent than those applied to 
independent NGOs.
Given that organisations which do not conform to the registration requirements are 
outlawed, in theory NGOs that can operate openly in China would include 
registered social organisations, approved internal social organisations, registered 
second-level social organisations, registered PNEUs, and perhaps mass 
organisations as well,12 but certainly not business enterprises, service units, or 
unregistered organisations. In reality, however, any comprehensive study of 
Chinese NGOs must also include some organisations in the last three categories, for 
the following reasons:
Firstly, current regulations require every NGO to find a "professional management 
unit" iyewu zhuguan damvei) to act as its sponsoring agency. Only after obtaining the 
approval of its sponsor can an NGO apply for registration with Civil Affairs 
departments. The sponsor must be a state organ above the county level or an 
organisation authorised by such an organ. It must also be "relevant" to the activities 
proposed by the NGO, i.e., it must have responsibilities in the same field in which 
the NGO operates. For example, a literary society should be supervised by the 
Bureau of Culture, not the Education Commission; a football fans' club must be 
professionally managed by the Sports Commission, not the Health Bureau, and so 
on. On the other hand, state organs are under no obligation to accept applications 
for sponsorship from NGOs in their fields. For instance, the Bureau of Culture can
12 Mass organisations have often being accused, with very good reasons, of not being NGOs in 
the real sense. Nevertheless, they have been included in most studies of Chinese NGOs by both 
Chinese and foreign researchers, although they are treated as a special category. It should be 
noted that mass organisations perform administrative functions on behalf of the state and they 
operate in much the same way as government agencies. Their staff all have the status of civil 
servants and can be transferred to government agencies. The trade union, the communist youth 
league, and the women's federation in fact function as the Communist Party's labour, youth, and 
women's department respectively, and are under the direct leadership of the Party. In short, it 
often makes more sense to think of these organisations as part of the state apparatus than as 
NGOs.
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refuse to sponsor any literary society that wishes to register. Current regulations 
also disallow NGOs with similar remits to coexist in the same geographic area. For 
example, if there is already an association of disabled people in Beijing, then no new 
association of this kind will be allowed to register in Beijing. As a result of these 
strict rules, many grassroots NGOs have been unable to register, either because they 
fail to find government agencies that are willing to act as their professional 
management units, or because other NGOs with similar missions have already been 
registered in the sites where their intend to base their operations. In order to exist 
legally, some NGOs have registered with Industry and Commerce Bureaux as 
businesses instead, even though they engage in public-benefit activities and are 
non-profit-making. In fact, some of the best-known NGOs in China which are 
celebrated as "genuine NGOs" as opposed to "government organised NGOs" 
(GONGOs) and which have been the favourites with international donor agencies 
fall right into this category, and are therefore not under the jurisdiction of Civil 
Affairs.
Secondly, although the 1998 provisional regulations clearly defined PNEUs and 
service units, and specified different registration and supervision arrangements for 
them, as late as 2000 the re-registration of private service units as PNEUs had not 
yet started in most places. In one of my fieldwork cities, two years after the 
promulgation of the 1998 regulations, newly founded NGOs which should have 
registered as PNEUs were still allowed to register as private service units. The 
Ministry of Civil Affairs estimated that there were at least 300,000 to 400,000 PNEUs 
nationwide, but by the end of 2002 only 111,000 of them had been properly 
registered.13 Therefore, at present some organisations with "service unit" status 
must also be included in the category of NGOs.
Finally, there are unregistered, hence illegal organisations which nevertheless carry
13 These figures come from the Ministry of Civil Affairs' website (www.mca.gov.cn).
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out activities openly and which have been left alone by the government instead of 
being banned according to the regulations. Some second-level NGOs which have 
not been registered by Civil Affairs as demanded by the new regulation of 1998 are 
also continuing their operations without encountering any problem. This situation 
obviously has a lot to do with the currently limited government capacity to enforce 
the regulations concerning NGOs. This issue will be discussed further in later 
chapters.
To sum up, at present NGOs in China can have a diversity of legal status, ranging 
from registered popular organisations, internal organisations, second-level 
organisations, to business enterprises, service units, and completely unregistered 
organisations. This shows that although the government has been trying for some 
years to put the sector in good order, it has only had limited success so far.
NGO Terminology in China
The specific Chinese terms for different types of NGO have already been introduced 
in the pervious section. This section concerns the generic terms currently in use. As 
mentioned above, the official Chinese term for NGO is popular organisation, but the 
word "NGO" is increasingly used by government officials, academics, and NGO 
practitioners in China on both formal and informal occasions. Two other 
terms —"non-profit organisations" and "third sector organisations" —are also 
frequently used. Technically, these two terms have different denotations from the 
term NGO, as they cover popular organisations as well as service units, but the 
three terms are often used interchangeablly. A few years ago, "NGO" was still 
considered a more sensitive term than the other two inside China. One reason for 
the sensitivity which has often been mentioned is that the Chinese translation of the 
word "non-government" may have the connotation of anti-govemment. When an 
international conference on NGOs took place in Beijing in 1999, for example, the
16
Chinese organisers had to replace the word "NGOs" in the title of the conference 
with "non-profit organisations" in order to have the conference approved by higher 
authorities. Recently, however, "NGO" has become so fashionable that to point out 
to a GONGO that it is not a genuine NGO would be a serious offence.14 When 
another major NGO conference took place in Beijing in October 2001, not only did 
the word "NGO" appear in the title of the conference, but the event also ended with 
the high-keyed release of a "Beijing Anti-Poverty Declaration by Chinese NGOs" 
(People's Daily, 3 November 2001: 2). There seems to be good reason, therefore, for 
me to use the term NGO to refer to the objects of this study.
In their discussions on domestic NGOs Chinese researchers and NGO practitioners 
often divide them into two broad categories: "officially-organised" (guanban) NGOs 
and "popular" (minban) NGOs. The former are initiated by the government and 
receive government subsidies. Their staff are often on the government's payroll, and 
their leadership positions are usually held by government officials. By contrast, 
popular NGOs are initiated by individual citizens and receive no government 
subsidies. Their staff are not government employees and they do not have officials 
occupying their top management positions.15 Officially-organised NGOs are also 
frequently called "top-down" (zi shang er xia) NGOs, whereas popular NGOs are 
referred to as "bottom-up" (zi xia er shang) NGOs.16
14 Presentation by a Chinese NGO researcher at the Forum on Governance in China, IDS, 11-13 
September 2001. The researcher took part in organizing the 1999 conference.
15 The distinction between officially-organized and popular NGOs is not always clear-cut. For 
example, some popular NGOs have staff who are able to work for them while retaining their 
status as government employees. This kind of situation will be explained in more detail later in 
the thesis.
16 Calling NGOs either "officially-organized" or "popular" represents a different way of 
classifying them from the one described in the previous section. This classification is based on 
NGOs' origin, whereas the previous section distinguished NGOs by their different legal status. 
Officially-organized NGOs are less likely than popular NGOs to have ambiguous legal status. 
Given their official background, they are less likely to run into difficulty when they try to 
register with Civil Affairs. Therefore, it is usually popular NGOs that are forced to register as 
businesses, or second-level organisations under registered NGOs, or not register at all.
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M ethodology
Fieldwork for this thesis was conducted in a number of sites in north, northwest, 
southwest, east, and southeast China, which included Beijing, Shanghai, 
Guangdong, Shaanxi, Yunnan, Sichuan, and Anhui. The initial research was carried 
out between October 1999 and September 2000. This was supplemented with 
further fieldwork in October and November 2001, and again in October and 
November 2002. The research centred on case studies of individual NGOs. In total, I 
studied 40 NGOs. Of these, seven were studied most intensively, which involved 
the use of ethnographic methods such as participant observation. Another seven 
NGOs were studied in a detailed but less intensive way. This typically involved 
several interviews with the NGOs7 key personnel plus visits to the organisations but 
no extended observations or extensive interactions with the NGOs7 staff and clients. 
Information on the remaining 26 NGOs was drawn from one detailed interview, 
usually carried out during a visit to the organisation, and the NGOs7 documents. All 
40 organisations are described in an appendix.
In selecting my cases, I tried to achieve as much diversity as possible. The 
organisations I studied spread over ten different sectors. Their distribution by sector 
is as follows:
Sector Number of NGO Studied
Children's Rights and Welfare 10
Women's Issues 3
Environment 2
Legal Service 2
Learned Society/Science and Technology 3
Disability 7
HIV/AIDS 5
Education 2
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General Social Welfare 4
Rural Development/Poverty Alleviation 2
Total: 40
In terms of geographic distribution, not only are my cases located in different parts 
of China, but the locations also represent both rich coastal areas and 
socio-economically underdeveloped hinterland regions, both big metropolises and 
small cities. Finally, my fieldwork also covered NGOs with all the different legal 
status mentioned above: there are fully registered NGOs, second-level organisations 
"hanging under" registered NGOs, NGOs registered as businesses, as well as 
unregistered organisations.
Most organisations I studied are popular NGOs. As noted earlier, my original 
research design focused on social welfare NGOs. Although the Chinese NGO sector 
as a whole is dominated by officially-organized NGOs, the vast majority of them are 
either business and trade associations or science and technology associations (Pei 
1998; Wang, Zhe and Sun 1993; White 1994). There have been few 
officially-organized NGOs in the social welfare sphere.17 Consequently, most of the 
NGOs I found in the field were popular NGOs. Later, as my research question 
changed, I extended my fieldwork to more sectors. However, I decided that I would 
continue to devote more attention to popular NGOs, as I found that a relatively 
large quantity of secondary data and analyses already existed on 
officially-organized NGOs which I could utilize, but there had been very few
17 The reason is twofold. On the one hand, the three big mass organisations, the trade union, the 
women's federation, and the youth league, are already performing many social welfare 
functions. In addition, there are already specialised agencies such as the China Disabled Persons 
Federation and the National Commission on the Affairs of Elderly People that are responsible 
for looking after particular groups of vulnerable people, therefore the government perceives no 
need to set up many officially-organized NGOs in this field. On the other hand, state policy in 
the reform era has emphasized the necessity for society to share the responsibility for social 
welfare provision with the state (which is captured in the slogan "the socialization of social 
welfare"). The government has therefore sought to encourage private initiatives and mobilize 
non-governmental resources to complement its own effort. This means that it wishes to see 
popular rather than officially-organized NGOs being created in this sector.
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detailed studies of popular NGOs. This had resulted in considerable 
misunderstanding of the characteristics and modus operandi of these organisations. 
I felt that my research would make a bigger contribution to the knowledge of 
Chinese NGOs if it could help to fill the gap in data and analyses on popular NGOs.
As far as I know, my research differs from existing qualitative studies of Chinese 
NGOs in its extensive use of ethnographic methods, especially in relation to my 
seven core case studies. I worked in one NGO for two weeks, during which time I 
participated in all its daily activities as a full member of the organisation, even 
answering phones and receiving visitors on behalf of its director. Although I did not 
work for the other NGOs, I usually spent days "hanging around" on their premises, 
chatting with people, observing their activities, looking through documents, and 
examining pictures, work regulations, and memos on walls and notice boards. 
When I was studying an NGO, I usually spent a lot of time socializing with its 
members in the evenings and at weekends. I would go to their homes for dinner or 
eat in restaurants with them. To show their hospitality, my hosts often took me to 
local tourist attractions for sightseeing or to famous local markets for shopping. 
These informal after-work interactions often yielded information about the NGOs 
which would never have come out in formal interviews in the NGOs' offices. I was 
also able to ask probing questions that would have been too intrusive in a more 
formal setting. Many of the most informative interviews I had happened during 
these informal interactions in the form of chats and conversations. One such 
interview took place when I drove with an NGO director to an airport in another 
city to pick up her daughter. The journey lasted several hours, during which she 
went over the entire history of her organisation with me, telling it as a personal 
story rather than a formal account of events. Another interview, again very informal, 
took place one evening when my interviewee and I were both attending a 
conference away from home. After dinner, we went shopping together for three 
hours. Through our chat I was able to learn a lot of illuminating details about her
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organisation which she did not mention before when I interviewed her more 
formally.
The use of ethnographic methods also had another big advantage: It allowed me to 
obtain more genuine information and weed out more false information than 
researchers who did not employ such methods. My experience suggests that in a 
first interview many interviewees would deliberately withhold some important 
information or give some inaccurate information. For example, there is a strong 
tendency for NGO directors to complain about the lack of support from the 
government but not to mention how they might have gained access to various 
state-controlled resources by forging patron-client ties with state officials. NGO 
staffers often emphasize their altruistic motives while downplaying personal 
considerations that might have led them to work for NGOs. Clients sometimes 
hesitate to criticize the services of NGOs before a stranger whom they have just met. 
My research strategy, however, provided me with several lines of defence against 
information manipulation by interviewees. In particular, by having many follow-up 
interactions which were usually progressively less formal with my interviewees, I 
developed a friendship with many of them. As a result, some of them would confess 
to me that certain information they initially gave me was wrong. For example, when 
she first introduced her staff to me, one NGO manager greatly exaggerated their 
previous experience and qualifications. She also claimed that they left their previous 
jobs to join the NGO because they found its work more fulfilling. Later, she revealed 
to me that some of the staff were in fact laid-off workers who did not have any job 
when she hired them.
Once they became friendly with me, many interviewees also decided to share with 
me information which they had initially chosen to withhold. One director of a 
popular NGO always described the main problem facing her organisation as the 
constant interference in its affairs by a government agency that exercised oversight
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over its operation. One researcher who studied this NGO published a paper whose 
analysis was apparently heavily influenced by the director's complaints against the 
government agency. It portrayed the agency's role as entirely negative, seeking to 
control the NGO and hampering its effort at helping the clients. When I first met the 
director, I was given the same one-sided story about the NGO's relationship with 
the agency. However, after the director and I became friends, she told me another 
side to this story, namely there had been considerable benefits to the NGO in 
placing itself under the supervision of this particular agency. The NGO had been 
able to use the agency's resources to carry out its activities. In fact, at the beginning 
it was the director who invited the agency to play a supervisory role, precisely out 
of calculations of the potential gains to the NGO of having the agency on board. In 
short, the NGO and the agency had a mutually beneficial relationship, which was 
initiated by the NGO, even though the director preferred to present her 
organisation as a victim of government interference to outsiders.
During my fieldwork I was able to build good rapport with several NGO directors. 
They became very open with me and took me along to their meetings, both formal 
and informal, with government officials, donors, and other supporters, such as 
friends who advised them on PR matters. This gave me good opportunities to 
observe how NGO managers conducted their organisations' external relations. I 
also proactively created opportunities for myself to observe NGOs interacting with 
donors, potential clients, and each other. For example, taking advantage of my 
affiliation with Save the Children UK (SCUK), a British NGO with a big operation in 
China, I arranged for two NGO directors who had not met before to go on a study 
visit to a SCUK-funded project in central China. During the visit, I was able to 
observe the two directors sharing experience and networking with each other and 
with the local project they were visiting. In another instance, I referred some 
potential clients to two NGOs in the same city that provided similar services. I 
accompanied these potential clients on their visits to the two NGOs. This allowed
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me to see both how the NGOs presented themselves to potential clients and how 
potential clients assessed die organisations and their services.
One veteran NGO leader I met during my fieldwork, Meng Weina, was the main 
founder of two NGOs in Guangzhou and one in Beijing that provided services for 
disabled people. A keen networker, she had contact with many other NGOs all over 
the country. Luckily for me, she took a great interest in my research and sought to 
help me by introducing me to other NGOs she knew. In Guangzhou, she arranged 
for a senior manager of one of the NGOs she co-founded to take me to visit several 
other popular NGOs in the disability field. During these visits, the manager often 
exchanged information with our hosts about the latest development in their own 
organisations. They might also gossip about other NGOs. From their conversations I 
was able to gain information which I would not have heard otherwise. In Beijing, 
Meng Weina personally took me to visit several other NGOs. Once again, I often 
found her conversations with our hosts as informative as the visits themselves. 
Once Meng Weina and the director of another Beijing-based NGO decided to do a 
bit of networking by spending a whole day visiting three other NGOs. They invited 
me to join them. In each NGO we visited, listening to Meng Weina, the other 
director, and our host sharing experiences was like observing a small focus group of 
NGO directors. Its very different dynamics from one-to-one interviews produced 
some very different data from what I obtained in one-to-one interviews. Meng 
Weina also took me to many interesting events in different NGOs which she felt 
would be useful for me to observe, for example, a big ceremony to launch a new 
service, an inspection tour by a high-level government official, a fund-raising 
activity, and so forth. In addition, she constantly sent me documents which she 
thought were relevant to my research, such as her correspondence with government 
officials and other NGOs. Meng Weina's help greatly aided my research by giving 
me access to more organisations and a more diverse range of information than I 
originally envisaged.
23
In addition to the 40 NGOs covered by my own fieldwork, my analysis has also 
drawn on qualitative data on other NGOs that are generated by research and 
investigation conducted by others. In particular, I have referred to 15 case studies of 
Chinese NGOs commissioned by the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation in 
2001 and 21 case studies carried out by the NGO Research Centre at Tsinghua 
University in 2000 and 2001.1 have also been able to gain information on yet more 
NGOs through various activities I participated in while based in Beijing between 
1999 and 2000. For example, in November 1999, a team of consultants from a 
US-based NGO carried out a study of the capacity-building needs of Chinese NGOs. 
I interpreted for these consultants for one week while they interviewed several 
NGOs. In the thesis I have included information which I learned from those 
interviews as well.
To maintain confidentiality I have left out the names of most NGOs I studied. To 
ensure that no clue is left concerning the identity of the organisations under 
discussion, I only note the dates of my interviews without mentioning the locations. 
In some places, I also judge it prudent to omit the exact date, giving only the month 
and year when an interview took place.
Scope of the Research
My research is confined to organisations that are approved or at least tolerated by 
the state. Therefore, although it includes organisations that are not registered, as 
explained above, it excludes organisations that are specifically prohibited by the 
state, such as clan-based organisations, independent labour unions, or certain 
religious groups. Although such organisations do exist despite the state ban, usually 
by surviving underground, they operate in different ways from the organisations I 
studied. Their relations with the state and the rest of the society are also governed
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by different logic.
The vast majority of NGOs covered by my fieldwork are organisations that are 
active in the spheres of social welfare and social development. I did not interview 
organisations whose activities are primarily linked to the functioning of the market, 
such as trade and production associations, associations of entrepreneurs and 
merchants, or consumers' associations. Nor did I conduct fieldwork on 
organisations in such domains as arts, culture, or sports. However, throughout the 
thesis I have quoted secondary data on NGOs operating in these other arenas. My 
analysis is based on both these secondary data and the primary data generated by 
my own fieldwork. My conclusions apply to Chinese NGOs in general, not just 
those in the social welfare and social development fields.
Synopsis of the Thesis
Chapter 2 first reviews the existing literature on Chinese NGOs. I suggest that 
analytical frameworks that are based on the state-versus-society dichotomy, such as 
civil society and corporatism, are unable to capture the complexity of the relations 
between NGOs, their constituencies, and the state. A deep understanding of the 
nature and functions of Chinese NGOs requires that researchers disaggregate both 
"state" and "society" to take into account the diverse incentives and goals within 
them. I also question the adequacy of NGO management theories as analytical 
frameworks for the study of Chinese NGOs. Although data that are generated by 
the managerial approach to NGO studies are useful, I suggest that only political 
analysis is likely to lead to important findings about Chinese NGOs at this stage of 
their development.
Following the discussion of the works of other scholars, I introduce the key concepts 
and theoretical issues which I have explored in constructing my own analytical
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framework. I then outline this framework at the end of the chapter.
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the relationship between Chinese NGOs and the state (as 
composed of diverse entities and interests rather than as a monolith). I propose that 
there is a crucial distinction between NGO "autonomy" and "independence". Many 
Chinese NGOs can be characterized as heavily dependent on the state yet enjoying a 
remarkable degree of de facto autonomy. Chapter 3 addresses the issue of 
autonomy. It challenges the mainstream view that Chinese NGOs generally suffer 
from a lack of autonomy. It also disputes the conventional wisdom that relatively 
speaking popular NGOs are more autonomous than officially-organized NGOs. It 
shows that the central government has limited capacity for enforcing its NGO 
management policies. NGOs can cultivate bureaucratic patrons who shield them 
from control and supervision by civil affairs or other government departments, 
leaving them with substantial autonomy. Given their origin, officially-organized 
NGOs are often more likely to have powerful bureaucratic patrons than popular 
NGOs, therefore they may enjoy more rather than less de facto autonomy than 
popular NGOs. Both officially-organized and popular NGOs, however, are heavily 
dependent on the state, as Chapter 4 argues. Citing a large amount of empirical 
evidence, it demonstrates that not only do Chinese NGOs rely on the state for 
resources, information, and project implementation, but their legitimacy is also 
frequently derived from their links to the state.
The degree of operational autonomy a particular NGO enjoys and the amount of 
support it is able to draw from the state depends significantly on the skills of that 
NGO. The skills of Chinese NGOs are the subject of Chapter 5. In this chapter, I 
criticize current analyses of the capacity-building needs of Chinese NGOs for their 
insufficient attention to the particular political, institutional, and cultural context in 
which these organisations operate. While Chinese NGOs appear to lack many basic 
skills and capabilities as defined by standard NGO capacity-building programmes,
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they clearly possess the necessary skills that enable them to survive and develop in 
the specific environment of contemporary China. In this environment, there are 
often good reasons for "bad" or "irrational" management practices of NGOs. 
Therefore such practices should not be attributed to NGOs' lack of capacity.
While NGOs possessing the kind of skills described in Chapter 5 are able to carve 
out a niche for themselves in contemporary Chinese society, it is clear that some of 
these skills are also likely to result in their dysfunctionality in serving the interests 
of their clients or members. The dysfunctionality and limitations of Chinese NGOs 
are the focus of Chapter 6, which explores their causes. It highlights some key 
factors that negatively affect the performance of Chinese NGOs and constrain their 
benevolent actions. These include certain aspects of the state's NGO policy, the 
limited state capacity for curbing the improper and illegal activities of NGOs, 
NGOs' dependence on the state, problems with the motivations of NGO workers 
and the methods they use to achieve results, and certain features of China's political 
culture.
Chapter 7, the conclusion, reflects on change and continuity in state-society 
relations in post-reform China as revealed by this study of Chinese NGOs. I suggest 
that the most significant change and continuity can be summarized in the notion of 
dependent autonomy. On the one hand, the general dependence of NGOs on the 
state proves that although many important changes have taken place in 
state-society relations after two and a half decades of reforms, these have not 
amounted to revolutionary changes. On the other hand, the high degree of de facto 
autonomy many NGOs have enjoyed indicates that the state is no longer able to 
tightly control society. This is partly the consequence of the state losing control over 
its own agents. The extraordinary freedom enjoyed by some NGOs, especially in 
pursuing activities that are of dubious legality and do not necessarily serve public 
interest, would not have been possible without the protection and assistance of their
27
bureaucratic patrons and friends. The weak state capacity for imposing discipline 
on NGOs, however, may not augur well for the development of civil society in 
China. It may actually lead to an uncivil society where rules do not exist or are 
ignored, and organisations that are supposed to work for public interest may be 
used to serve illegitimate private interest instead.
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2. Research on Chinese NGOs: Comparing Different Analytical 
Frameworks
The first part of this chapter aims to provide a summary of the existing literature on 
Chinese NGOs. I discuss the English- and Chinese-language literatures in two 
separate sections, since the two literatures are distinct in many aspects. This reflects 
the fact that researchers inside and outside China have taken rather different 
approaches to the study of Chinese NGOs. The second part of the chapter 
introduces the concepts and theoretical issues that will inform my own analysis of 
Chinese NGOs in later chapters.
2.1 English-language Literature
Civil Society, Corporatism, and Institutional Analysis
Studies by foreign scholars, which tend to be theoretically more sophisticated than 
the works of Chinese researchers, often employ some basic models of state-society 
relations as their analytical framework. Most studies compare the explanatory 
power of the two leading paradigms of state-society relations in the China studies 
field, i.e. civil society and corporatism18, and conclude that corporatism more 
accurately describes the relationship between Chinese NGOs and the state, 
although they are usually cautious about dismissing the civil society model 
completely, allowing instead that elements of it are still useful for understanding
18 According to the classic definition of corporatism authored by Schmitter, it is "a system of 
interest representation in which the constituent parts are organized into a limited number of 
singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated 
categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain 
controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports. ” (Schmitter 1979: 
13). Political scientists often distinguish between two subtypes of corporatism: state corporatism 
and societal corporatism. The difference lies in the relative strength and autonomy of social 
organisations vis-a-vis the state. Under state corporatism, the power of the state is predominant.
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Chinese NGOs.19 They then identify the particular features of the corporatist 
arrangements in China which distinguish them from corporatism in other places, 
labelling the Chinese variants "state-socialist corporatism" (Shue 1994), "socialist 
corporatism" (Pearson 1997), "corporatism Chinese style" (Unger and Chan 1996), 
"local corporatism", "departmental corporatism" (White, Howell and Shang 1996), 
and so forth.
The rejection of civil society as a primary interpretative framework by most foreign 
researchers is mainly on three grounds. Firstly, it has been generally observed that 
Chinese NGOs only enjoy limited autonomy from the state, and many NGOs are in 
fact hybrid organisations in which state and society are interwoven. Hence they do 
not even meet the minimal definition of civil society, whose component 
organisations exist outside and independent of the state (Shue 1994; Nevitt 1996; 
Howell 1996a, 1998; White 1994; Whiting 1991; Unger and Chan 1996). Secondly, in 
contemporary usage the notion of civil society has been linked closely to political 
democratisation. Civil society organisations are often perceived as agents of 
democratisation. This does not seem to square with the discoveries of researchers on 
the ground, who find that Chinese NGOs often perform better as the state's 
instrument of control over societal groups than as mechanisms for expressing and 
pursuing the interests of the latter (Nevitt 1996; Pearson 1997; White 1994; Yep 2000; 
White, Howell and Shang 1996).20 Furthermore, apart from some underground 
organisations, Chinese NGOs "have neither an explicit nor an implicit democratic 
programme" (Howell 1998: 72). They "do not serve as forums for critical public 
discussion of political affairs" (Howell 1998: 71), and the internal culture of these 
organisations hardly embodies any democratic spirit either.
19 Even those who use the term "civil society" may actually have corporatism in mind. For 
example, Frolic designates Chinese NGOs "state-led civil society", then goes on to explain that 
"State-led civil society is a form of corporatism." (Frolic 1997: 58)
20 Even researchers who argue that Chinese NGOs increasingly perform social representation 
functions point out that this does not mean they already constitute a civil society (see, e.g., 
Zhang 1997).
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Finally, the civil society framework is considered inadequate because of the way it 
narrows our thinking. The notion implies a clear-cut distinction between the state 
and society, which may cause researchers to overlook the frequent blurring of the 
boundary between them in contemporary China (Perry 1995; Yep 2000). In addition, 
the impetus behind the formation of NGOs in China has come from both state and 
society, but the civil society notion tends to direct our attention solely to the impetus 
from society. "An analysis which privileges civil society over the state leads to only 
partial explanations", writes Howell, "as attention becomes focussed on the 
autonomous, voluntary and spontaneous characteristics of these organisations at 
the expense of their relationship with the state. It implicitly assumes an oppositional 
and conflictual relation with the state, neglecting the cooperative dimensions." 
(1994:107)
All these seem to suggest that corporatism is a more adequate tool for analysing 
Chinese NGOs. As Baum and Shevchenko aptly summarise: "The principal 
attraction of corporatist models is their ability simultaneously to acknowledge the 
pluralizing socioeconomic changes induced by market reforms and the continued 
dominance of the Leninist party-state." (1999: 348) Viewing Chinese NGOs through 
the corporatist lens is precisely what many researchers have done. In her study of 
business associations in China, for example, Pearson proposes that we see these 
organisations in the light of "socialist corporatism". She defines it as a variant of 
state corporatism that reflects the specific features of a reforming socialist regime, in 
particular, the devolution of some power from an over-extended state bureaucracy 
to extra-state bodies created by the government itself, such as the new business 
associations that have emerged in the reform era.
A similar view was expressed by Unger and Chan, to whom the large number of 
new associations formed in the 1980's indicate that the Chinese state has
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implemented a "corporatism Chinese style" (1996: 104) to replace the old 
"Leninist-command" system. They describe this Chinese corporatism thus: "China 
in this sense approaches state corporatism from the opposite direction as the East 
Asian NICs: not as a mechanism for yet further strengthening the state's grip over 
the economy and over society, but rather the reverse, a mechanism through which 
the state's grip could be loosened" (1996:105).
In their detailed study of associations in China, White, Howell and Shang also made 
extensive use of the concept of corporatism. Their research on local associations in 
two cities led them to coin the phrases "local corporatism" and "departmental 
corporatism". The former, a form of "meso-corporatism", refers to the relationship 
between local government as a whole and local associations under its jurisdiction. 
The latter, a form of "micro-corporatism", highlights the motivations behind the 
establishment or sponsorship of subordinate associations by individual government 
departments. The former is initiated by local states to promote the social-economic 
development of their localities, while the latter serves to advance the particular 
institutional interests of individual departments.
Like the civil society model, the corporatist interpretation has also faced challenges. 
It should be noted that even analysts who embraced corporatist models have often 
felt it necessary to offer a few caveats. For example, Pearson (1997) acknowledges 
that the development of corporatism in China cannot be said to be the result of an 
explicit or even conscious state doctrine. White, Howell and Shang equally dismiss 
the existence of any "systematic and clear-minded attempt" at establishing 
corporatism, seeing instead a more "incremental, disjointed, implicit and 
haphazard" process at work (1996: 212). They also point out that the associations 
they came across in their research exhibit a diversity of relationships with the state, 
with some organisations being more autonomous and voluntary than others, so 
they are best described as forming an organisational continuum stretching from a
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state-dominated extreme to a civil society extreme. Like White, Howell and Shang, 
Shue (1994) also writes about a " state-corporatist continuum" of civil associations in 
China. Similarly, Pearson's comparison of three business associations shows that 
"socialist corporatism does not exist uniformly in all business sectors", with some 
associations enjoying more autonomy than others, although she still thinks that 
"there are sufficiently similar characteristics to consider them all part of a new 
socialist corporatist strategy." (1997:134-135)
The challenges to the corporatist interpretation, however, go beyond these caveats. 
Yep (2000) studied the same business associations on which the exponents of the 
corporatism model have largely based their analysis, but he believes that the 
usefulness of the model is rather limited. As Yep points out, corporatism is 
essentially a system of interest representation that involves political exchange 
between the state and organised social interests. For corporatism to work, there 
must be effective mechanisms for aggregating and communicating social interests. 
In addition, the specific social group that enters into corporatist exchange with the 
state also needs to have a strong internal cohesion. On both counts Yep finds that 
business associations in China fall short of the corporatist definition. First, they are 
too dominated by the state to be able to play effective interest aggregation and 
communication roles. Second, instead of promoting horizontal integration within 
the business sector, these organisations actually hinder such integration, as business 
managers are disaggregated into different associations according to types of 
ownership (e.g., privately-owned, collectively-owned, etc.) and the scale of their 
enterprises. In short, to Yep "there may be forms of corporatism emerging in China, 
but not in essence." (2000: 548)
Even Howell, who once offered corporatist analyses of associations in China in the 
book she co-authored with White and Shang, seems to have moved some distance 
away from that position. In a later article she has inclined to a view similar to Yep's:
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In the Chinese case, ... there is little evidence of involvement of the new social 
organisations in central government policy. This suggests first that in the 
post-Tiananmen period the balance of power between social organisations and the 
state is in favour of the latter; secondly, that control and coercion constitute the 
leitmotiv of the state, but by no means the only factor, in its relationship with these 
new social organisations; and thirdly, that the power of these new organisations is 
not yet sufficient to be drawn into the policy arena. Thus it would be more accurate 
to describe the relationship between the party/state and the new intermediary 
sphere as one of incorporation rather than corporatism per se." (1998: 63)
The strongest objection to the corporatist analysis on the ground that it obscures 
state dominance over social organisations has come from Foster, whose 
investigation of business associations in the coastal city of Yantai leads to the 
conclusion that these entities are "in essence appendages of government or Party 
organisations" (2002: 42). The closeness and, in many cases, overlapping, of the 
business associations and their sponsoring government agencies in terms of 
personnel, office space, daily operations, and functions suggest that the associations 
can be more fruitfully studied "as new elements of the state's administrative system 
than as participants in a state-society dialogue." (2002:42)
The corporatist analysis of Chinese NGOs has also been criticised from the opposite 
direction. While disagreeing with the civil society model, Saich (2000) also faults 
corporatist interpretations for over-estimating the capacity of the state to enforce its 
will upon NGOs while under-estimating the ability of NGOs to circumvent or 
deflect state intrusion. Saich stresses that NGOs in China are able to negotiate their 
own niches with the state, and they often "subordinate" themselves to the state of 
their own volition, as this allows them to have more impact on policy-making and 
to pursue their members' interests and organisational goals more effectively than if 
they have remained completely autonomous.
Whether they subscribe to the corporatist analysis, or lean towards further
34
state-dominance interpretations, or see instead more room for NGOs to "negotiate 
with the state" (Saich 2000) than is allowed by the corporatist notion, the above 
summary of some major existing studies by foreign scholars shows that the 
popularity of the state-versus-society approach—what Perry (1994) has termed the 
"state-society paradigm"—has by no means declined among China scholars. The 
state-society dichotomy constitutes the basic framework for most of the 
above-mentioned analyses of Chinese NGOs, even though many analysts 
acknowledge that the boundaries between state and society are often blurred. They 
are preoccupied with assessing the degree of autonomy from the state that is 
enjoyed by these NGOs,21 even while acknowledging that Chinese NGOs are mostly 
mixtures of state and society. In their eagerness to identify some general patterns of 
state-society interaction that can accommodate the variations in the relationship 
between NGOs and the state revealed in their empirical data, many analysts have 
also failed to explore these variations further to see what interesting discoveries and 
insights they might lead to.
That is why the few exceptions to this general thrust of current international 
scholarship on Chinese NGOs are particularly worth mentioning. Perry (1994) has 
suggested that a deeper understanding of Chinese politics require that researchers 
move beyond the state-society dichotomy by disaggregating the crude and 
unwieldy categories of "state" and "society". The following three studies are good 
examples of such an approach.
In his article on private business associations in Tianjin, Nevitt argues that the 
state-society paradigm is less useful than "an institutional focus" for understanding 
these associations, by which he means "a focus on the changing incentives and
21 With the exception of Foster, who takes the "extreme" view that the business associations he 
has studied are so deeply embedded within state agencies that they should be considered part of 
the organisational complex of the state, therefore the question of their degree of autonomy is no 
longer relevant.
35
behaviour within the institutions of the party-state" (1996: 41). Nevitt compares two 
associations of private businesses in one city. One of them, the Self-Employed 
Labourers' Association (SELA), is comprised exclusively of small-scale private 
entrepreneurs. The other one, the Industrial and Commercial Federation (ICF), 
serves larger private enterprises as well as joint ventures, township enterprises, etc., 
although private enterprises form the largest single category of its members. Several 
factors suggest that the SELA might more actively represent the interests of private 
business vis-a-vis the state than the ICF. To begin with, the SELA collects 
membership fees whereas the ICF does not. Its entire budget comes from the 
municipal Communist Party. Secondly, the SELA's professional management unit 
(see Chapter 1) is a government agency, the Industry and Commerce Bureau, 
whereas the ICF is directly supervised by the local branch of the Party. Finally, the 
membership of the SELA consists entirely of private entrepreneurs, whereas the 
ICF's membership is mixed.
Instead, Nevitt found that the ICF was far more active in pursuing both the 
collective and individual interests of its private entrepreneur members than the 
SELA. In fact, although both organisations had a dual role, i.e. to perform control 
functions on behalf of the state and advocacy functions on behalf of their members, 
neither seemed to have balanced its two duties well. The SELA was too 
control-oriented and largely neglected its advocacy functions whilst the reverse was 
true of the ICF. Not only did the SELA and the ICF display very different behaviour 
despite having similar missions, but the practice of their district22 chapters also 
diverged from that of the municipal-level organisations. The municipal SELA and 
ICF seemed to have balanced their dual roles better than their district chapters, 
which means that relatively speaking the municipal SELA took its advocacy 
functions more seriously than its district chapters, while the municipal ICF was
22 In China, large cities are divided into districts. District governments are similar in structure to 
municipal governments. Functional government agencies at the municipal level all have 
branches at the district level.
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more restrained in pursuing its members' interests than its district chapters.
What accounts for these differences? Nevitt suggests that the explanation lies in the 
different incentives guiding the careers of party-state officials who controlled the 
SELA and the ICF at different levels. He distinguishes between two career strategies 
for these officials. The "ladder of advancement" strategy means that officials seek 
career advancement by trying to please their superiors, and this would entail 
carrying out faithfully the tasks assigned to them by the authorities immediately 
above them. Officials who pursue the "big fish in a small pond" strategy, on the 
other hand, choose to tie their fortunes to their local institutions and concentrate 
their energy on "developing their own local networks of power and support" (1996: 
38). Prior to the reforms, the "big-fish" strategy did not make much sense, since 
under the command economy "virtually all resources were allocated from higher 
levels and virtually all income was remitted to higher levels" (1996: 38). In other 
words, there was little water in the small pond to sustain big fish. After market 
reform and economic decentralisation, however, the "big-fish" strategy has become 
a credible alternative to the traditional "ladder of advancement" strategy.
This explains the difference between the behaviour of the SELA and the ICF as well 
as between the municipal organisations and their district chapters, argues Nevitt. 
Municipal level officials in Tianjin have a much bigger chance of advancing up the 
bureaucratic ladder than district officials, given Tianjin's prominence and proximity 
to Beijing. Consequently, officials who control the municipal SELA and ICF tend to 
execute their duties more conscientiously, which is why the municipal 
organisations have achieved a better balance of the control and advocacy functions. 
In contrast, officials at the district level are more likely to be attracted to the 
"big-fish" strategy. To develop their local economy and increase local resources, 
these officials can be expected to attach more importance to the large private 
enterprises that are members of the ICF than to the peddlers, small retailers and
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restaurateurs who make up the ranks of the SELA. No wonder, then, that district 
ICF chapters went as far as helping their members to manipulate city-level policies 
in order to pay less tax and enjoy preferential rates for services, while district SELA 
chapters hardly bothered to look after the interests of the petty private 
entrepreneurs in their charge. For similar reasons, the municipal ICF was also more 
interested in advocacy for its members than the municipal SELA, although as 
mentioned before, at this level both organisations were more careful about 
balancing their dual roles than their district chapters.
A comparative study of private business associations has also been conducted in 
Beijing by Unger (1996). Although Unger did not conceptualise his study in terms of 
an "institutional focus", his actual approach was very similar to Nevitt's, and he 
discovered exactly the same phenomena as observed by Nevitt. The three private 
business associations in Beijing included in his investigation, the SELA for small 
private business operators, the Private Enterprises Association (PEA) for 
medium-sized businesses, and the ICF for the largest entrepreneurs, displayed 
starkly different attitudes towards their constituencies. The SELA and the PEA were 
completely dominated by their supervising government agency and failed to 
represent the interests of their assigned private entrepreneur groups. The ICF stood 
at the opposite pole and served the interests of its members "beyond the goals of the 
state" (1996: 813). Unger identified as many as seven factors which might have 
contributed to the difference between the SELA and the PEA on the one hand and 
the ICF on the other hand, and he hypothesised that these factors would also 
condition the behaviour of other associations in other parts of China. The factors 
range from the central government policy towards the particular social group an 
association is supposed to represent, the nature of an association's supervisory 
agency, i.e., whether or not it has direct regulatory responsibilities over the 
constituency of the association, to the particularistic interests of the local officialdom 
and the social status of an association's constituency.
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If the explicit and implicit institutional focus of Nevitt and Unger are illuminating 
because they take us beyond what the state-society paradigm allows us to see by 
disaggregating the "state", then equally illuminating is Wank's (1995a) 
"institutional explanation"23 of the different attitudes of entrepreneurs in Xiamen 
City towards one particular private business association, which transcends the 
state-society paradigm by disaggregating "society".24 When the Xiamen Civic 
Association of Private Industry and Commerce was suppressed due to 
intra-bureaucratic conflict, Wank found that neither the small shop owners nor the 
entrepreneurs of the largest trading firms among its members showed much 
concern. Those most upset by the suppression of the Civic Association were the 
owners of medium-sized firms that were beginning to expand from retail into 
wholesale trade. As Wank explains, the variation in entrepreneurial attitude 
towards the Civic Association is related to the different strategies pursued by these 
entrepreneurs with regard to the state bureaucracy. In China's partially marketised 
economy, bureaucrats still have considerable control over the allocation of public 
resources, including resources in short supply, such as bank loans and under-priced 
public assets. They also hold much regulatory power, which gives them 
discretionary control over fines, licences, fees and taxes.
In this context, private entrepreneurs have been observed to pursue one of two 
business strategies with regard to the bureaucracy. They may see the bureaucracy as 
an obstacle and try to keep contact with it to a minimum. This strategy is 
widespread among the petty entrepreneurs, who "perceive the demands by officials 
for cash pay-offs regarding taxes, fines and licences as arbitrary and predatory. By
23 "An institutional explanation emphasizes how organisational constraints shape social action. 
The interests of actors have to be explained rather than assumed." (Wank 1995a: 67, footnote 29)
24 In fact, Wank disaggregated both the state and the society in his analysis of the association. He 
described the fight between two state organisations for the control of the association as well as 
the different attitudes towards the association among the city's private entrepreneurs. Here I am 
primarily interested in relating the society side of the story.
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lessening interaction with officials, they seek to reduce bureaucratic interference in 
their enterprises" (Wank 1995a: 67). The other strategy sees the bureaucracy as a 
source of opportunity and seeks to increase contacts with it. This strategy is pursued 
by entrepreneurs running big firms, who form patron-client ties with the 
officialdom in order to gain "access to scarce commodities and restricted 
opportunities as well as to bureaucratic protection from policy fluctuations, central 
state campaigns, and harassment by local officials" (Wank 1995a: 68). Since petty 
private entrepreneurs in Xiamen mostly pursued the first strategy, their indifference 
to the demise of the Civic Association is not very surprising. The biggest private 
operators had already developed good connections with the officialdom, so they 
did not need the Civic Association either. It was the owners of firms that were 
expanding from retail into wholesale trade who were most keen about the Civic 
Association. They did not enjoy bureaucratic patronage yet but it would become 
crucial to their future business success. The Civic Association provided some 
bureaucratic protection for them and the opportunity to develop contacts with 
officials. They were therefore the most disappointed when the Civic Association 
ceased operation.
As the studies by Nevitt, Unger and Wank demonstrate, institutional analyses that 
disaggregate the "state" and "society" promise us a more nuanced view of Chinese 
NGOs than the state-society binary thinking. If we were to achieve a more accurate 
and detailed understanding of Chinese NGOs, then researchers would need to pay 
closer attention to the diverse interests of the different actors within "state" and 
"society", and to explore more thoroughly the incentives, opportunities, and 
constraints that shape their behaviour.
Classification of Chinese NGOs: Degrees of Autonomy from the State
The articles by Nevitt and Unger also help to demonstrate the inadequacy of
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another dominant habit of thinking in the field of Chinese NGO studies. If there is a 
single issue that has interested most foreign scholars of Chinese NGOs, then it is the 
degree of autonomy from the state maintained by these organisations. This interest 
is manifested by their predilection for classifying Chinese NGOs according to this 
criterion. For instance, Whiting (1991) divided Chinese NGOs into 
quasi-governmental, semi-govemmental, and truly non-governmental. White, 
Howell and Shang (1996) categorised them into four sectors: "the caged sector", i.e. 
the mass organisations; "the incorporated sector", i.e. the registered NGOs; "the 
interstitial, 'limbo7 world of civil society", i.e. unregistered NGOs which have been 
allowed to operate in the open; and "the suppressed sector", i.e. underground 
organisations. Howell (1997) identified four broad types of NGOs based on the 
criteria of autonomy, spontaneity and voluntariness: mass organisations, 
semi-official organisations, popular organisations, and illegal organisations.
Researchers who focused on NGOs in a specific field have equally considered an 
organisation's relative autonomy from the state as the most important attribute in 
classifying these organisations. For example, Chen, who studied qigong25 
associations, saw them as forming four main categories: "official bodies", 
"legitimate and public groups", "popular, informal groups", and "underground 
associations" (Chen 1995: 354). Knup (n.d.), who examined environmental NGOs in 
China, produced three categories with varying degrees of autonomy from the state: 
government-organised NGOs, individual-organised NGOs, and voluntary 
organisations.
As mentioned earlier, in their eagerness to describe broad patterns, some 
researchers have neglected to explore the variations in the relationships between 
Chinese NGOs, their constituencies, and the state. The classification of Chinese 
NGOs according to their degree of autonomy from the state appears to be an
25 Chinese traditional breathing and meditation exercises.
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attempt to address such variations. It suggests that researchers often consider an 
organisation's relative autonomy to be a vital clue to its behaviour and function. 
However, the business organisations in the studies by Nevitt and Unger all belong 
to the broad category of government organised NGOs, but they display vast 
differences in the way they go about their business. This suggests that where an 
NGO stands on the autonomy scale may be of limited value in either predicting or 
explaining its behaviour. An even bigger problem with the autonomy-based 
classification of Chinese NGOs is that researchers have equated the extent of an 
organisation's official links with its degree of autonomy, but these two aspects do 
not always go hand in hand. To use the organisations in the studies of Nevitt and 
Unger again, the ICF is actually a mass organisation, i.e. the least autonomous 
category in the various classifications cited above, whereas the other business 
organisations are all in the next category which is supposed to have more autonomy. 
As we know, the empirical data showed that the ICF in fact acted with more 
autonomy than the other organisations. In later chapters, more examples like this 
will be presented to demonstrate that the actual degree of autonomy which a 
particular NGO maintains is often not as obvious as its formal connections to the 
government might suggest. In practice, an officially-organised organisation may 
well enjoy more de facto autonomy than a purely popular organisation. Therefore, to 
classify Chinese NGOs into "quasi-governmental", "semi-governmental", and 
"truly non-governmental" or similar categories may sometimes create a false sense 
of distinction between NGOs with different official links and may actually mask 
some universal features in their interactions with the state and their constituencies.
Policy Research
The majority of the published works by foreign scholars on Chinese NGOs should 
probably be classified as academic research, as they address more or less theoretical 
issues. In addition to this type of writing, there have also been a small number of
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studies which might be called policy research. These are mainly reports prepared 
for various foreign and international institutions with a practical interest in the 
development of the NGO sector in China. They usually contain concrete 
information on the legal and financial frameworks for NGOs in China and 
government policies relevant to the sector. They also make assessments of the needs 
of Chinese NGOs in areas such as funding, management training, and information.
While these reports often contain perceptive and thought-provoking comments on 
both external and internal problems faced by Chinese NGOs, they are not able to go 
into much detail as they are typically based on information gathered during short 
study visits or meetings and interviews with NGOs lasting no more than a few 
hours. As the authors rely heavily on interviews with NGO staff and are not able to 
verify the information provided by them through close observation of the 
day-to-day operations of these organisations and their interactions with external 
actors such as government agencies, clients, and local communities,26 their 
conclusions run the risk of being biased towards the claims and self-assessments of 
NGO staff 27 Finally, many authors of such reports are foreigners whose expertise 
lies in NGO management or broad development issues rather than China studies. 
As a result, their analyses tend to be influenced by their knowledge and conception 
of NGOs in other countries, which may actually be a liability given that the context 
is so different.
A good example of the failure of these reports to fully appreciate "NGOs with
26 Most authors of such reports are foreigners, so in addition to time constraints, there are also 
other factors affecting their ability to check the interview data through first-hand observation, 
such as various language and cultural barriers. The need for long and close observation is 
acknowledged by the author of a report for the Ford Foundation. At the end of her report, Raab 
recommended that to test some of the conjectures put forward in her study it would be advisable 
to do participant observation by placing a researcher as an intern with Chinese NGOs for several 
months (Raab 1997: 55, footnote 131).
27 Such limitations are not confined to policy research. It seems that the academic research 
discussed earlier has also been affected by these constraints. I have not seen any published work 
by foreign scholars that is based on the kind of extensive participant observation recommended 
by Raab.
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Chinese characteristics" is the way they see the currently illiberal legal framework 
for NGOs in China solely in political terms. The various restrictions on the 
formation of NGOs are perceived to be born entirely of the state's fear of potential 
political challenge to its monopoly of power and are therefore strongly criticised. 
No report seems to understand that the fear of potential economic problems has 
also been an important consideration in the government's decision to maintain tight 
control over NGOs. In fact, over the years a considerable number of NGOs, 
especially GONGOs set up by local government agencies, have been embroiled in 
economic activities which are not strictly speaking legal. Some of these 
organisations are nothing more than secret moneymaking devices. Financial 
irregularities and other forms of corruption have been a serious problem with many 
Chinese NGOs, and it is partly responsible for the government's strict regulation of 
the sector, a fact which few studies by foreign researchers seem to realise.28 One 
explanation for this lack of awareness must be that this kind of information is most 
unlikely to come up in interviews with NGOs themselves.29
2.2 Chinese-language Literature
Under-utilised Information
The Chinese literature on NGOs is more diverse than the English literature. A 
sizeable share of this literature consists of non-academic writings, such as 
presentations at various conferences and workshops by NGO practitioners, and 
published speeches and short articles by Civil Affairs officials responsible for NGO 
registration. Although these materials offer little theoretical analysis, they often
28 In fact, I have not come across any study by foreign researchers, whether it belongs to the 
category of policy research or academic research, which recognises that a substantial number of 
Chinese NGOs have been guilty of various corrupt activities.
29 Such information is also unlikely to come up in interviews with government officials, who 
often refrain from exposing corruption cases for fear that they would undermine the attempt of 
GONGOs to raise money from the general public and potential foreign donors.
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contain important factual information which one suspects has not been accessed by 
most foreign researchers, for some of the theoretical debates recounted in the 
previous section may not have arisen in the first place if these facts had been taken 
note of.30
For example, in a collection of articles by Civil Affairs officials and staffers of 
officially-organised NGOs published in 1992, many contributors cite the 
"bureaucratisation" (xingzhenghua) of social organisations as one of the main 
problems that need to be addressed. As they explain, this means that many social 
organisations are dependent on and directly controlled by state administrative 
agencies and act as their auxiliary bodies. They are initiated by these administrative 
agencies. Their staffs are seconded from the agencies. Their leadership positions are 
held concurrently by officials of the agencies. Their operating funds come from the 
agencies. Finally, which activities they should undertake is also dictated by the 
agencies. The secretariats of these NGOs, which are staffed by personnel from the 
administrative agencies, actually rim the show. Their actions neither reflect the 
wishes of their members nor represent their interests. In other words, these 
organisations are just membership organisations in name and only their secretariats 
have any substance to them, so their function and behaviour are not much different 
from government organisations. In extreme cases, administrative agencies have set 
up social organisations, which are by definition membership organisations, without 
even bothering to recruit any members. In other words, these social organisations 
only have secretariats. Their membership is non-existent. Administrative agencies 
created these organisations by simply putting up another signboard on their doors 
to proclaim its existence, and they become both the government agency and the 
secretariat of the memberless social organisation (Shen 1992; Leng 1992; Zhao 1992). 
This phenomenon is known as "one team, two signboards" (yi tao renma, Hang kuai
30 To be fair to foreign researchers, these materials are scattered around and are not always easy 
to find.
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paizi).
The information from this collection of articles by people with intimate knowledge 
of Chinese social organisations fully corroborates Foster's argument introduced in 
the previous chapter that many business associations in China are simply 
organisational appendages of state agencies. Although these organisations are 
presented as NGOs, to treat them as such would only cause confusion. Foster 
suggests that the government agency in China should not be considered a single 
organisation but a complex of multiple organisations. Administrative agencies often 
preside over a set of subsidiary organisations including enterprises, service units, 
and social organisations which are all part of the agency's organisational complex. 
Judging by the descriptions of Chinese Civil Affairs officials and social organisation 
representatives themselves, to treat the most official (or "bureaucratized") social 
organisations as part of the government's organisational complex indeed makes 
more sense than studying them as NGOs. If foreign scholars who advocated the 
corporatism model had studied the Chinese materials on the bureaucratization of 
NGOs, they might have at least decided to banish the most official social 
organisations from the NGO territory, as Foster did, and would have consequently 
made their corporatist interpretations more convincing by applying them only to 
the more substantive NGOs. Since this did not happen, debates inevitably broke out 
as people like Yep and Foster questioned the validity of corporatist interpretations 
by pointing to the evident embeddedness of many social organisations within 
government agencies.
Beyond Associations
As can be seen from the summary of the English-language literature, most of it is 
based on the study of one particular type of NGO, namely associations, especially 
business and trade associations. Very few foreign scholars have studied other types
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of NGOs, such as social service organisations, foundations, and membership 
organisations other than economic associations. In this regard the Chinese literature 
is also more diversified. In the last several years, a few large-scale research projects 
have produced a number of publications on these other types of NGOs. Particularly 
interesting is a series of 10 books sponsored by the China Youth Development 
Foundation (CYDF) and published in 1999. The CYDF is a famous top-down NGO 
under the aegis of the Communist Youth League. The series, entitled "third sector 
studies", includes four books that are devoted to the CYDF itself. They all use the 
CYDF as a case study of Chinese NGOs and each of them focuses on a particular 
aspect of the CYDF, for example, its fundraising strategies, or the motivation of its 
staff. Together with a comprehensive book-length study of the CYDF published in 
1997, these volumes provide a wealth of information about this highly successful 
organisation which offers the reader considerable insight into the unique 
environment in which Chinese NGOs operate and the way they adapt to and exploit 
that environment.
Another major research project in recent years resulted in the publication of two 
volumes in 2000 and 2001 respectively by the Tsinghua University NGO Research 
Centre which contain 21 case studies of a variety of Chinese NGOs. Although these 
case studies are less detailed than the books on the CYDF and are not as analytical, 
they are the first systematically collected qualitative data on Chinese NGOs in 
which all the major types are represented. Following the Tsinghua research, the 
China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA) also commissioned some similar 
case studies which were published in one volume in late 2001. There is 
unfortunately much overlap between the Tsinghua and the CFPA cases, but the 
CFPA study does include several NGOs which are not in the Tsinghua study, 
therefore it has further expanded the existing qualitative database.
In addition to these qualitative research projects, the Tsinghua NGO centre has also
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conducted a nation-wide survey of NGOs as well as a survey of NGOs in Beijing. 
Although the quality of the surveys was marred by various factors, for example, the 
extremely low response rates,31 they have at least generated the first quantitative 
data set on Chinese NGOs.
The "Post Totalist Society" and the "Dual Nature of Chinese NGOs"
Unlike their foreign colleagues, Chinese scholars seem to have little disagreement 
amongst themselves concerning the characteristics of Chinese NGOs. Neither civil 
society nor corporatist theories hold much attraction for them. They consider both 
paradigms unsuitable for analysing the Chinese realities, as they fail to give proper 
recognition to the vast power retained by the state over society (see, e.g., Shen and 
Sim 1999; Kang 1999a). Some scholars also accuse them of being "abstract" and 
"macro" theories which are not very practical when it comes to describing the actual 
behaviour of Chinese NGOs or interpreting complex empirical data (Kang 2001: 2). 
As natives of the society they study, Chinese scholars obviously have an advantage 
over their foreign colleagues in understanding the environment in which Chinese 
NGOs operate and in observing their actual behaviour. As a result, their major 
theoretical contribution to this field of study is probably a more specific description 
of the condition of the state and society in China after 20 years of reform and of the 
particular characteristics of Chinese NGOs brought about by that condition.
In their book on the fundraising strategies of the CYDF, Sun etal use the term "post 
totalist society" to describe the environment in which the CYDF operates. As they 
explain, before the reforms, Chinese society could be called a "totalist" society, 
which was characterised by the state's monopoly of most resources as well as most 
of the space for economic and social activities. By the time the CYDF was founded in
31 The response rates for the two surveys were 15.64% and 13.7% respectively (Deng 2001a: 10; 
Deng 2000: 26).
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1989, a decade of market-oriented reforms had put the Chinese society well on the 
path towards a post totalist society, which is characterised by the emergence of 
"free-floating resources" and "free operating space", i.e. important resources which 
are no longer controlled by the state and opportunities for people to use the 
resources now in their hands. On the other hand, the state still holds considerable 
sway over the economic and social realms in a post totalist society. Political and 
administrative authority can still penetrate all other spheres and exert heavy 
influence on the workings of the market, although compared to the totalist society 
such authority is more likely to be exercised in irregular and informal ways. In short, 
the post totalist society is a transitional stage between a totalist society and a society 
with a fully developed market economy (Sim et al 1999).
The emergence of a post totalist society not only creates the possibility for NGOs to 
develop, but also determines the pattern of their behaviour. The study of Sun et al 
shows that the huge fundraising success of the CYDF can be attributed to its skill in 
exploiting both resources within the state and those outside the state, or, to use the 
expressions of Chinese scholars, both "resources within the system" (tizhi nei ziyuan), 
and "resources outside the system" (tizhi wai ziyuan). As Sun et al point out, given 
the continued pre-eminence of political and administrative power, if an 
organisation like the CYDF separates itself from the "system" and fails to use its 
"political advantage" as a top-down NGO with strong ties to the system, it would 
find it very difficult, if not entirely impossible, to mobilise social resources on any 
significant scale. On the other hand, if the CYDF has relied solely on its ties to the 
system, it would not have achieved its tremendous success either. There are two 
reasons for this. First, the state's dominance over society has after all been weakened 
in a post totalist society, therefore, if NGOs want to tap into societal resources 
outside state control they would need to do so on their own. Second, the CYDF is 
sponsored by the Communist Youth League. Although it can easily use the 
resources controlled by the Youth League, to gain access to resources belonging to
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other state organisations would be a very different matter. To do so also requires 
that the CYDF apply its own initiative.
Therefore, the lesson from the CYDF case study is that any NGO that wishes to 
survive and do well in today's China must be able to utilise resources both inside 
and outside the state. This has inevitably contributed to the "dual nature" 
(shuangchongxing) of Chinese NGOs, a judgement widely shared by Chinese 
scholars. The "dual nature of Chinese NGOs" was first raised by Wang, Zhe and 
Sun after they studied social organisations in Xiaoshan city in the early 1990's. More 
specifically, they suggested that Chinese social organisations can be described as 
"semi-official, semi-popular" (ban guan ban min) in nature.32 This is reflected in 
every aspect of these organisations' existence. For example, motivations for the 
establishment of social organisations come from both the government and society; 
they perform both management functions on behalf of the state and service 
functions on behalf of their members; and their leadership positions are shared 
between government officials and representatives selected from their membership 
(Wang, Zhe, and Sun 1993).
The studies of the CYDF have demonstrated more vividly the dual nature of 
Chinese NGOs. In his book, Kang distinguishes between two modes of operation 
which the CYDF employs simultaneously: administrative (xingzhenghua) and 
"socialised" (shehuihua). The former means drawing on the state's extensive 
organisational network and administrative authority to do things. The latter means 
reaching out to society directly instead of enlisting the aid of the state apparatus. 
Take fundraising as an example, when branches of the Communist Youth League in 
work units all over the country collect money from their members, then give it to
32 Wang, Zhe and Sun actually identified three types of social organisations: officially-organised, 
semi- officially-organised, and popular, but they found the majority of the organisations to be 
semi- officially-organised, so the sector as a whole could be described as semi-official 
semi-popular in nature.
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the CYDF as collective donations in the name of the work units, it is typical 
administrative means at work. Socialised fundraising, on the other hand, relies on 
methods such as charity concerts, newspaper and television advertising, and direct 
mailing. Kang (1997) points out that under present circumstances combining 
administrative and socialised modes of operation is the most sensible strategy for 
Chinese NGOs. His argument was echoed by Sun et al, whose entire book was 
dedicated to illustrating the adept combination of administrative and socialised 
mobilisation techniques by the CYDF.33 Since socialised methods were still novelties 
in China when first introduced by the CYDF, they made the CYDF wildly successful 
in drawing popular support to its cause.
Strategies, M otivation, Organisation, and Leaders
Apart from a few policy research papers, the English-language literature on Chinese 
NGOs is predominantly a political science literature, for it is mainly concerned with 
broad issues such as state-society relations and the political and social consequences 
of market reforms. In contrast, much of the Chinese literature, especially the various 
case studies of individual organisations, is more in the tradition of NGO studies. It 
examines NGOs' internal management, their performance, and their external 
relations. The Chinese literature is therefore a useful source of concrete information 
on some specific issues concerning Chinese NGOs, for example, who are the NGO 
leaders, how are NGOs set up, the motivations of NGO staff, and the governance 
structures of NGOs. The most interesting materials in this literature, however, have 
to do with the strategies used by NGOs to exploit the institutional environment of a 
post totalist society in order to gain advantage for themselves, such as the 
fundraising strategies of the CYDF discussed by Kang and Sim et al. The materials 
on NGO strategies have shown that far from being helpless victims of state stricture,
33 Sun et al contrast socialised with what they call "organisation-based" (zuzhihua) method, but it 
is obvious from reading the book that by "organisation-based mode" they mean exactly the same 
thing as what Kang has called "administrative mode".
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NGOs in today's China can find many ways to evade state control and even to use 
the resources of the state to advance their own interests.
Particularly interesting in this regard is the analysis by Gao Bingzhong of NGO 
strategy to gain legitimacy. As mentioned in the Introduction, despite government 
regulations that outlaw any unregistered NGO, many such NGOs have continued 
to exist and operate openly. One explanation for this, as suggested by Gao, is that in 
present-day China NGOs do not need "full legitimacy" in order to survive. Many 
NGOs have come into being with only "partial legitimacy", then try to gain full 
legitimacy using their partial legitimacy. Partial legitimacy consists in three forms: 
social legitimacy, administrative legitimacy, and political legitimacy.34 Social 
legitimacy can be based on tradition, common interests, or common values. For 
example, the last 20 years have seen the revival of many folk societies organised 
around the worshipping of local deities which had been banned by the state as 
"feudal superstition" for decades. These societies enjoy wide local support since 
they carry on traditions going back many generations and they cater to popular 
beliefs in theism, fatalism, and retribution. The days when sacrificial rites are 
performed are organised into local festivals with folk art performances and temple 
fairs. These attract many local people, who come to take part in the commercial and 
cultural activities and to see friends and relatives in addition to worshipping the 
deities. In other words, the societies' activities also serve some important common 
interests. Because they build on tradition, common interests, and common values, 
these societies enjoy social legitimacy and it has been the precondition for their 
existence (Su et al 1999: 319-336).
An NGO's administrative legitimacy derives from its association with the state
34 In addition to these three types of legitimacy, Gao also mentions "legal legitimacy", which 
means the legal status which NGOs obtain after they are registered. Gao's whole article, 
however, can be said to be devoted to explaining how NGOs can exist without "legal legitimacy" 
if they have social, administrative, or political legitimacy.
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administrative system. It can be obtained in many different ways, for example, 
receiving the backing of government agencies or officials, having officials as 
members, or being allowed to take part in government organised activities. In 1998, 
Beijing University did a survey of its local alumni associations. From the survey 
data Gao found that only 23% of the 38 associations had been registered by Civil 
Affairs. The rest either never applied for registration or had had their applications 
turned down. The fact that the unregistered associations were nevertheless able to 
exist can be explained by their administrative legitimacy, as the top posts in these 
associations were without exception held by high-ranking officials in the local 
Communist Party, government, state-owned enterprises, or service units. Gao used 
an example to demonstrate the power of administrative connections: On the 
occasion of the centennial celebration of the founding of Beijing University in 1998, 
the alumni association in Heilongjiang Province gave its Alma Mater a pair of very 
expensive carved vases as present. They were similar to the pair of vases placed in 
the Heilongjiang Room in the Great Hall of the People, except that they were bigger. 
They were even bigger than the pair of vases which were presented as the official 
gift of the provincial government to the Hong Kong government in 1997 to celebrate 
its return to China. Note that this resourceful alumni association did not even have a 
legal status, as it was not registered (Su et al 1999: 337-354).
Finally, NGOs gain political legitimacy by showing that they accept the existing 
political order and conform to state ideology. Since political legitimacy is crucial to 
the survival of NGOs in China, the vast majority of them go beyond a minimalist 
position, i.e. not violating any political standards set by the state, and try to 
demonstrate that they actively support the state's goals and policies. For example, 
the Beijing University Alumni Association describes its purpose as, above all, "to 
contribute our efforts to the socialist construction of our motherland, the 
reunification of our country, and the rejuvenation of China." (Su et al 1999: 368) As 
Gao points out, obviously an alumni association exists primarily to serve the
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common interests of its members. If the members want to serve their country, there 
are ample opportunities for them to do so in their own work units. Yet the chief 
purpose of the alumni association has been described as promoting the national 
interest, which shows how badly Chinese NGOs need political legitimacy to justify 
their existence (Su et al 1999: 355-372).
Gao's study offers many good examples of clever manoeuvres by NGOs to gain or 
claim legitimacy. A folk society that worships a dragon tablet invites academics 
from around the country to its festival every year to study it. The society arranges 
food, accommodation, and the programme for the academics, and it always invites 
them to a discussion at the end of their visit, at which they are asked to speak of 
their impressions of the festival. The guests usually feel obliged to make some 
positive remarks, stressing the boost the festival provides to the local economic and 
cultural life. These remarks are construed as positive assessments by the country's 
intellectual authorities, which are used to lend political legitimacy to the society. 
Another typical legitimacy-gaining strategy of NGOs is to make partial government 
recognition or sanction look like full government recognition or sanction. 
Government agencies or officials may approve of certain functions of an NGO or 
some of its activities, but the NGO will construe it as full approval or acceptance of 
itself by the government. To use the example of the dragon tablet society again, Gao 
has recorded the speeches of several local officials and the leader of the society at 
two discussions during the dragon tablet festivals. The officials all affirmed the 
positive contribution of the festival to local economic development but avoided 
making an overall assessment of its nature. When it was the leader's turn to speak, 
however, he went straight to the most sensitive issue, i.e. the superstitious element 
of the festival, and interpreted the officials' positive comments as "having removed 
the label of superstition from the festival" (Su et al 1999: 350). In other words, it 
could now lay claim to political legitimacy.
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Deficiencies of the Existing Research
The discussion of the post totalist society and the dual nature of Chinese NGOs it 
gives rise to is very useful in facilitating our understanding of these organisations. 
However, on the whole academic research inside China has not moved very far 
beyond identifying this dualism.35 Consequently it shares the same problem with 
English-language studies that adopt the "state-society paradigm". As mentioned 
earlier, the state-society binary thinking can only take us so far, as it is inadequate 
for explaining the variations within the NGO sector. In fact, many NGO case studies 
conducted by Chinese researchers contain interesting information which shows that 
individual NGOs usually have rather different relationships with different 
segments of the state and society. However, such information has not been used by 
Chinese researchers for the kind of institutional analysis described in the previous 
section, thus the dynamics of NGO development in China remains insufficiently 
explored.
The binary thinking which dominates NGO research inside China is also reflected in 
the fact that researchers often draw sharp lines between "officially-organised 
NGOs" and "popular NGOs", or between "top-down" and "bottom-up" NGOs, as 
they are alternatively called. Some researchers have even carried the polarisation of 
the two different types of NGOs to the point of being inconsistent with their other 
analysis, e.g. the dual nature of Chinese NGOs. For example, while talking about 
NGOs' dual nature Kang asserts that they usually depend on both "resources 
within the system" and "resources outside the system", and they usually use both 
"official" and "non-official" channels to obtain resources (Kang 1999a: 3). When he
35 On the issue of NGO legitimacy, for example, researchers such as Kang merely state that 
Chinese NGOs must strive for two kinds of legitimacy at the same time: "official legitimacy" (i.e. 
recognition from the government) and "social legitimacy" (Kang 1997: 636). More nuanced 
analysis, such as that by Gao, which distinguishes between administrative and political 
legitimacy, and which hints at cleavages within the state, e.g. when NGOs with strong 
administrative connections can flout the registration requirements by the state, is still very rare.
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tries to emphasize the difference between top-down and bottom-up NGOs, 
however, Kang claims that bottom-up NGOs are not able to access resources 
controlled by the government and they can only use socialised methods to raise 
funds (Kang 2001: 45,48, 73).
In over-emphasising the difference between top-down and bottom-up NGOs, 
Chinese researchers have made a similar mistake to that made by many foreign 
researchers. The distinction between "officially-organised" and "popular" NGOs is 
both useful and necessary in highlighting the different origin and consequently the 
different initial endowments of NGOs. However, as was pointed out earlier, this 
does not mean that organisations with more government ingredient must perforce 
enjoy less autonomy than those with less government ingredient, or that their goals, 
behaviour, and the strategies they adopt to pursue their organisational 
development are necessarily different.
The fact that Chinese researchers have drawn sharp lines between top-down and 
bottom-up NGOs must also be blamed on the general lack of understanding of the 
latter, which leaves intuitive assumptions that they stand in contrast with the 
former unchallenged. Although a number of case studies of bottom-up NGOs have 
been conducted in recent years, they are not detailed and in-depth enough to give 
us sufficient insight into the workings of these organisations. Apart from the studies 
of the CYDF, a typical top-down NGO, and a couple of other case studies in the 
CYDF sponsored book series,36 the rest of the existing NGO case studies tend to be 
superficial, usually done within a very short time.37 Furthermore, these case studies 
can perhaps be said to have suffered from the managerial approach to NGO studies. 
The researchers who carried out the case studies turned to non-profit organisation
36 Which include the study of the Dragon Tablet Society and the Beijing University Alumni 
Associations by Gao, which he used for his analysis of NGO legitimacy.
37 A somewhat extreme example is an NGO case study in the two Tsinghua volumes. The author 
of the case study told me that it was based on a one-day visit to the organisation.
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management literature in Western countries for inspiration, and used their case 
studies to describe the formal structures and functions of the organisations. Such 
information is obviously useful for building up a database of Chinese NGOs, 
however, it is far from certain whether these are the most urgent issues which need 
to be researched. Apparently non-profit organisations in Western countries operate 
under very different legal, fiscal and institutional frameworks from those faced by 
Chinese NGOs. The issues that are of great importance to Western non-profit 
organisations may therefore not be so important or relevant to Chinese NGOs at the 
present time.
To give just one example, similar to Western non-profit organisations, most Chinese 
NGOs have a board of directors which is supposed to determine major policies and 
exercise supervision. However, it is commonly known that the governing boards of 
many Chinese NGOs are mere figureheads and have no real control over the actions 
of the NGOs. When asked about her organisation's board of directors by a 
researcher, the general secretary of the Yilong County Rural Development 
Association gave an extremely candid answer. She had visited the United States and 
felt that NGO's board of directors there performed very useful functions. "But ours 
is a sham. So why should I spend my energy on a sham? These mere formalities of 
democracy have no real meaning even if we perform them." (Yang 2001a: 83) While 
NGO managers decide not to waste time on their figurehead boards, some Chinese 
researchers continue to devote their time to describing the formal governing 
structures of NGOs instead of analysing the real decision-making processes within 
them. At this stage of NGO development in China, one suspects that foreign 
researchers are at least right in prioritising political analysis over managerial 
analysis, as many Chinese NGOs are still fluid entities which have yet to take 
mature organisational forms. They can easily produce mission statements, 
constitutions, management structures, and rules and procedures that may have 
little bearing on what actually happens. Before they can effectively assess the
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management of these organisations, researchers need, first of all, to find out what is 
really going on and w hy—in other words, the politics behind the management 
issues.
2.3 Conceptual Foundations of the Study
My analysis of Chinese NGOs borrows insights from the existing studies. In 
particular, it draws inspiration from institutional analyses that explain NGO 
behaviour by taking into account the existence of divergent interests, motivations, 
and attitudes within both the state and society. My analysis also invokes relevant 
concepts and theoretical reflections in the scholarly literatures on China's political 
culture and the political economy of reform-era China. Below is a summary of the 
key theoretical issues in these literatures which I have explored and related to my 
study of Chinese NGOs, followed by a description of the analytical framework of 
my study.
Political Culture and Political Participation in China
Many observers of China's political culture have noted that it has a host of attributes 
that constitute obstacles to collective action and the growth of civil society. These 
include fatalism, passivity, fear of politics, deference to authority, elitism, and lack 
of cooperative spirit and group solidarity. Alan Liu, for example, commented thus 
on China's mass political culture:
Two primary characteristics of this culture are occasionalism and sectionalism. The 
first means every group (or person) attempts to maximize its (or his/her) 
short-term interest while a specific occasion allows it. The second means every 
group deals with the state independently of other groups (1996: 224).
Liu also quoted Liang Qichao, a famous early twentieth-century Chinese reformer
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and scholar, who enumerated eight characteristics of the Chinese political culture: 
survivalism, inurement to violence, a propensity to internecine conflicts, 
falseness-and-craftiness, egocentricity, myopia, fearfulness, and volatility. Although 
Liang made this observation in the 1920s, in Liu's opinion, these characteristics of 
the Chinese people "are still much in evidence" today (1996: 226).
Another scholar, Ogden, had this to say on the elitism and individualism of Chinese 
political culture:
Mainstream Chinese culture has also been deeply elitist, for it is a society in which 
everyone ranks him- or herself (and are ranked) as superior to some and 
subordinate to others. But it has also been a highly individualistic culture, in the 
sense that Chinese, beyond their loyalty to family, do not tend to display the type of 
group loyalty that is seen in some other cultures, such as Japan's; and that they 
seem to be interested far more in individual self-enrichment than in the collective 
public good (2002:115).
Comments like these appear to typify "interpretive studies", which are 
"characteristically based on documentary sources, interviews, and field 
observation" (Nathan and Shi 1993: 95).38 Such studies have been accused of a 
number of weaknesses, which have led Nathan and Shi to conclude that "In short, 
even the best interpretive work consists of broadly stated, loosely specified insights 
using ill-defined terms, meaning different things to different readers, and making 
statements that may or may not be true." (1993: 96) An alternative to interpretive 
studies is the survey approach. As Nathan and Shi point out, surveys have the 
advantage of allowing researchers to describe beliefs, values, and attitudes with 
precision and to measure variation in cultural attributes among a population. So, 
what light have survey studies been able to throw on Chinese political culture?
Not surprisingly, different surveys have yielded different results, but there has been
38 It should be noted that both Liu's and Ogden's books, from which these quotations are taken, 
have drawn on a diversity of sources, including survey data.
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no lack of survey findings that support the "broadly stated insights" of interpretive 
studies. For example, a 1987 national survey found that although Chinese citizens 
were generally interested in politics, their interest seldom translated into concrete 
actions of political participation. In this survey, 62.41% of the respondent agreed 
with the statement that "I am very cautious about discussing politics"; while 63.69% 
agreed that "It is better not to get too involved in politics"(quoted in Tao and Chen 
1998: 219). A survey carried out in Beijing in 1988-1989 concluded that "most people 
in Beijing abandon group-based political activities when articulating interests, 
engaging individually in the majority of political activities. Many political activities 
elsewhere that are collective, such as campaigns and strikes, have become 
individualized in Beijing" (Shi 1997: 110). Similar conclusions were reached by a 
survey of the rural population conducted in four counties in 1990: "the Chinese 
sample trails nearly all other countries with respect to rates of cooperative, 
group-based efforts to solve problems and address issues, thus echoing the common 
observation about the weakness of civil society in China" (Jennings 1997: 364).
Another survey of Beijing residents in 1995 found that the majority of respondents 
were elitist- and authority-oriented. 71.4% of them agreed or strongly agreed that 
"The well-being of the country is mainly dependent upon state leaders, not the 
masses"; 63.5% agreed or strongly agreed that "In general, I don't think I should 
argue with the authorities even though I believe my idea is correct" (Zhong, Chen 
and Scheb I I 1997). Similar attitudes have also been detected among many private 
entrepreneurs in four provinces in central and eastern China. In a survey carried out 
in these provinces in 1997 and 1999, 49.2% of private entrepreneurs agreed or 
strongly agreed that "Rich people should have more influence in policy making 
than poor people"; 50.1% of them agreed or strongly agreed that "Measures to 
improve the political structure should be initiated by the party and government, not 
by society" (Dickson 2003). A 1998 survey of 350 university students in Beijing 
asked them to prioritize twelve development challenges for China over the next five
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years. Only 3.4% of the respondents chose "Increase public participation in 
government decisions" as the first priority; 0.6% chose "Increase public 
participation in community decision-making" as the first priority, making both 
issues rank below others such as "Develop a society where ideals count more than 
money", "Develop a friendlier and more humanistic society", and "Protecting the 
environment" (quoted in Ogden 2002:123-124).
What have caused the above-mentioned characteristics of the Chinese culture and 
popular attitude that hinder political participation and civic activism? Scholars have 
explored different explanations. Lucian Pye tries to trace the psychological roots of 
China's political culture. Take "stoic fatalism" as an example, Pye suggests that the 
Chinese socialization process is responsible for this particular trait of its people. As 
Pye explains, from earliest childhood Chinese learn that they must accept the 
dictates of their parents without complaint and must not show the slightest 
aggression towards their parents whatever their private feelings. "Years of quiet 
obedience to paternal authority teach that it is usually best to display no emotions, 
accept fatalistically what is called for, and suppress one's anger" (Pye 1988: 56). 
Other scholars cited China's long tradition of Confucianism as contributing to many 
of its distinctive cultural attributes. For example, Hu (2000) describes how 
Confucianism as a state ideology has supported authoritarianism through such 
means as teaching the ruled to be loyal and obedient to their rulers and 
emphasizing the virtue of conformity and hierarchy. Many scholars also note the 
obvious effect of decades of frequent political campaigns and the state's pervasive 
control over society on mass political culture.
The nature of the political institutions in China offers another explanation for its 
people's political behaviour. As Shi (1997) argues, whereas the institutional 
arrangements in many societies make it difficult for ordinary citizens to influence 
policies at the implementation stage, thereby forcing them to pursue their interests
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by targeting the agenda setting or policy formulation stages of the policy process, 
the institutional design in China is such that the reverse is true. In China, policies 
are usually not formulated in a precise form, and lower-echelon bureaucrats often 
enjoy considerable discretionary power in interpreting and implementing policies 
according to local situations. Such an institutional design induces people to focus on 
influencing the decisions of individual officials rather than the policy-making 
process itself in order to obtain the desired benefits from the government. This in 
turn encourages them to take individualized actions such as developing 
patron-client ties with officials or using guanxi (personal connections), which is 
often more cost-effective than investing in group-based political activities.
The Political Economy of Transitional China
Political economic studies of post-reform China have provided important insights 
for my analysis of NGOs. Particularly relevant are studies of private businesses and 
their relationship with the state, and studies of "state entrepreneurialism" and 
corruption in the reform era.
A detailed review of private business —state relations in China will be provided in 
Chapter 4. Here I briefly summarize the key findings of major studies. These studies 
conclude that the growth of private businesses in China has not led to the formation 
of a civil society that pushes for political change, as analyses and forecasts 
influenced by modernisation theory have posited. Instead, these studies find that 
private entrepreneurs operate by forging patron-client networks with state officials, 
who still control many vital resources and opportunities in China's only partially 
marketized economy (see, e.g., Solinger 1992; Bruun 1993; Pieke 1995; Wank 1999). 
Private entrepreneurs depend on such networks to conduct their businesses. In 
other words, although reform has created a new social group that controls 
autonomous economic resources, this has not amounted to the rise of an
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independent social force that is interested in reshaping the political system, thereby 
challenging the authority and domination of the state. The development of private 
businesses has not removed the dependence of societal actors on the state. It has 
only changed the forms of such dependence.
Reform has also brought changes to the Chinese state. In analysing the behaviour of 
state agencies in the new era, some scholars have developed the notion of "state 
entrepreneurialism" (or "entrepreneurial state"). It refers to the widespread 
phenomenon of state agencies engaging in business activities to make profits for 
themselves. As one study describes this phenomenon:
Since the late 1980s, but especially in the 1990s, individual departments across the 
state system have been setting up new profit-seeking, risk-taking businesses. These 
businesses vary from small trading companies that operate from the departments' 
own premises, to large department stores and real estate development corporations. 
But all are invested in by those departments, and are staffed by former bureaucratic 
employees. Most importantly, their earnings are shared with their parent 
department (Duckett 1998: 3).
The businesses set up by state agencies may or may not be related to the regular 
administrative functions of the agencies. For example, Duckett's (1998) study found 
that municipal and district real estate management bureaux in Tianjin had set up 
many real estate development companies since the mid-to-late 1980s, obviously 
capitalizing on their privileged access to land, which was still administratively 
rather than competitively allocated. On the other hand, these bureaux had also set 
up many other businesses, such as trading companies and department stores, which 
fell outside their bureaucratic sphere of action.
Although Duckett acknowledges that state entrepreneurialism often involves the 
exploitation of their bureaucratic power and position by state agencies, she argues 
that it is different from corruption, since the profits gained from such ventures go to
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the state bureaux rather than to individual officials. This argument is tenuous at 
best. According to a study by Lin and Zhang (1999), state agencies use the profits 
generated by their businesses in three common ways, one of which is to share them 
among agency employees. This can take various forms, including bonus payments, 
free or subsidized consumer goods, the provision of housing and other communal 
facilities (e.g., canteens and cable TV), and group consumption (e.g., banquets, 
junkets, and entertainment). Therefore, at least some of the profits gained from state 
entrepreneurialism do go to individuals in the agencies. But instead of benefiting 
just the leaders of the agencies, the profits are shared among all the members. This 
often has the effect of muffling potential whistle-blowers. As one study of official 
corruption in China points out, corruption in the reform period takes place at both 
the individual and the organisational level. In the case of organisational corruption, 
"illicit actions are taken not by a single individual or by collusion among 
individuals, but by a public agency to achieve material gains for the agency as a 
whole through the use of its power." Arguably, organisational corruption has been 
one of the defining features of official corruption in the reform period (Lii 2000: 201, 
193).
While the charge of corruption cannot be dismissed simply on the ground that state 
entrepreneurialism benefits entire agencies rather than selected individuals within 
them, not all entrepreneurial undertakings by state agencies are considered 
corruption by the central state. Lin and Zhang (1999) suggest that most such 
activities take place in the grey areas of law and regulation. Although state agencies 
use some of the proceeds to satisfy the private interests of their members, often they 
also use part of the profit to fill the gaps in budgetary allocation. In fact, originally 
state entrepreneurialism arose partly as a response to budgetary shortfalls 
commonly faced by state agencies. The tenacity of this phenomenon despite 
repeated attempts by the central state to contain it is also partly attributable to the 
fact that state agencies justify their entrepreneurial activities by using some of the
64
profits to finance their formal bureaucratic functions.
Dependent Autonomy: The Conceptual Framework of the Study
My analysis of Chinese NGOs has been informed by the concepts and theoretical 
issues introduced above. It is founded on separating two notions, autonomy and 
independence, which have been treated as interchangeable terms in studies of 
Chinese NGOs up to now. I suggest that making a distinction between them is in 
fact crucial to understanding Chinese NGOs. Chinese NGOs at the present time are 
best characterised as dependent on the state but being able to enjoy substantial 
autonomy of action. In exposing the dependence of NGOs on the state, I draw a 
parallel between NGOs and private businesses. I demonstrate how NGOs rely on 
various forms of support from the state to operate, just as private entrepreneurs rely 
on patronage-client ties with state agencies and officials to rim their businesses. I 
point to the structural and institutional conditions of China in its current 
transitional state, which make the dependence of both NGOs and private businesses 
on the state inevitable.
In analysing the autonomy of Chinese NGOs, I link it to the behaviour and 
motivation of state agencies in the post-reform period. The transformation of the 
Chinese state as a result of the reforms has been one of the key issues of concern for 
China scholars. Most studies of the Chinese state under reform ask how the relative 
strength of central and local states and their relationship have changed. Many note a 
major weakening of the central government's ability to control local governments 
and officials and ensure their compliance with its policies. However, some scholars, 
notably those who developed the concept of state entrepreneurialism, take 
individual state agencies instead of the local state as a whole as their unit of analysis. 
They show that many state agencies have engaged in activities that primarily serve 
their own individual interest rather than the collective interest of the territorial
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governments of which they are component parts and in the process may often 
compete with other state agencies. In other words, reforms have not only increased 
the autonomy of the local state taken as a whole but also increased the autonomy of 
individual state agencies. As I will demonstrate later, in many cases, the autonomy 
of Chinese NGOs, especially officially-organized NGOs, is a consequence of the 
increased autonomy of individual state agencies. Sometimes the autonomy of the 
former is best seen as the extension of the autonomy of the latter.
Although the general pattern of NGO-state relationship in contemporary China can 
be summarized in the notion of dependent autonomy, individual NGOs cannot 
automatically expect to receive a high level of support from the state or enjoy a high 
degree of autonomy. My research suggests that much depends on the skills of 
individual NGOs in "working the system" in order to maximize both the support 
from the state and their autonomy. Here the political culture and characteristics of 
political participation in China become particularly relevant. They provide the 
necessary background for understanding the skills and strategies of NGOs.
Throughout my analysis, I chart the divergence of interests, goals, and attitudes 
between different levels and agencies of the Chinese state. I also underscore the 
multiple divisions that exist within society, especially among constituents and 
staff of NGOs. Furthermore, I show that NGOs that have found a niche for 
themselves in contemporary China often represent the convergence of interest 
between segments of the state and society. In short, the disaggregation of the 
state and society39 and an emphasis on their inter-penetration constitute the 
basic analytical approach of this study.
39 Recognizing that both the state and society are composite rather than unitary entities does not 
mean that we cannot talk about "state" and "society" any more. Disaggregating the state and 
society does not deny their existence, and emphasizing their inter-penetration does not deny the 
distinction between them. Therefore, throughout the thesis I will continue to use the terms 
"state" and "society", especially where I am only interested in distinguishing them from each 
other. I shall use phrases like "state agencies" and "different social groups" when my emphasis 
is on the divisions within each realm.
66
Conclusion
While many foreign scholars have drawn inspiration from "macro" theories such as 
civil society and, in particular, corporatism, Chinese analysts are right to question 
their usefulness in interpreting the reality of Chinese NGOs. Most foreign 
researchers have in fact rejected the civil society paradigm, but corporatism seems 
to have captured the imagination of quite a few of them. Whether corporatism 
accurately describes the relationship between the state and the large number of 
business and trade associations that have come into being in the reform era is still in 
dispute, as attested by the papers of Yep and Foster. In any case, it would be very 
difficult to apply the concept of corporatism to other types of NGOs, such as 
foundations like the CYDF, social service organisations, or non-governmental 
research institutes, as corporatism is essentially about interest group politics. Even if 
it has some heuristic value in understanding business associations in contemporary 
China, it is hard to see how the concept can aid our study of NGOs in the classical 
sense, namely organisations working for social and economic development which 
may or may not be membership organisations.
Therefore, when it comes to analysing the actual behaviour of a diverse array of 
Chinese NGOs, the concepts proposed by Chinese researchers seem to be of more 
practical value. The idea of the dual nature of Chinese NGOs, for example, allows us 
to explore the roles played by both state and society in the development of NGOs. 
The distinctions between resources within the system and resources outside the 
system and between administrative and socialised modes of operation help to 
demonstrate some of the ways in which the dual nature of Chinese NGOs manifests 
itself. Finally, the different types of legitimacy suggest a framework for explaining 
why NGOs without legal status can still survive and even thrive in China despite 
the government's attempt to eliminate such organisations.
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Chinese researchers, however, have not undertaken the kind of institutional 
analysis exemplified by the works of Nevitt, Unger, and Wank. Such an approach 
recognises the multifarious interests, agendas, and perspectives within both state 
and society. It is the interactions of these diverse interests, agendas and perspectives 
rather than simple state-society confrontation or co-operation that constitute the 
basic environment for Chinese NGOs. Only by examining these interactions closely 
can we fully appreciate the complex nature of NGOs in contemporary China.
To study such interactions, I have developed a conceptual framework that is centred 
on the notion of dependent autonomy. In the following chapters, I will use this 
framework to analyse the empirical materials from my research.
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3. The Autonomy of Chinese NGOs
Most scholars believe that Chinese NGOs lack autonomy. This is not only because 
the majority of them are "officially-organised NGOs", and are therefore under 
government control, but also because even the limited number of "popular NGOs" 
are not able to enjoy full autonomy either. One only needs to look at the current 
"dual management system" (shuangchong guanli tizhi) for NGOs to realize it, the 
argument goes. Current regulations require every NGO to place itself under the 
"professional management" of a state organ with responsibilities in its area of work, 
in addition to being registered and vetted annually by Civil Affairs departments. 
The professional management agency holds a wide range of responsibilities, 
including supervising the NGO's "ideological work", financial and personnel 
management, research activities, contacts with foreign organisations, and the 
reception and use of donations from overseas (Ministry of Civil Affairs 2000; State 
Council 1998a, 1998b). NGOs that do not comply with the dual management 
requirement are outlawed. Therefore, as one Chinese researcher summarizes the 
situation: the current legal framework ensures that no fully autonomous NGO can 
lawfully exist in China (Kang 1999b: 222).
Although the sector as a whole lacks autonomy, experts generally believe that 
certain types of NGOs are more autonomous than others. The consensus of 
researchers and practitioners divides Chinese NGOs into two broad categories: the 
officially-organised or "top-down" NGOs, and the popular or "bottom-up" NGOs. 
Top-down NGOs are less autonomous than bottom-up ones, since they are initiated 
by the government and receive government funding, and many of their staff are 
actually government employees seconded from administrative agencies or service 
units.
The belief that Chinese NGOs, particularly officially-organised NGOs, suffer from a
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lack of autonomy is in fact based on two false equations. First, policy is equated 
with actual practice. Second, government support and the commitment of its 
resources are equated with control. Both equations do not bear scrutiny. Through 
the dual management system the intent of the state is apparently to hold the NGO 
sector on a tight leash, but this does not mean that the state always effectively 
enforces its policy. Similarly, just because an NGO is launched by a government 
agency with government resources does not mean that it will not find ways to 
pursue its own independent agenda. In this chapter, I first use some examples of 
officially-organised NGOs to demonstrate that contrary to common beliefs, 
autonomy is not necessarily a practical issue with Chinese NGOs. Then I discuss 
whether popular NGOs are indeed more autonomous than officially-organised 
NGOs.
3.1 Officially-organised NGOs
The Case of China Youth Development Foundation (CYDF)
The CYDF has undoubtedly been the most thoroughly studied NGO in China, 
thanks to its interest in sponsoring research on NGOs and its willingness to allow 
itself to be used as a case study. The CYDF's pedigree as a top-down NGO is 
indisputable. It is registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs as a social 
organisation40, but it also has the status of a service unit under the Communist 
Youth League's Central Committee 41 Before launching the CYDF, the Youth League
40 Foundations are currently registered as social organisations even though they are not 
membership organisations. All the regulations concerning social organisations apply to 
foundations. In addition, they are also subject to the approval and oversight by the People's 
Bank of China. It has therefore been said that foundations are placed under a "triple 
management system".
41 This fact is not well-known. As was explained in Chapter 1, social organisations and service 
units are two different types of organisations. The latter are state-owned organisations which are 
by definition not NGOs, therefore for an organisation to be an NGO and a service unit at the 
same time is extremely confusing. Yet the CYDF's situation is not that unique when one thinks of 
the variety of legal status Chinese NGOs can have at present despite the existence of regulations 
which clearly stipulate what they should and should not be. Even more confusing than the
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first sought and obtained approval from the Party's Central Committee. It also 
asked the Secretariat of the Party's Central Committee to let one of its members 
serve as the honorary chairman of the CYDF's board of directors, to which the 
Party's Centred Committee consented (Kang 1997: 89-90). The Youth League 
provided the CYDF with its initial registered fund of 100,000 yuan, its initial 
operational cost, and office space. Above all, the Youth League supplied the CYDF's 
first staff from its own pool of cadres (Guo, Yang and Ying 1999). The nature of the 
relationship between the CYDF and the Youth League is perhaps best captured in 
the words of the CYDF's general secretary, Xu Yongguang, who jokingly called the 
CYDF "the son of the Youth League's Central Committee" (Kang 1997: 253).
Given the highly top-down nature of the CYDF, one would expect to find a 
lame-duck organisation under the tight grip of the state which must constantly 
follow the cue of its supervisory agency, the Youth League. Instead, the studies of 
the CYDF uncovered significant evidence of the organisation's remarkable 
autonomy in pursuing its own goals. To cite just a few examples: In 1991, just when 
the CYDF was trying to develop a nation-wide organisational network to 
implement its trademark programme, Project Hope, the Party's Central Committee 
and the State Council jointly issued a directive ordering an overhaul of all existing 
Chinese foundations and a temporary halt to the approval of new ones. The 
directive also stipulated that national foundations are not allowed to set up local 
branches. The CYDF, however, continued to push forward the establishment of 
Project Hope local operations but told them to call themselves Project Hope local 
"funds" instead of "foundations". The CYDF's general secretary claimed that a 
foundation was an organisation whereas a fund was just a sum of money, so the 
creation of local "funds" was not a breach of the directive (Kang 1997:445-446; Zhou
CYDF's dual status is the fact that the Youth League itself, which is supposedly a social 
organisation, can have a service unit under it. This helps to demonstrate the unique status of 
mass organisations, which are actually not very different from government agencies and are 
indeed treated as such rather than as NGOs by the state.
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and Chen 1999: 212).
A further example occurred in 1993 when the CYDF entered into barter contracts 
using karaoke machines donated by the Dutch electronics company Philips. The 
CYDF decided to set up an information management system which would connect 
its headquarters in Beijing and the provincial Project Hope offices through a 
computer network. However, it did not have the money to purchase the many 
computers and other equipment necessary for the network. Thereupon the person 
in charge of setting up the network suggested giving some of the karaoke machines 
to a couple of computer companies in exchange for the needed computers and the 
other network equipment. At the time there was a government regulation which 
forbade foundations to sell goods donated to them by foreign companies or 
individuals. The CYDF person knew that the computer companies would sell their 
karaoke machines, therefore the barter with them would result in a violation of the 
regulation. Nevertheless it was carried out. The CYDF person took the precaution of 
signing the contract with the computer companies himself on behalf of the directors 
of the CYDF, so, should the incident be investigated by the government later, he 
could claim that the directors did not know about i t  In this way the CYDF would be 
sheltered from the potential risk of the transaction. Fortunately no investigation 
occurred and the government regulation was later modified to allow the exchange 
and sale of donated goods (Kang 1997:167).
The final example concerns the CYDF's handling of the sensitive issue of 
educational deprivation amongst poor rural children when it first launched Project 
Hope, which aims at raising money from the public to help poor children to attend 
school. Project Hope was launched in October 1989, at a time when exposing the 
so-called "dark side" of the country, such as poverty and educational deprivation, 
still carried some political risk. October 1,1989 was the 40th anniversary of the 
founding of the People's Republic of China. Furthermore, the country had just gone
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through a major episode of political turmoil in the early summer of that year. 
Therefore, the Party had asked the media to concentrate on reporting the 
achievements of the country in the past 40 years. To raise money from the public, 
however, the CYDF would need to stress the fact that many Chinese children were 
still unable to receive basic education owing to poverty. Under the circumstances, 
the CYDF calculated that if it asked the Youth League for permission to organise a 
press conference to launch Project Hope, as was the normal practice, the Youth 
League might refuse to give its approval, which might result in the whole project 
being nipped in the bud. Consequently, instead of organising a press conference 
first, the CYDF printed 500,000 copies of a letter of appeal and sent it to enterprises 
all over the country asking them to donate money to Project Hope. As Xu 
Yongguang, the general secretary of the CYDF, described this move: "By sending 
out the letter we achieved a fait accompli. We have already created the double ', now 
what can you do about it?" (Sun et al 1999:35) As it happened, nobody did anything 
about it and everybody went along with the CYDF's plan. Three weeks after 
sending out the letter the CYDF held a press conference to officially launch Project 
Hope, which was attended by all the major news media in China (Sun et al 1999: 
34-35; Guo, Yang and Ying 1999: 20-22; Kang 1997: 98-99).
These three examples suggest that NGOs can often find ways to get round the rules 
laid down by the state in the pursuit of their own agendas and they may even defy 
government policies and regulations with immunity. As Xu Yongguang once said to 
the CYDF's staff: "We will play 'edge ball' to do even the things which should be 
done but which we are not allowed to do, let alone the things which nobody has 
explicitly said that we cannot do." (Kang 1997: 100) Given that the dual 
management system puts NGOs under the direct supervision of their "professional 
management units", at this point one might think that for an NGO to get round 
some minor state regulations is one thing, but to evade the control of its professional 
management unit is another thing, especially in the case of an NGO like the CYDF
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which only came into existence because its professional management unit used its 
own resources to launch it. So, does the CYDF have to take its orders from the Youth 
League? The following examples will help to illustrate the relationship between the 
two.
The various studies of the CYDF have all concluded that an important factor behind 
its success is that it has a very enlightened professional management unit which has 
allowed it to conduct its own business with minimal interference. The CYDF has 
been able to choose its own staff from the very beginning. The Youth League's 
Central Committee only assigned one of its staff members to the CYDF in the eleven 
years since its inception, and the assignment was in fact made at the request of the 
CYDF. It happened when the Central Committee set up a Project Hope Supervisory 
Office to monitor the use of the funds raised by the CYDF. The idea of creating a 
supervisory office was actually the CYDF's. According to Xu Yongguang, when the 
CYDF first put the idea to the Central Committee, the response was: All right, why 
don't you just set up this office yourself? One of your deputy general secretaries can 
serve as the director of this office. The CYDF then insisted that the supervisory 
office should appear to have been created by the Central Committee. As Xu 
Yongguang said to the Central Committee: "Even if this is just making a show, you 
should at least make it look genuine." Thereupon the Central Committee appointed 
one of its staff members the director of the Project Hope Supervisory Office, but this 
person was in fact chosen by the CYDF first. The Central Committee put together a 
list of recommended candidates for the job, from which the CYDF picked the person 
it wanted.42
Not only was the Supervisory Office created at the suggestion of the CYDF, but it 
was also hosted in the CYDF's office43 rather than the office of the Youth League.
42 Interview with Xu Yongguang, 8 November 2001.
43 The CYDF was initially given an office in the office building of the Youth League's Central 
Committee. By the time the Supervisory Office was set up, the CYDF had moved out of the
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Furthermore, except for the first year, the entire outlay of the Supervisory Office 
(including the salaries and welfare benefits of its staff) was paid by the CYDF 
instead of the Youth League's Central Committee (Kang 1997: 160). When the 
Central Committee-appointed director of the Supervisory Office was interviewed, 
he spoke enthusiastically about the great opportunities the CYDF offered its staff, 
all the while referring to it as "our organisation". As the interviewers concluded, he 
completely saw himself as a member of the CYDF instead of a supervisor from the 
outside (Guo, Yang and Ying 1999: 265). Putting these facts about the Supervisory 
Office together, one can hardly conclude that the Youth League has tried to place 
the CYDF's financial operation under close supervision.
As soon as it was set up, the CYDF submitted a written request to the Youth 
League's Central Committee for permission to take advantage of the Youth 
League's organisational resources to raise funds. The Central Committee agreed 
and promptly asked all its departments and subsidiary units to actively support the 
CYDF's work. In its early years the CYDF relied entirely on the Youth League's 
nation-wide network to implement Project Hope. With its meagre initial resources, 
the CYDF was only able to hold the first Project Hope national conference by 
"getting a lift" in a Youth League national conference, i.e. by making the Project 
Hope meeting part of the agenda of the Youth League conference. At that 
conference, the Youth League's Central Committee asked the Young Peasants 
section of the Youth League at all levels to assist the CYDF with implementing 
Project Hope in their own areas. In his speech the director of the Central 
Committee's Young Peasants Department told cadres in local-level departments 
that they should make Project Hope-related work part of their routine job and 
combine it with the Youth League's other work in poverty-stricken areas (Sun et al 
1999: 46). Because the CYDF depended so much on the Youth League's network,
Central Committee's building, but its new office was also an estate owned by the Central 
Committee. The CYDF was allowed to use it for free. (Guo, Yang and Ying 1999:126; Kang 1999b: 
223).
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which was mobilised by commands from the Central Committee, many local Youth 
League branches thought the right to use the name of Project Hope belong to the 
Youth League's Central Committee. This meant they did not need to seek the 
approval of the CYDF if they decided to carry out activities in the name of Project 
Hope. Feeling that its ownership of Project Hope was being challenged, the CYDF 
then began to assert that Project Hope belonged to it, not the Youth League's 
Central Committee, and the CYDF and the Central Committee were not the same 
thing (Zhou and Chen 1999: 210-211).
To counter the challenge to its ownership of Project Hope from the Youth League's 
local branches, the CYDF promoted the establishment of local Project Hope funds to 
be managed by specialised offices separate from local Youth League committees. 
Eventually every province set up such an organisation.44 These organisations are 
still under the aegis of provincial Youth League committees, just as the CYDF is 
under the aegis of the Youth League's Central Committee, but at least they have 
independent identities. Since government regulations prohibit national foundations 
from setting up local branches, the provincial Project Hope Fund management 
offices all have independent legal status and are not subsidiaries of the CYDF, but 
the CYDF has managed to gain some control over the provincial organisations on 
the basis of its ownership of Project Hope. The CYDF argued that the local Project 
Hope Funds were all part of the national Project Hope Fund, and should therefore 
be subjected to the overall supervision of the CYDF (Kang 1997; Sun et al 1999).
Throughout the CYDF's wrestling with local Youth League committees for control 
over Project Hope, the Youth League's Central Committee consistently took the side 
of the CYDF rather than that of its local branches. At crucial moments, the CYDF 
always asked the Central Committee to put pressure on local branches to yield to its
44 Most of the provincial organisations are also called Youth Development Foundation, but some 
of them have taken on other names, such as Project Hope Office.
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wishes, and the Central Committee never failed to oblige it. Because the Young 
Peasants departments of the Youth League at local levels had initially been 
responsible for implementing Project Hope, they were reluctant to hand over the 
operations to the specialised Project Hope Fund offices set up later, but the Central 
Committee stood behind the CYDF and the Young Peasants departments were 
edged out. Next, the CYDF wanted to have a say in the appointment of local Project 
Hope Fund managers. Originally it was the provincial Youth League committees 
which appointed the managers, but the CYDF demanded to share the authority 
with provincial Youth League committees. Again the Central Committee lent its 
support to the CYDF (Kang 1997; Sim et al 1999).
So far we can see that the relationship between the CYDF and the Youth League's 
Central Committee is hardly one in which the professional management agency 
dominates the NGO, denying it its autonomy. On the contrary, we see the NGO 
gradually strengthening itself using the resources of its professional management 
agency. Perhaps most illuminating is what Xu Yongguang, who founded the CYDF, 
said in my interview with him. He confirmed that initially the CYDF relied heavily 
on various support from the Youth League's Central Committee. Drawing from the 
CYDF's experience, he advised Chinese NGOs to make good use of government 
resources at the beginning, then to pay more attention to "developing their 
individualities" later. As Xu Yongguang sees it, after their initial reliance on 
government resources, NGOs should take care to gradually "grow their own 
wings". Once they have "grown their own wings", NGOs will gain more 
independence, and more independence will lead to a stronger bargaining position 
vis-a-vis the government. Although the current legal framework is not ideal, Xu 
Yongguang believes that it is still possible for NGOs to develop their autonomy.45 It 
was very interesting to hear Xu Yongguang discuss how the CYDF intended to 
repay its generous patron, the Youth League's Central Committee, which had
45 Interview with Xu Yongguang, 8 November 2001.
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allowed it to grow its own wings. By the CYDF's own admission, the Central 
Committee has never tried to place its people in the CYDF. One important reason 
seems to be that the Central Committee has been very satisfied with the CYDF's 
current management team. However, what if the Central Committee refuses to 
endorse the CYDF's choice of leaders in the future when the current ones leave? 
What if the Central Committee tries to send its own choice of replacements?46 
According to Xu Yongguang, the CYDF should then be prepared to "play a dirty 
trick" on the Central Committee by using the board of directors against it. The 
CYDF's board of directors has never had a real say in its affairs. However, 
nominally it is the highest decision-making body of the CYDF (Kang 1997:157). The 
chairperson of the board has always been a Central Committee official, but most of 
the board members appear to have been picked by the CYDF itself. If the Central 
Committee tries to appoint its candidates to the CYDF's chief managerial positions 
in the future, the CYDF would simply ask the board of directors to veto them. As Xu 
Yongguang said confidently: "The directors of the board will definitely follow our 
command."47
Should this happen, it would not be the first time that the CYDF has played a trick 
on the Central Committee. During the interview Xu Yongguang also told another 
story of how the CYDF tried to minimise the Central Committee's supervision of its 
personnel. The CYDF was supposed to report to the Central Committee the 
appointment of all its department heads for the record. To avoid doing this, the 
CYDF abolished all the departments and reorganised them into seven "centres" and 
one general office instead. Afterwards it no longer had to report the appointment of 
its new middle-level managers to the Central Committee, as there would be no
46 So far the top management positions of the CYDF have all been held by former Youth League 
cadres like Xu Yongguang, who have retained their status as Youth League employees. This 
means that although the Youth League no longer pays their salaries, if the CYDF ceases to exist, 
the Youth League will be under obligation to find other jobs for them.
47 Interview with Xu Yongguang, 8 November 2001.
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m ore n e w  d ep a rtm en t h ea d s .48
From the CYDF's experience we can see that Chinese NGOs indeed face many 
restrictions on their autonomous development. However, the CYDF case shows that 
far from passive victims of state stricture, NGOs can be skilful operators who adapt 
themselves well to this environment. They can find ways to overcome the 
restrictions on their autonomy and even use the state's resources for their own 
purposes. But perhaps the CYDF is a unique case? What about other 
officially-organised NGOs? Have they been equally able to enjoy significant de facto 
autonomy and to "grow their own wings"? The following section looks at the 
experience of some other officially-organised NGOs.
Other Cases of Officially-organised NGOs
We start with the most "official" of all NGOs, the mass organisations.49 While 
studying associations in China, Unger and Chan discovered a strategy which mass 
organisations had been using to gain more freedom from state oversight. The 
strategy was to sponsor other NGOs to do things that were inconvenient for the 
mass organisations to do themselves. It is worth quoting here two examples which 
Unger and Chan came across:
The All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce is currently engaged, as a 
deliberate strategy, in establishing other associations that will come under its 
umbrella. With the Federation as intermediary, these new organisations will be one 
degree further removed from direct government intervention, both local and state. 
In June 1993, as just one example, it sponsored the establishment of a national 
Private Enterprise Research Association. The inaugural convention in Taiyuan, 
Shanxi, was financed by wealthy Shanxi entrepreneurs and brought together
48 Interview with Xu Yongguang, 8 November 2001.
49 As noted earlier (Chapter 1, footnote 12), conventionally mass organisations are covered by 
studies of Chinese NGOs. That is why in this section I include mass organizations in my 
discussion. In terms of their functions, the status they enjoy, and the way they operate, mass 
organisations would in fact be more accurately described as state agencies than as NGOs.
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wealthy businesspeople and Federation officials from throughout the country, 
along with some sympathetic central government officials. Under the Federation's 
auspices, in the guise of this "research" association, new direct cross-provincial 
organisational linkages among the businesspeople are being cemented, overleaping 
regional governmental administrations (Unger and Chan 1996:116).
In a similar vein the Shanghai municipal trade union federation has sought to 
establish a financially independent research association, with the intent that it 
would lobby for workers' rights to an extent that the union federation as a 
government-aligned organ cannot. We were told by Shanghai union leaders in 
mid-1993 that the explicit strategy is to create an intervening layer of sponsorship 
so as to buffer the new association from the municipal and national governments' 
writ (Unger and Chan 1996:117).
Some subsidiary organisations sponsored by mass organisations have acted with 
little restraint until the situation got out of hand. For example, a subsidiary of the 
China Science and Technology Association, China Scientific and Technological 
Development Foundation, turned itself into an illicit bank by accepting deposits and 
making out loans, until it lost millions of yuan. Its cashier was arrested while trying 
to flee the country after embezzling over eight million yuan. A person who carried 
out political activities considered potentially subversive by the government was 
found to be using an NGO for his cause. When the authorities investigated the case, 
they expected to find the NGO an unregistered, hence illegal, organisation, so that 
the person could be found guilty on that ground, but the organisation turned out to 
be a legitimate NGO as it was a subsidiary organisation of the China Federation of 
Literary and Art Circles. The person was able to make the Federation sponsor his 
NGO because he enjoyed good personal relations with a deputy president of the 
Federation.50
Mass organisations are not the only officially-organised NGOs that have engaged in 
sponsoring subsidiary NGOs. The practice has been widespread among other
50 Cases of lax government supervision of NGOs resulting in big problems cited by the director 
of the Popular Organisation Management Bureau (POMB), Ministry of Civil Affairs, in a lecture 
at Tsinghua University, Beijing, on 10 January 2000.
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officially-organised NGOs as well, a phenomenon described by Civil Affairs 
officials as "big social organisations approving small social organisations" (da 
shetuan pi xiao shetuan). Some NGOs that were unable to register as independent 
organisations because they failed to satisfy some of the registration prerequisites 
had followed the strategy of "hanging under" (guakao) registered NGOs as 
second-level organisations. Some second-level NGOs went on to sponsor third-level 
NGOs, until in extreme cases fifth-level NGOs had been found existing (Chen 1997: 
25). The host NGOs usually charge a "management fee" for providing the 
sponsorship. Once they have collected the fees, however, many host organisations 
are not interested in monitoring the activities of the NGOs they sponsor, leaving 
them to enjoy complete operational freedom.51 To plug this loophole in its NGO 
management regime, the new government regulation of 1998 stipulated that NGOs' 
subsidiaries would also need to be approved by both their professional 
management units and Civil Affairs departments. A 1999 document jointly issued 
by the Party's Central Committee and the State Council on strengthening the 
management of NGOs further ordered a clean-up of all existing subsidiaries of 
NGOs. 52 However, when I interviewed the director of a national-level 
officially-organised NGO in 2000, he revealed that he was still allowing a few 
second-level NGOs under his organisation to operate, even though the ministry 
which was the professional management unit of his organisation did not approve 
them. As this director said: "After all we are former officials of the ministry, so we 
are not afraid of being punished by the ministry. Besides, I think these NGOs are 
doing good things. As long as they are doing good things, I am not afraid of 
providing protection for them."53
Officially-organised NGOs can sometimes be so unafraid of their professional
51 Interview with a Chinese NGO researcher, 17 June 2002.
52 The 1999 document was for internal circulation within the Party and the government only, so 
its full content is not in the public domain, but I have heard some of its specific stipulations from 
government officials on various occasions.
53 Interview, 7 March 2000.
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management units that they even try to fire them. An interesting case concerns the 
China Flowers and Plants Association, which was an NGO under the Ministry of 
Agriculture. The association was very successful in achieving financial 
self-sufficiency and in fact had a net income of around six million yuan each year, 
part of which it seems that the Ministry of Agriculture took away. The association 
wanted to break away from the Ministry and have the Central Afforestation 
(Greening) Committee serve as its professional management unit instead. For that 
purpose it obtained the approval of a Vice Premier of the State Council. Unwilling 
to lose this profitable subsidiary, the Ministry of Agriculture protested to the 
Premier. The ruling of the Premier obviously balanced all the different interests as 
well as saved everybody's face: the association would be allowed to go to the 
Afforestation Committee first. Then, after two months, its professional management 
unit should be changed again into the Ministry of Forestry.54
The story of the China Flowers and Plants Association demonstrates that 
professional management units are not always able to control the NGOs nominally 
under their supervision. In this case, at least the professional management unit had 
tried to control the NGO. In other cases, possibly because they can derive no 
concrete benefit, professional management units show no appetite for controlling 
the NGOs under their sponsorship and indeed neglect their supervisory duties. In 
one example, the China Life Science Society sponsored some qigong practices that 
nearly resulted in Falun Gong55 style troubles for the government. When the central 
government investigated the Society afterwards, its professional management unit, 
the National Environment Protection Agency (NEPA), and the Ministry of Civil
54 Lecture by the director of the POMB, 10 January 2000.
55 Falun Gong is a qigong related sect that took the government by surprise when 10,000 of its 
followers surrounded the headquarters of the state apparatus in central Beijing for 13 hours on 
25 April 1999 to protest against some criticism of its practice in the media. The government 
subsequently launched a nationwide crackdown on Falun Gong and eventually banned it as "an 
evil cult." The Falun Gong incident reminded the government that it had not maintained effective 
control over the activities of non-government organisations, hence its effort to tighten the 
registration and supervision of NGOs after the incident.
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Affairs (MCA) both tried to shirk responsibility. The NEPA pointed out that it had 
sent a letter to the MCA the year before stating that it no longer wished to be the 
Society's professional management unit, but it never received a reply from the MCA. 
The MCA responded that according to current NGO regulations, as long as no new 
sponsor had been officially approved, the existing professional management unit 
must assume full responsibility for an NGO's activities. Otherwise, it argued, 
government agencies would all shift the blame onto others once the NGOs under 
their supervision had made trouble.56
This case is apparently not unique. In a 1999 speech, a vice minister of civil affairs 
acknowledged that weak government oversight of NGOs had often been the result 
of NGOs' professional management units and civil affairs departments trying to 
pass the buck to each other rather than working together.57 Maintaining effective 
control over NGOs has in fact been a constant challenge for the state. The many 
cases of officially-organised NGOs "violating law and discipline" (weifa weiji) which 
are discovered every time the state launches a "clean up and rectification" (qingli 
zhengdun) campaign to improve order in the sector prove that many 
officially-organised NGOs have been able to enjoy remarkable autonomy. The 
following is an amusing example: the China Cadre Education Association, an NGO 
under the Party's Central Academy, was found to have engaged in illegal 
fund-raising. The members of the association were all veteran cadres who took part 
in the Red Army's Long March in 1934-1935. They sent a document on a red 
letterhead (hongtou wenjiari)58 to Heilongjiang Province in which they asked for five 
million yuan to build a Long March memorial and claimed that their action had been 
approved by Jiang Zemin, the leader of the Party, himself. In fact, what happened 
was that members of the association were present at a function to commemorate the
56 Lecture by the director of the POMB, 10 January 2000.
57 "The Concluding Speech by the Vice Minister of Civil Affairs Xu Ruixing at the Meeting on 
Strengthening the Management of Popular Organizations, 8 December 1999".
58 Red letterheads are used for official documents and indicate that they contain direct orders or 
information from the government.
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Long March which was attended by Mr. Jiang. At one point, when Mr. Jiang was 
moving around the crowd to greet people, he stopped to shake hands with a 
member of the association. The person seized the opportunity to say something like: 
"Mr. General Secretary, we are going to build a memorial to commemorate the Long 
March." Not knowing what the person was talking about and with no time to find 
out, Mr. Jiang merely nodded politely and said "good, good" before moving on. On 
the basis of this brief encounter between Mr. Jiang and its member, however, the 
association subsequently claimed that Mr. Jiang had been personally informed of 
the project and had given it his blessing.59
The China Cadre Education Association appears to be a typical example of the 
so-called "retired officials reemployment project" (laoganbu zaijiuye gongcheng), a 
sarcastic reference to the phenomenon of NGOs being created to allow retired 
officials to continue to enjoy some influence as well as extra income. Sometimes 
incumbent officials set up NGOs shortly before they are due to retire, so that they 
can move to leadership positions in the NGOs afterwards. Some of these NGOs are 
mainly used for the personal gains of the retired officials. For example, they hold 
annual meetings in tourist attractions so that they can enjoy a free holiday. They 
also use these NGOs to reimburse their expenses on foreign trips. Relying on their 
seniority, some of these former officials even refuse to allow civil affairs 
departments to exercise their supervisory authority over the NGOs they control, 
causing the departments a big headache.60
Sometimes retired officials may not be involved in NGOs directly, but may use their 
influence to protect unregistered NGOs or to help NGOs that do not meet the 
requirements to register. Needless to say, retired officials are not the only ones who 
practise favouritism. Incumbent officials also use their influence and authority to
59 Lecture by the director of the POMB, 10 January 2000.
60 Lecture by the director of the POMB, 10 January 2000.
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shield NGOs which enjoy special relations with them (Chen 1997). As the director of 
the Ministry of Civil Affairs' Popular Organisation Management Bureau (POMB) 
complained, these officials irresponsibly intervene on behalf of problematic NGOs 
to enable them to be set up, but later, when these NGOs get into trouble, they try to 
shift the blame onto others.61 The problem of officials ignoring the rules while 
helping their friends has been so widespread that the 1999 directive jointly issued 
by the Party's Central Committee and the State Council specifically warned all Party 
and government officials to abide by laws and regulations and not to interfere in the 
state's management of NGOs. The 1999 document also made it clear that in future if 
NGOs were caught engaging in illegal activities, not only would their managers be 
punished, but their professional management units would be held responsible as 
well.62 The threat to punish NGOs' professional management units is itself a proof 
that the state has not been able to subject NGOs to effective control even though it 
has installed the dual management system which on paper appears to leave NGOs 
with very limited autonomy.
Reasons for the De Facto Autonomy of Officially-organised NGOs
From the various cases mentioned above we can see that how much de facto 
autonomy NGOs can enjoy is directly related to the state's ability to enforce its 
policies in this area, which can be undermined by many factors. The 
aforementioned cases reveal a few factors: first, the ability of individual officials to 
interfere in the implementation of government regulations on behalf of the NGOs 
they patronise, which has led Civil Affairs officials to lament that in NGO 
management "rule of men" (renzhi) had been more prevalent than "rule of law" 
(fazhi) (Wu and Chen 1996: 36); second, NGOs' financial independence. When 
NGOs do not need government funding but contribute to the coffers of their
61 Lecture, 10 January 2000.
62 Lecture by the director of the POMB, 10 January 2000.
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supervisory agencies instead, they are usually in a good position to negotiate more 
autonomy for themselves. Third, whether NGOs' professional management units 
take their supervisory responsibilities seriously. If a government agency neither 
stands to gain nor to lose from the operation of the NGO under its supervision, it 
may feel no incentive to carefully monitor the NGO's activities. Finally, the special 
relationship between many officially-organised NGOs and their supervisory 
agencies. Many officially-organised NGOs were created by the very state agencies 
which serve as their professional management units while their directors were 
former officials in the agencies. Consequently they are often trusted and given a free 
hand rather than tightly controlled by the agencies. This is a point which seems to 
have been missed by researchers on Chinese NGOs up to now. Compared with 
popular NGOs, officially-organised NGOs tend to possess better bureaucratic 
connections, higher status, and superior knowledge of the way the state machinery 
operates. As a result, they are usually in a better position to manipulate rules and 
regulations in order to enjoy more autonomy. They are also less afraid of defying 
the authority of government agencies than popular NGOs. Xu Yongguang once 
described the CYDF as an NGO "of high birth" (Fang and Wang 2001: 421). It 
should not be very surprising if such NGOs are more likely to be their own masters 
than NGOs of lower birth.
To examine further the reasons for the de facto autonomy of officially-organised 
NGOs it is worth returning to the case of the CYDF. At the moment, what mainly 
determines the autonomy of an NGO is its relationship with its professional 
management unit, as the latter is the linchpin of the current NGO management 
regime. We saw earlier that the CYDF has been given a rather free hand by its 
professional management unit, the Communist Youth League's Central Committee. 
Why has the Central Committee been so indulgent? The explanation begins with the 
leader of the CYDF, Xu Yongguang. He was director of the Central Committee's 
Organisation Department before leaving to set up the CYDF. It was a key position in
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the Youth League as the Organisation Department is in charge of personnel 
appointments. Xu Yongguang was also one of the longest-serving cadres of the 
Central Committee, having worked there since 1978. Because of his long association 
with the Central Committee, Xu Yongguang is both "trusted and respected" by it.63 
Furthermore, his deputies are also former Youth League cadres. This is an 
important reason why the Central Committee has adopted a hands-off approach 
towards the CYDF.
The CYDF's considerable autonomy is also based on its financial independence. 
When the CYDF was first set up, government regulations required that foundations 
should have an initial registered fund of at least 100,000 yuan, so the Youth League's 
Central Committee gave the CYDF 100,000 yuan, plus another 10,000 yuan for 
operational costs. Since then the CYDF has survived on its own. As of June 30,1999, 
it had raised a total of 1.78 billion yuan under Project Hope,64 which makes the 
financial contribution from the Youth League negligible. The importance of 
financial independence in deciding the relative autonomy of an organisation is not 
just demonstrated by the relationship between the CYDF and the Central 
Committee, it can also be seen from the relationship between provincial Project 
Hope Fund offices and provincial Youth League committees. The fundraising 
record of provincial Project Hope Fund offices varies considerably from one place to 
another. In the provinces where they are more successful, the provincial Youth 
League committees have had a difficult time bringing them to heel. As a CYDF 
person put i t  "When the Youth League committees cannot hold the purse strings, 
they cannot hold much else either." (Guo, Yang and Ying 1999: 285). In contrast, in 
the provinces where the Project Hope Fund offices have been less successful in 
fundraising, "probably the salaries of their staff are still dependent on the Youth 
League committees", consequently these organisations have not been able to ignore
63 Interview with Xu Yongguang, 8 November 2001.
64 From the CYDF's fact sheets.
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the command of the Youth League committees (Guo, Yang and Ying 1999: 285).
As it achieved its enormous fundraising success, the CYDF made sure that the 
Youth League would share the reward of that success. During its first year of 
existence, the CYDF funded various activities organised by both the Central 
Committee and grassroots Youth League organisations. In its second year, the 
CYDF received a donation of over 10,000 sets of audio-visual equipment from the 
Philips Company, which it gave to the Youth League's local branches as well as 
Youth League committees in all the central government ministries. Presenting these 
gifts to Youth League committees in the central government proved to be a 
particularly clever move, as it endeared the CYDF to some very useful friends who 
were able to render it highly valuable service later. For example, these Youth 
League committees helped to mobilise support for Project Hope and the CYDF 
within their own ministries, including asking their ministers to write inscriptions 
for the CYDF (Kang 1997: 116-118). In subsequent years, as Project Hope got into 
full steam, the CYDF distributed the money it raised through the Youth League's 
organisational network. Even though ensuring the money was used to build schools, 
purchase teaching aids, and pay the school fees for poor students in 
poverty-stricken areas means a lot of hard work, the Youth League's local branches 
all appreciated the job as it involved spending money after all, which meant more 
power and influence to them. In addition to letting the Youth League distribute 
Project Hope funds65, the CYDF also continued to support Youth League projects. 
For example, after raising the money to equip 10,000 rural primary schools with a 
"Project Hope Library", the CYDF decided that in choosing the beneficiaries it 
would give priority to its own Project Hope schools as well as schools targeted by 
the Central Committee's project "Servicing Ten Thousand Villages" (Kang 1997: 
190).
65 As mentioned earlier, the CYDF benefited enormously from this arrangement as well. Since it 
does not have a nation-wide organisational network of its own, the CYDF needs the help of the 
Youth League to run an operation that extends all over the country.
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The benefit which the Youth League has derived from the success of Project Hope is 
not confined to economic gains. Equally important are the political gains. In the first 
few years, despite the huge fame which Project Hope rapidly acquired, Xu 
Yongguang deliberately kept a low profile for the CYDF, always pushing the Youth 
League into the limelight instead, so much so that most people thought Project 
Hope was rim by the Youth League, very few people had actually heard about the 
CYDF (Kang 1997; Guo, Yang and Ying 1999). Project Hope greatly enhanced the 
public image of the Youth League. It also enabled Youth League cadres to present 
more achievements to their superiors. As a provincial Youth League cadre said in an 
interview:
When the general secretary of the provincial Youth League committee goes to see 
the general secretary of the provincial Party committee, the general secretary of the 
Party committee is pleased whenever Project Hope is brought up says: "You have 
done a good job with Project Hope." So the general secretary of the Youth League 
committee feels honoured. When the general secretary of the Party committee tries 
to name the achievements of the Youth League, the only thing he can think of is 
Project Hope. He does not remember any other work which the Youth League has 
done (Sim etal 1999:120).
More achievements have meant better chances of promotion for Youth League 
cadres. Research shows that many Youth League cadres who were associated with 
successful Project Hope operations have been promoted to high positions in the 
Party and the government after leaving the Youth League (Sun et al 1999: 120-121; 
Guo, Yang and Ying 1999: 28-29). Youth League cadres do not stay with the League 
for life, as it is after all a youth organisation, so sooner or later they are reassigned 
jobs in the Party or the government. Exactly what kind of job a person can have 
upon leaving the Youth League depends very much on the individual's track record 
as a Youth League cadre, therefore Project Hope has provided a big boost to the 
careers of many Youth League cadres.
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As we have seen, the Youth League trusts the CYDF because of the personnel 
connections. The CYDF costs it nothing while continuously brings it huge economic 
and political benefit Individual Youth League cadres have also been rewarded for 
supporting the CYDF's work. Under the circumstance, there is no reason why the 
Youth League should not let the CYDF have as much autonomy as possible. With 
the Youth League firmly on its side, the CYDF also successfully foiled potential 
challenge to its autonomy from other quarters, especially the education and 
propaganda departments of the Party and the government.
The Ministry of Education was upset first by the CYDF's fundraising techniques 
then the fame of Project Hope. To mobilise public donations to Project Hope, the 
CYDF graphically portrayed the poverty and educational deprivation suffered by 
many rural children, which cast a bad light on the work of the Ministry of Education. 
Whenever the education departments release their statistics, they always show high 
school attendance and retention rates. When the CYDF goes to the press, on the 
other hand, it always emphasizes the large number of children who are unable to 
attend school. In other words, the CYDF's publicity materials often contradict the 
claims of education departments, which have resulted in many frictions between 
the two. Officials in the Party's Propaganda Department have also been offended by 
the CYDF's fundraising campaigns66, as the problems it exposed not only 
embarrassed education departments, they could by extension cause embarrassment 
to the entire government. On one National Teachers' Day, the Central Television 
Station showed a documentary film which it had made jointly with the CYDF about 
the educational condition in poor regions of the country. A high-ranking official 
saw the film and thought the impression it created was that "teachers are miserable 
while students are helpless." Consequently he sent some subordinates to the Youth 
League's Central Committee to "have an exchange of views" and to give them a 
presentation on the government's achievements in promoting basic education in
66 Interview with Xu Yongguang, 8 November 2001.
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recent years. CYDF staff sarcastically refer to this kind of incident as being "given a 
lesson" (Guo, Yang and Ying 1999: 30). In later years, as the government became 
more and more open about the tremendous development challenges still facing the 
country, the CYDF's elaboration of poverty and educational deprivation was no 
longer a big offence to the Ministry of Education, but Project Hope became so 
famous that it completely overshadowed the work of education departments. 
Education officials felt unfairly upstaged since the government's annual education 
budget was more than 160 billion yuan whereas the money raised by the CYDF was 
only about 0.1 billion yuan each year. Yet everybody talked about the achievements 
of Project Hope as if the important work was all done by it (Guo, Yang and Ying 
1999; Sun et al 1999).
In the face of the pressure on it to stop playing up the "dark side" of the country 
from such powerful state agencies as the Ministry of Education and the Propaganda 
Department of the Party, it is hard to imagine that the CYDF would have been able 
to have its own way if the Youth League had not stood firmly behind it. The support 
that a patron like the Youth League can lend its protege is not limited to its own 
authority. With the help of the Youth League's connections, the CYDF managed to 
get many top state officials to write inscriptions for Project Hope.67 When the 
paramount leader Deng Xiaoping also wrote an inscription for the CYDF (the title 
"Project Hope" in his calligraphy), the CYDF had acquired a powerful shield of 
protection against potential enemies. The CYDF eventually registered Project Hope 
as a trademark with the State Trademark Bureau, using Deng Xiaoping's 
calligraphy as the logo. As Xu Yongguang said: "Once we had Deng Xiaoping's 
inscription, those people who wanted to make trouble for us would have to think
67 In China, it is customary for organisations or individuals to approach government officials for 
their hand-written inscriptions which are displayed as expressions of support or approval. It is 
also customary for shops, restaurants, etc. to use the calligraphy of government officials or 
distinguished scholars for their signboards instead of block letters. Similarly, newspapers and 
journals ask leaders to hand-write their titles which they use as their mastheads.
91
twice."68 This is a good demonstration of the advantage of officially-organised 
NGOs. They are created by state institutions and are placed under the constant 
supervision of those institutions, but if they handle the relationship with their 
supervisory agencies skilfully, the close links with the supervisory agencies need 
not stand in the way of their autonomy and can even help to increase it.
3.2 Popular NGOs
If officially-organised NGOs can find ways to enjoy de facto autonomy, e.g., by 
using personal relations, by achieving financial independence, by finding powerful 
patrons, and by offering their supervisory agencies various benefits in exchange for 
more freedom, then popular NGOs can use the same methods to overcome the 
constraints on their autonomy as well. What is not certain, however, is whether they 
inevitably enjoy more autonomy than officially-organised NGOs, as many have 
assumed, simply because they did not come into existence in a top-down fashion 
and are not as closely linked to state agencies as officially-organised NGOs. If the 
overall environment for Chinese NGOs is a restrictive one, as the conventional 
wisdom has it, then it would seem a bit naive to believe that certain NGOs can have 
greater autonomy simply because they are more genuinely non-governmental. As a 
matter of fact, it would not be illogical to assume the opposite: that the state is more 
on its guard against these NGOs on account of their being more genuinely 
non-governmental, hence it intrudes more frequently.
There have been cases of popular NGOs being co-opted by the state so that they lose 
their original spontaneous and bottom-up character. One example concerns some 
women's organisations. Since the mid-1980s, popular women intellectuals' 
associations have been formed in many cities and provinces, but the mass 
organisation All China Women's Federation soon became involved and these
68 Interview, 8 November 2001.
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associations began to lose their autonomy. In the words of a women intellectuals' 
association interviewee:
The Women's Federation was always conscientious, drew up the constitution, sent 
representatives and wanted to shape the [new] federations in its own image. The 
original federations were spontaneous. The Women's Federation gave a hand. Then 
gradually the federations lost their former activism. Before they could organise 
their own activities with their own money. But now they have to wait for the help 
of the Women's Federation (Howell 1996b: 138).
In another example, a constitutional research society sought financial support from 
the local People's Congress and the government-controlled Law Society. After 
giving the society some money, the leaders of the People's Congress and the Law 
Society joined it and virtually took over it. Its original founders lost control of the 
society's activities and had to abandon the organisation (Raab 1997: 20).
Co-optation is not the only means at the state's disposal for controlling popular 
NGOs. The fate of popular literary societies in Xiaoshan City discovered by Wang, 
Zhe, and Sun demonstrates some other means. Before 1988, literary societies 
mushroomed in Xiaoshan. At the peak, their number reached between 50 to 60. 
They also established contacts with popular literary societies in other parts of the 
country, exchanging their publications and manuscripts. In 1988, however, the 
government decided to tighten its control of literature and art organisations. 
Subsequently the police paid several visits to the work units of the leaders of the 
literary societies, making them feel that they were under a lot of pressure. As a 
result, many of the societies suspended their activities or disbanded. Some societies 
did survive into 1989, when the government introduced the dual management 
system for NGOs which required them to find a professional management unit. As 
mentioned earlier, an NGO's professional management unit must be an 
organisation with official responsibility in the NGO's field of activity. Therefore the 
literary societies could only appeal to the local chapter of the China Federation of
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Literary and Art Circles, a mass organisation, to act as their sponsor. However, the 
Federation was already sponsoring eight NGOs which it created itself, so it refused 
to take on the popular literary societies. Without a professional management unit, 
NGOs are not allowed to register. Consequently the last surviving popular literary 
societies in Xiaoshan also had to disband, with the exception of only one 
organisation which was composed of retired local officials and teachers. It 
eventually managed to persuade the Federation to sponsor it, but it was forced to 
make some changes first. Like the other societies, this particular society also used to 
have contacts with similar groups in other places. It even had over a dozen 
members who lived in other cities. To be allowed to register, however, it had to get 
rid of those members and limit the participation to local residents (Wang, Zhe, and 
Sun 1993: 230-231). In the space of a few years, therefore, the number of popular 
literary societies in Xiaoshan was reduced from over 50 to just one, and the 
remaining one had had to cut its contact with similar organisations elsewhere in 
order to survive.
While state interference through coercion is a serious threat to the autonomy of 
popular NGOs, more often it is constricted by NGOs' self-censorship. Unlike 
officially-organised NGOs, who acquire their sponsoring units by birth, popular 
NGOs need to find government agencies willing to act as their professional 
management units by themselves or at least find registered NGOs who are willing 
to let them "hang under" as second-level organisations, otherwise they cannot exist 
lawfully. When they do manage to find sponsors, it is crucial that they maintain 
good relationship with their sponsors, which require the NGOs to behave 
themselves so as not to cause any trouble for their sponsors. Apart from such 
considerations, there is always the fear that if they do anything which the 
government does not want them to do, they will be banned outright. In an interview, 
the director of one of the most active and outspoken environmental NGOs in China 
contrasted his cautious approach with that of the environmental activist Dai Qing,
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whose sharp criticism of a big dam project only resulted in her being completely 
deprived of a voice within China (Raab 1997: 27). On another occasion, a 
representative of the same NGO summarised the goal of her organisation as first of 
all to support the government to do the things it was able to do, i.e., not making any 
impossible demands on the government. Only secondly was the organisation's goal 
to maintain its independence so that it could voice different opinions.69 Before 
making any move, Chinese NGOs always try to guess what the government's 
reaction would be. However, there seems to be a big difference between the 
strategies of officially-organised NGOs and popular NGOs. When the CYDF knew 
that its planned activities were politically sensitive and would not please the 
government, for example, it often decided to achieve fait accompli first and deal with 
the consequences later. Speaking of a particular CYDF fundraising initiative in 
Hong Kong which resulted in the central government's representative office in 
Hong Kong sending a scathing report to Beijing, Xu Yongguang said: "The higher 
authorities gave us a dressing down, reproaching us for not seeking permission to 
do it first. We thought that if we asked for permission we would not be given it, so 
of course we did not ask for permission first."70 This attitude stands in stark contrast 
with that of popular NGOs, who apply self-censorship not only to their activities, 
but also to their everyday management decisions. The fear is that if the government 
does not like an NGO on political grounds, it might find fault with, say, some 
financial decisions the NGO makes, then punish the NGO using that excuse.71
It appears that the closer an NGO is to the grassroots, the more likely that it fears 
incurring the displeasure of the state. Some popular NGOs have been set up by elite 
members of the society such as academics, lawyers, or journalists who have some 
good connections with the state bureaucracy based on work or personal relations,
69 Interview, 18 November 1999.
70 Interview, 8 November 2001.
71 Interview, 18 November 1999. According to Saich (2000: 133), a 1997 Public Security Bureau 
Circular recommended some administrative measures which could be used to block unwelcome 
NGOs, one of which was to pull them up on financial regulations.
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whereas others are formed by ordinary citizens without such connections. The latter 
category of NGOs appear to be the least able to maintain their autonomy owing to 
their fear of punishment from the state for disregarding any of its rules. This 
situation is vividly demonstrated by the experience of a parents' organisation which 
I encountered during my field research.
The organisation was formed by some parents of autistic children who organised 
regular activities amongst themselves for years. They called themselves a "club", 
although it appeared to be a full-blown formal organisation. For example, the club 
had a constitution. Its members elected an executive council once every four years 
and they paid annual membership fees which were used to publish a newsletter, 
among other things. The club organised a wide range of activities, e.g., inviting 
specialists from other cities to give training and lectures to its members; conducting 
surveys of the needs of families with autistic children; drawing media attention to 
the lack of social service for autistic children. In fact, it was the best-organised 
grassroots autonomous organisation I came across in China. Since 1996, the club 
had been trying to register as an independent organisation. Obviously it had not 
been easy for it to gain approval from the government. When representatives of the 
club first went to see government officials, the latter considered them troublemakers 
and refused to see them. With perseverance and the right tactics, the club eventually 
gained the sympathy of relevant government officials. In 1998, the local Civil Affairs 
Bureau finally decided to allow the club to register. However, before the registration 
went ahead, the Falun Gong incident took place. Afterwards the government froze 
the registration of new NGOs and the club was told by civil affairs officials that no 
new organisation of its kind would be approved in the next 5 to 10 years.72
As the government launched a national-wide campaign to straighten out the NGO 
sector after the Falun Gong incident, the members of the club became afraid of
72 Interview, 25 March 2000.
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carrying on their activities without a legitimate status, therefore the club was left 
with one choice, i.e., to become the subsidiary of a registered organisation. The city 
where the club was located has an officially-organised NGO called the Mental 
Health Association. Its leader agreed to let the parents' club "hang under" it. 
However, there were serious concerns among the parents that once the club became 
a subsidiary of the Mental Health Association, it would lose its autonomy, and its 
freedom to organise activities would be restricted. The fear seemed to be 
well-founded. As one parent related to me:
Last time we met with the general secretary of the Association he said: "In the past 
some parents insisted on remaining independent. They were going too far." Then I 
mentioned that we wanted to invite certain experts from other cities to come here to 
give us some training. The general secretary immediately reacted by saying: "Once 
you have joined our association, we will take care of all these things. You parents 
can just sit back and act as our advisers."73
Members of the club split up into two camps: those who favoured affiliation with 
the Mental Health Association, because this seemed to be the only legitimate means 
for them to continue working for the interests of autistic children and their families; 
and those who were against affiliation with the Association, thinking that they 
could only carry out effective work by being an independent organisation. 
Eventually parents who favoured affiliation with the Association joined it as 
individual members of its newly-formed Youth and Children Branch. The rest of the 
parents, a minority, became "dispersed", and the club ceased operation. The parents 
who joined the Association had hoped that some of them would be allowed to serve 
on the executive council of the Youth and Children Branch, so that they could have 
some influence on its decision-making, but it turned out that the Association did not 
reserve a single place on the council for them. When I spoke to some parents who 
joined the Association four months afterwards, they remained disappointed about
73 Interview, 27 March 2000.
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the situation.74
The club offers a good example of popular NGOs losing their autonomy or even 
their own identity because of their fear of state retribution for operating outside its 
orbit. Sometimes popular NGOs also forgo their autonomy voluntarily in order to 
better promote the interests of its members. A classic example involves the Xiaoshan 
Self-Employed Labourers' Association. The Association was established in 1983 by 
self-employed business people in the city. At the inaugural meeting, representatives 
elected a nine-member board made up entirely of self-employed labourers. As a 
popular organisation, however, the Association did not carry any weight with 
government departments, so it was unable to influence the government to attend to 
the needs of its members. When the next election came up three years later, 
therefore, the Association appealed to the government to give it some official status. 
Consequently two officials from the local Industry and Commerce Bureau were 
elected to the board. One of them was elected chairperson of the Association. The 
other person was made general secretary, i.e. the chief executive of the Association. 
Meanwhile, the Association itself was formally placed under the sponsorship of the 
Industry and Commerce Bureau as a semi-official organisation (Wang, Zhe and Sun 
1993: 39-40; White, Howell and Shang 1996:114).
Conclusion
This chapter has presented various examples to show that officially-organised 
NGOs in China can enjoy a great deal of de facto autonomy whereas popular NGOs 
can face many constraints on their autonomy. These examples are intended to 
challenge two currently dominant views: first, lacking autonomy is a big issue for 
Chinese NGOs; second, popular NGOs are more autonomous than 
officially-organised NGOs. While these views do not hold water in the face of
74 Interview, 16 July 2000.
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empirical evidence, it does not mean that their opposites are true. Chinese NGOs 
are not enjoying unlimited freedom from government intervention, nor can one say 
that officially-organised NGOs in general are more autonomous than popular 
NGOs. What is clear is that in the same institutional environment some NGOs have 
fared much better than others, whether in maintaining their autonomy, in 
mobilising public support, or in achieving organisational sustainability and 
development, and these include both officially-organised and popular NGOs. What 
lessons can be learned from the success stories? What particular qualities or skills 
are responsible for the outstanding performance of these NGOs? These questions 
are addressed in the next two chapters.
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4. Chinese NGOs and the State: A Dependent Relationship
In existing research and discussions, no distinction has been made between the 
autonomy and the independence of Chinese NGOs. Although these two words have 
similar meanings and are often used interchangeably, differentiating one from the 
other is crucial for understanding the nature and behaviour of Chinese NGOs. This 
thesis treats autonomy and independence as two analytically distinct concepts, for 
the following reasons: First, I argue that many Chinese NGOs enjoy a good deal of 
autonomy but remain heavily dependent on the state for their survival, legitimacy, 
and operation.75 Second, so far the interest in NGO autonomy seems to have made 
analysts pay more attention to the state than to NGOs by directing their 
investigation towards the state's attempt to restrict NGOs' freedom and use them 
for its own purposes. Analysing NGOs' independence (or rather their lack of it), on 
the other hand, may compel the researcher to focus more on the needs, goals, and 
strategies of NGOs.
In the previous chapter, I have tried to demonstrate that many Chinese NGOs are 
able to enjoy a high degree of de facto autonomy. In this chapter I shall describe 
NGO's multiple dependence on the state. Many Chinese researchers have noted 
that Chinese NGOs have been drawing various forms of support from the state. 
Based on their detailed studies of the CYDF, for example, researcherj; haye pointed 
out that NGOs exploit both state:ownedjmd society-owned resources for their own 
organisational development, and they use both administrative and socialised 
methods to mobilise donations. Extant studies, however, all take for granted that
75 In the Oxford English Dictionary "autonomy" is defined as follows: "of a state, institution, etc.: 
the right of self-government, of making its own laws and administering its own affairs." The 
various meanings of "independent" include "not depending on something else for its existence, 
validity, efficiency, operation, or some other attribute"; "not contingent on or conditioned by 
anything else"; "not dependent or having to rely on another for support or supplies." Clearly an 
organisation can be self-governing but at the same time dependent on other organisations for the 
various things cited in the definition of "independent".
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the overall trend of NGO development in China will show a continuous diminution 
of the role of the state and a steady rise in the significance of social forces. As 
researchers see it, at present bottom-up NGOs are already surviving on their own 
w ithjittle help from the state. The current "dual management system" places them 
under the supervision of state organs, but these organisations have a "natural 
tendency" (Kang 1999b: 111) to seek full autonomy and detachment from the state. 
Whenever possible, therefore, they will try, to fulfil their natural inclination by 
breaking away from the state's influence. The top-down NGOs, for their part, will 
be under growing pressure to make themselves more relevant to the needs of 
society, as their survival will also increasingly depend on how much support and 
approval they can receive from society.
The assumption that Chinese NGOs will increasingly align themselves to society 
rather than the state reminds one of the claims which have been made about private 
businesses in China. Many analysts had thought that the private sector would be a 
major driving force for civil society in China. According to their reasoning, as 
economic reform progresses, the power of the private sector will continue to grow 
at the expense of the state. Their possession of independent economic resources will 
allow private entrepreneurs to emerge as an autonomous social class. Since their 
fortune is tied to the market, whose healthy long-term development needs the 
protection of democratic political institutions, the private business class will have a 
strong interest in promoting political reforms, and will join hands with other social 
forces to struggle against the authoritarian state in order to bring about democratic 
political changes. In other words, economic reform will inevitably lead to political 
liberalisation, and those at the cutting edge of economic reform will also play a 
leading part in political reform.
Unfortunately, such assumptions have not been substantiated by various empirical 
studies into private business-state relations in China. These studies find that the
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development of private businesses has not led to the emergence of civil society but 
has only created new forms of societal dependence on the state. Instead of forging 
horizontal alliances amongst themselves and with other social groups, studies 
reveal that private entrepreneurs have sought to advance their interest by 
cultivating patron-client ties with government officials. They rely on such ties for 
both commercial advantage and political protection (see, e.g., Solinger 1992; Bruun 
1993,1995; Pearson 1999; Wank 1995b, 1999). Bureaucratic patronage is vital to the 
commercial success of private businesses since partial market reform has left much 
control over the allocation of resources and opportunities in the hands of officials. 
Without access to those resources and opportunities, private entrepreneurs would 
not have been able to conduct any business on a meaningful scale. Partial reform 
also leaves private businesses to operate in an environment in which many 
uncertainties remain, for example, with regard to the state's support for private 
property rights, limits to administrative interference in commercial activities, and 
the constancy of government policies. As a result, bureaucratic patronage is needed 
in order to reduce these uncertainties (Wank 1999).
The clientelist relationship between private businesses and government officials 
differs from the clientelism that existed in the pre-reform period. David Wank has 
termed the new variant "symbiotic clientelism" to distinguish it from the 
"dependent clientelism" under the command economy. The key difference lies in 
the degree of client dependence on patrons. With symbiotic clientelism the 
dependence is reduced as the entrepreneur-clients now have resources which they 
can offer officials in exchange for their patronage. Nevertheless the clientelist nature 
of the relationship is unquestionable, as "it involves an imbalance of power between 
official patrons and entrepreneurial clients, it involves the exercise of discretion by 
officials in allocating resources and opportunities, and it is embedded in personal 
ties" (Wank 1995b: 155).
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Not only have private businesses developed a dependence on the state bureaucracy, 
but the dependence has intensified in more commercialized areas, further 
disappointing general expectations. As Wank explained:
[T]he salient feature of the social structure in more commercialized areas is not, as 
some have argued, the reduction of dependent patron-client ties, but the rise of 
symbiotic ones. In areas characterized by petty private business, the smaller scale of 
commercial activity may erode dependent patron-client ties without engendering 
new symbiotic forms. This is because for petty private business, resource 
requirements are fewer and more easily available without bureaucratic discretion, 
thereby obviating the need for patron-client ties. In contrast, in areas of greater 
commercial activity, the resource requirements linked to bureaucratic discretion 
are also greater, obliging entrepreneurs to cultivate official patrons. In other words, 
it seems that greater commercialization is more likely to transform the 
dependent-clientelist order into a symbiotic one (Wank 1995b: 180-181).
Similarly, access to foreign capital does not make entrepreneurs more independent 
of state power either:
While this reduced their dependence on officials for capital, the infusion of 
overseas capital led them to expand into business activities that did require 
bureaucratic support. Foreign capital enabled them to set up capitalist firms, which 
then needed bureaucratic support for access to business sites, direct foreign-trade 
opportunities, raw materials, and so on. In other words, access to foreign capital 
reduces dependence on the bureaucracy for one resource, but appears to generate a 
need for bureaucratic support in acquiring other resources (Wank 1995b: 181).
In short, empirical studies find that market reform has created a private sector with 
its own resources and distinct interests. However, the private sector has not 
emerged as an independent social force that seeks to challenge the state's 
domination over society, as surmised by civil society analysts. Rather, private 
businesses have entered into clientelist relationship with officials in order to 
safeguard and expand their gains from market reforms. Moreover, studies show 
that further marketization of the economy or the ability of private businesses to 
access foreign capital does not necessarily bring the immediate decline of
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clientelism. If, as Solinger has suggested, China's transition from a planned to a 
market economy could be a sui generis process that is "potentially quite protracted" 
(Solinger 1992: 122), then the dependence of private businesses on the state could 
also be a protracted episode rather than a transient phenomenon.
There is good reason to believe that what is true for private businesses is also true 
for NGOs in China. It seems that many analogies can be drawn between the two 
types of organisation. After all, they all operate in the same institutional 
environment and are faced with similar constraints, even though they pursue 
different objectives. If private businesses need protection against bureaucratic 
harassment, arbitrary local sanctions, and fluctuations in central government 
policies, there is no reason why NGOs can do without the same protection. 
Similarly, when the state retains considerable control over the allocation of 
resources, both private businesses and NGOs need to cultivate the patronage of 
state agents in order to gain access to those resources on which their ability to carry 
out their activities depend.
For this reason, the effort by researchers to distinguish between top-down and 
bottom-up NGOs in China is largely misguided. Bottom-up NGOs, including a 
sub-category which is sometimes referred to as donor-organised NGOs (DONGOs), 
i.e. NGOs which are set up with donor funding, are analogous to private businesses 
that have access to foreign capital. As Wank points out, while the infusion of foreign 
capital removes the dependence of these businesses on the bureaucracy for one 
resource, it creates dependence for other resources. By the same token, the ability to 
generate their own funding does not make bottom-up NGOs independent of the 
state, as they then turn to the state for other support that is equally indispensable to 
their survival and operation. The degree of NGO's dependence on the state tends to 
have more to do with their size than with their origin (i.e., whether they are 
officially or popularly organised). Again, there is an analogy with private
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businesses. As Wank (1999) has shown, petty private businesses may be able to keep 
their contacts with the bureaucracy to a minimum, since the small scale of their 
operations means that their resource requirements are few and easily met. In 
contrast, large-scale private businesses must build up extensive clientelist networks 
in order to be able to engage in the more lucrative commercial activities which also 
require more bureaucratic backing. In a similar vein, one can imagine a small 
grassroots NGO that limits its activities within the local community to lead a more 
or less separate existence from the state. However, it is inconceivable how an NGO 
running a cross-regional operation can do away with one sort of state support or 
another, regardless of whether it is an officially-organised or a popular 
organisation.
In this chapter I will again refer to the case of the CYDF, which provides an excellent 
example of the experience of top-down NGOs. For the most part, however, I will 
use the examples of bottom-up organisations (including DONGOs) to illustrate 
Chinese NGOs' dependence on the state. My reasons for preferring such examples 
are obvious: if it can be proven that NGOs created in the bottom-up fashion and 
sustained largely by non-governmental (including overseas) funding are not 
independent of the state, then it goes without saying that other types of NGOs must 
be equally if not more dependent on the state. Using the examples of popular NGOs 
also has an additional advantage. As I have suggested in several places, judging by 
the comments various people have made on popular NGOs, they are probably the 
most misunderstood category of Chinese NGOs. Many received views of popular 
NGOs have gone down unchallenged, not because they are founded on careful 
empirical research, but only because they sound intuitively correct. Therefore, the 
stories of bottom-up NGOs related here are also intended to present a more accurate 
picture of these organisations and their relationship with the state, and to refute 
some spurious notions which have gained wide circulation.
105
By NGO dependence on the "state" I refer to state in the broad sense. It covers both 
central and local state, both organisations (such as government agencies) and 
people (such as officials serving as agents of the state), both administrative organs 
and other state-owned institutions, e.g., the official newspapers of the government 
or the Party. NGOs may depend on certain components of the state for support but 
not others. For example, a particular NGO may survive on the patronage of local 
officials but may have no direct contact with the central government. I nevertheless 
speak of NGO's dependence on the state rather than specifying the particular 
elements, since in this chapter I am only concerned to distinguish the state from 
society. It does not matter exactly what parts of the state are involved, as long as it is 
clear that they represent power, influence, knowledge, or resources that are outside 
the domain of society.
4.1 NGO Dependence on the State for Legitimacy and Protection
In Chapter 2 I mentioned Gao's discussion of the different types of legitimacy of 
Chinese NGOs. He suggests that some NGOs have come into being by dint of their 
social legitimacy. However, social legitimacy alone only allows these NGOs to lead 
a precarious existence at best, therefore they would use all their ingenuity to try to 
gain administrative and political legitimacy as well. Possessing political legitimacy 
requires that NGOs conform to the official ideology and support the goals and 
policies of the state. In other words, the criteria of political legitimacy are set entirely 
by the state. Administrative legitimacy stems from association or contacts with the 
state bureaucracy, therefore it also derives from the state. Since to Chinese NGOs 
social legitimacy only means partial legitimacy, which cannot guarantee them a 
secure life, in Gao's analysis they clearly depend on the state for full legitimacy.
Gao uses a folk society that worships a dragon tablet as an example of NGOs 
created on the basis of social legitimacy which then endeavour to gain
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administrative and political legitimacy. However, from the story he has told, one 
might conclude that it has taken more than social legitimacy to bring the dragon 
tablet society into being. It would appear that from the very beginning the society 
has depended on some connection with the authority of the state for its existence. 
Since worshipping the dragon tablet represents "feudal superstition" which is 
banned by the state, its followers were afraid of carrying out their activities openly. 
The society was formally established and came into the open only after its two 
leaders, both of whom were members of the Community Party, said that they 
would take the blame should the government take action against the society. The 
main founder and also the first head of the society was a veteran of both the Eighth 
Route Army (balujun)76 and the People's Liberation Army who had retired from the 
army on a state pension. He famously said to the other founding members of the 
society who were still hesitating: "Go ahead. I will take the pressure if anything 
happens." These words are still being frequently quoted by the locals and have been 
an inspiration to them ever since (Su et al 1999: 322, 325-326). Here we see that both 
the courage of the leader to initiate a potentially illegal organisation and his 
credibility in the eyes of his followers come ultimately from association with state 
power. The leader's army service record and party membership have afforded him 
some sort of station which ordinary people do not have. It was such station, which 
was conferred by the state, which provided the necessary encouragement to the 
members of the society to formally launch it.
When the state nevertheless figures prominently in a story about NGOs' social 
legitimacy, one gets a keen sense of how important the state is to NGOs. In fact, 
much of Gao's discussion of NGO legitimacy boils down to their legitimacy in the 
eyes of the state. Chinese NGOs need first of all this kind of legitimacy, because 
otherwise they may be suppressed by the state at any moment. But Chinese NGOs
76 The army led by the Communist Party during the war of resistance against Japan (1937-1944). 
It was renamed the People's Liberation Army after the war.
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also need legitimacy in the eyes of society. Often, such legitimacy depends on the 
state as well. Legitimacy in the eyes of society is not the same as what Gao calls 
social legitimacy. By social legitimacy Gao means roots of social support. He 
explained this concept using the example of folk societies which were formed on the 
basis of local tradition, shared values, and common interests. By legitimacy in the 
eyes of society I refer to the credibility and trustworthiness of NGOs in the eyes of 
their potential clients, donors, and the general public. Apparently no NGO can 
function properly if it is not perceived as a trustworthy and credible organisation by 
the public.
In their study of the CYDF Sun et al found that the organisation established its 
legitimacy in the eyes of society not on account of its non-governmental status but 
rather by displaying its numerous ties to the state. As a CYDF staffer said: "Under 
our system, to conduct a publicity campaign you need first of all to ask the leaders 
to write inscriptions for you, because common people believe in this. When they see 
that the leaders have given something the nod, they know that this thing is safe and 
legal" (Sun et al 1999: 55). When the CYDF sent out its first letter of appeal by mass 
mailing, it aroused considerable suspicion among the public, as there were many 
scams around at the time which all involved letters being sent to people to invite 
them to take part in certain projects. Some organisations and individuals who 
received the CYDF's letter actually contacted the Youth League or the police to ask 
them to find out if it was yet another hoax. At this point, the CYDF came up with the 
brilliant idea of printing an advertisement in the People's Daily, the official 
newspaper of the Party. CYDF staff described it as a "decisive move" which gained 
the CYDF tremendous confidence from the public: "Just imagine. Even the People's 
Daily has carried an advertisement for the CYDF and Project Hope, so there can be 
no doubt that it is not a sham... .Afterwards we never heard of people writing to the 
police asking them to check out the CYDF again" (Sun et al 1999: 57).
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Not only do the Chinese public need this kind of assurance before they can trust an 
NGO, foreign businesses also frequently base their decisions on whether to donate 
money to a local NGO or not on the NGO's relationship with the government As 
CYDF staff related their experience:
Foreign businesses would also ask about the government's attitude towards our 
organisation. They would ask: "How does the Party Central Committee view this 
activity of yours? How does the government view it?" You tell them they all 
support it. In particular, you stress to them that Jiang Zemin has written an 
inscription for us. Deng Xiaoping has also written an inscription. These leaders 
have also personally donated money to us. Then these businesses will decide to 
work with you. Therefore, government support is very useful (Sun et al 1999: 274).
The CYDF's experience is fairly representative of that of the NGO sector as a whole. 
Since the concept of non-governmental organisation is still a novelty to most people, 
top-down and bottom-up NGOs alike emphasize their connections to the 
government or simply claim they are the government when they try to establish 
their credibility with the public. For example, when staff of the Yilong County Rural 
Development Association, an NGO running micro credit projects, went into villages, 
they would tell villagers that they came from the county government office that was 
responsible for implementing poverty alleviation projects (Deng 2001b). As the 
general secretary of the Association defended their approach: "If you go to the 
villages [as an NGO], ordinary people will not trust you. In China there is only the 
government. Ordinary people do not know there are other organisations beside the 
government" (Yang 2001a: 100-101). This view has been echoed by many other 
NGOs. A member of a legal counselling centre for women told me: "The reality in 
China is this: If you go out in the name of the Centre, people will simply ignore you. 
They only pay attention to you when you say you are from the Information Office of 
the government's Justice Bureau."77 The director of an NGO that provides services 
for rural women told a researcher: "Without government backing...society won't
77 Interview, 29 April 2000.
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trust you" (Raab 1997: 45). This NGO publishes a magazine for rural women which 
is a subsidiary of Chinese Women's News, the official newspaper of the All China 
Women's Federation. When a rival publication tried to undermine the magazine, it 
did so by spreading a rumour that the magazine was a private venture without any 
links to the Women's Federation. The NGO's director apparently considered the 
rumour to be a serious threat to the reputation of her organisation, and took swift 
actions to rebut it (Raab 1997: 46).
The experience of the Prisoners' Children's Villages (PCVs) provides one of the
most telling examples of NGOs1 dependence on the state for legitimacy in the eyes
of society. These villages were set up by an NGO called Shaanxi Province Returning
to Society Research Association (SPRSRA). The SPRSRA's original purpose was to
help ex-convicts to reintegrate into society, but most of its work has centred on
running PCVs that provide residential care for the^children of serving convicts who
cannot be cared for by their families or relatives. Zhang Shuqin, the founder and
general secretary of the SPRSRA, used to be a journalist working for a newspaper
published by the Shaanxi Province Prison Bureau. The SPRSRA's directors and 
*
advisers include many incumbent and retired officials from the prison bureau as 
well as other relevant state organs, such as the public security bureau, the civil 
affairs bureau, and the people's procuratorate.78 The SPRSRA identified children in 
need of help by contacting serving convicts through their prisons. Prison authorities 
informed their inmates that the PCVs could take care of their children. Those who 
wished to take advantage of the PCVs' services were then asked to sign a document 
entrusting the care and education of their children to the PCVs until their release 
from prison. Since the convicts were unable to check out the PCVs themselves, the 
fact that the PCVs were introduced by the prison authorities served to assure them 
that these organisations were closely linked to the state judicial system and were
78 The names and titles of some of these officials are mentioned in a document of the association, 
"Summary of the Work of the Shaanxi Province Returning to Society Research Association", 
dated 17 October 1999.
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therefore not a fraud. As a matter of fact, it is possible that the convicts do not even 
see a clear distinction between the PCVs and the government. Because of its close 
relations with the prison bureau, the SPRSRA had special access to prisons. It could 
even take convicts out of prisons to participate in its public relations and 
fundraising events. Although she had been working full-time for the SPRSRA since 
it was set up, Zhang Shuqin had retained her position as an employee of the prison 
bureau, which allowed her to continue to wear her police uniform. Often, she would 
deliberately put on her uniform when representing the PCVs in front of convicts 
and the general public. Wearing the uniform was particularly important when 
Zhang Shuqin went to pick up children who had been selected for the PCVs from 
their home villages. She and her PCV colleagues usually went to the local 
government first and asked cadres of the township government to accompany them 
to the villages in order to gain the trust of local people. Once a PCV worker went 
straight to a village, only to be driven out by the villagers, as he was taken for a 
child trafficker. Only when he returned the next day with local officials was he able 
to take the child away.79
In addition to establishing their political legitimacy to the state, NGOs are also faced 
with the constant task of legitimizing their actions to individual government 
agencies or officials whose co-operation and support may be essential. Once again, 
the ultimate source of such legitimization is usually the state itself. For example, 
when the environmental NGO Friends of Nature criticizes local governments that 
pursue economic development strategies that damage the environment, it would 
justify its action by invoking central government policies which the local practices 
have violated.80 The SPRSRA legitimizes its work with convicts' children to 
government agencies by declaring its aim to be "eliminating potential problems for
79 The above information is based on various newspaper and magazine feature articles about 
Zhang Shuqin and her PCVs, a book on the PCVs (Chang 2000), and many conversations I had 
with Zhang Shuqin while working for her as a volunteer in December 1999 and January 2000.
80 Presentation by the director of Friends of Nature at an international conference in Beijing on 30 
October 1999.
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the government",81 and it always stresses the endorsement of its activities by 
higher-level officials when it approaches lower-level government agencies for 
assistance. While studying the Help Centre for Special Children, which is the 
extension of the PCV initiative in Beijing,821 was able to observe the Centre's staff 
making phone calls to various government offices. When contacting an agency for 
the first time, they often implied that they were making the call at the behest of 
some other government agencies or officials. For example, when Zhang Shuqin 
contacted a director of the prison bureau to see if the bureau would be willing to 
sponsor the planned PCV in Beijing, she claimed that certain high officials in the 
municipal Party committee who were responsible for public security and legal 
affairs —in other words the superiors of this bureau director —told her to call him. 
She also made a request to the municipal government office responsible for law and 
order related work that they lend her a police car. As Zhang Shuqin explained its 
value: "When you arrive in a police car, it is totally different from arriving in a taxi. 
As mere representatives of a popular organisation, you may have a hard time just to 
get past the doorkeepers and messengers in government agencies."83 Similarly, a 
government official explained the indispensable "co-ordination work" which his 
office provided for a popular women's NGO thus: "Since township governments 
are not familiar with them, if they go to the townships themselves, township 
governments will not receive them. Therefore before they go out it is necessary for 
us to speak to township governments first, then the lower levels will receive
81 This aim has been written into various documents of the SPRSRA, for example, "Summary of 
the Work of the Shaanxi Province Returning to Society Research Association, 9 August 1999".
82 Zhang Shuqin wanted to replicate the PCVs to other regions of China, so in July 1999 she 
moved from Shaanxi to Beijing. Her plan was to set up a demonstration PCV in Beijing first, then 
gradually open up more PCVs in other places. When I went to study Zhang Shuqin's work in 
Beijing, a large part of her effort concentrated on getting the relevant government agencies in 
Beijing to support her initiative. Since government regulations forbid NGOs to establish regional 
branches, Zhang Shuqin needed to register a separate organisation in Beijing rather than set it up 
as a branch of the Shaanxi PCVs. While trying to obtain the necessary government approval for a 
PCV in Beijing, Zhang Shuqin had opened a small office in Beijing and called it the Help Centre 
for Special Children. It was hosted by the China Charities Federation.
83 Conversation, 5 January 2000.
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them /'84
Legitimacy alone cannot guarantee Chinese NGOs a carefree existence. Even 
organisations that have fully established their legitimacy in the eyes of both the state 
and society are still vulnerable to obstruction or predation by individual 
government agencies or officials. They need protection against such hindrances, 
and the protection can only come from the state itself. Deng Xiaoping's inscription, 
which symbolised direct support from the paramount leader of the state, protected 
the CYDF against attacks from certain state agencies and officials who were 
offended by some of its activities. This type of protection is widely used by Chinese 
NGOs, who often hang inscriptions by high-ranking officials or pictures taken with 
them on their walls as well as print these on their publicity materials. The founder 
and director of a children's NGO was once granted a reception by a vice-premier 
who also wrote an inscription for her. Afterwards she printed the inscription and 
the picture of herself shaking hands with the vice-premier on every issue of the 
NGO's newsletter. Since the vice-premier appeared to be very supportive of this 
director's work, a rumour spread in the city where the NGO was located that she 
was the vice-premier's nominally adopted daughter (gannu'er),85 a rumour which 
she deliberately avoided denying. The director said she used these things to scare 
off "the little devils", meaning lower level officials who might make trouble for her. 
While the director's connection with the vice-premier was just a rumour, she did 
find herself some nominally adoptive parents in Beijing who were retired senior 
officials. She asked them to inquire about the NGO whenever they met officials 
from her part of the country and to ask them to render it assistance if necessary. As 
the director put it: "If these officials are repeatedly asked to support my 
organisation when they go to Beijing, they will conclude that I have powerful
84 Interview, 29 April 2000.
85 A custom in China whereby people "adopt" sons and daughters but don't necessarily take any 
responsibility for them or live together with them. It is somewhat similar to the custom of having 
godparents. The difference is that one can be nominally adopted at any stage of one's life. It is 
not unusual for adults to become nominally adopted children of others.
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connections, so at least they will refrain from creating troubles for me."86
This director initially set up her NGO in a different city. At first she received strong 
support from the local government, but then a major incident completely damaged 
her relationship with the local government, which resulted in her moving the NGO 
to another city. The incident involved a big charity concert to raise money for the 
NGO which was organised by the municipal women's federation, civil affairs 
bureau, and television station. After the concert, the organising committee, on 
which the NGO was not represented, claimed that the money raised was not 
enough to cover the cost of organising the concert. It claimed there was a total 
deficit of over 80,000 yuan. Furthermore, it asked the NGO to make up the deficit. 
The NGO suspected there was foul play, since dining the concert many businesses 
and individuals made large cash or in kind donations, which rendered the story of a 
deficit implausible. Some local journalists investigated the incident, then published 
articles in local newspapers questioning the organising committee's story. The 
newspapers were all owned by either the local government or the local Party 
Committee. They subsequently pressured the journalists to retract their articles. The 
organisers of the concert, on the other hand, made no attempt to give more 
explanations as to how they ran into a deficit. Nor did they publish their accounts. 
The whole matter might have remained unsettled if the director had not taken part 
in some activities in Beijing a few months later, during which she met the 
vice-premier who was later rumoured to be her nominally adoptive father. She took 
the opportunity to tell the vice-premier about the charity concert and showed him 
the articles written by the journalists. The vice-premier was outraged and 
personally wrote instructions to concerned central government agencies ordering 
them to carry out a thorough investigation and punish the wrongdoers. In the event, 
a team from Beijing composed of officials from the Party's Central Commission for 
Discipline Inspection, the Ministry of Supervision, and the Ministry of Culture went
86 Informal interview, 19 April 2000.
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to the city and investigated the case. The team found that the agencies responsible 
for organising the concert had used it to benefit themselves. In addition to pocketing 
some of the donated money and goods, the agencies also paid big per diems to their 
staff who worked on the concert, gave lavish banquets to the performers, and 
purchased equipment for personal use for members of the organising committee. 
These expenses all contributed to the high cost of the concert. After the investigation 
by the Beijing team, the agencies were ordered to hand over all the money and 
goods they had embezzled to the NGO. Many local officials implicated in the 
scandal were subjected to disciplinary action. The president of the women's 
federation was dismissed from her post.87
If the director in this case had not got the attention and support of the vice-premier, 
it was not certain whether she would have seen justice done her organisation in the 
end. As she said, officials tended to shield each other. Besides, they were often 
caught in dense local networks of personal ties. For example, the husband of the 
women's federation president was a high-ranking official in the municipal Party 
Committee.88 From these officials' point of view, it was not wise to take the side of 
an outsider like herself against their colleagues and friends. In any case, an 
investigation by the central government was launched only after the vice-premier 
took a personal interest in the matter. In this case, the NGO obviously depended on 
the central government to protect it from abuse by corrupt local officials. In another 
case which I am about to relate, an NGO was mistreated by a real estate company 
with which it had commercial transactions rather than by corrupt officials. All the 
same, it had to rely on the intervention of the government to protect its rights.
87 Information about the charity concert scandal is based on my informal interviews with the 
director of the NGO in April 2000 and various newspaper articles around the time of the event 
which give detailed accounts of the concert, the investigation, and the cleanup measures taken 
by the government after the investigation.
88 This is according to the director. I have not been able to double-check this information, but it 
sounds highly probable. Many women's federation leaders have husbands who are 
high-ranking officials in the government or the Party.
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The NGO, the Guangzhou-based Huiling Service Organisation for Mentally 
Disabled People (hereunder Huiling), purchased some apartments which it 
intended to use as a residential home for mentally disabled youth. When the real 
estate company realised that mentally disabled people were going to live in those 
apartments, it feared that it would deter potential buyers from purchasing the other 
apartments in the same block. Consequently it tried to cancel the sale and refused to 
hand over the apartments to Huiling. Since Huiling called the planned residential 
home "a training centre for mentally disabled youth", the company used it as an 
excuse for its backtracking. It said the apartments were meant to be used as family 
dwellings, not training centres. Huiling was changing the purpose for which they 
were built, therefore it was justified in pulling out of the deal.
To Huiling, the company's excuse was untenable, because the apartments were 
purchased in the name of the training centre, therefore the purpose for which they 
would be used should be clear to the company when it signed the contract. The 
company did not have any problem with making a sale to a training centre at the 
time and had already been paid in full, so it had no right to bring in this issue later. 
Huiling believed that the company's decision to cancel the sale was in fact based on 
its discrimination against disabled people. Therefore it took some mentally disabled 
youth and their parents to the company's headquarters to protest. It also asked the 
media to cover the event. Since Guangzhou is very close to Hong Kong, some 
journalists from Hong Kong also followed the story and reported it in Hong Kong 
newspapers as well as a news programme on television.
Despite the media reports that criticised the real estate company, initially Huiling 
was unable to make the company change its position. Since the legal system in 
China is not always effective in dealing with such cases, Huiling decided to turn to 
the government for help.89 The initial reaction from the government agency which
89 The NGO's director planned to take the case to court as a last resort if she failed to receive help
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Huiling approached was not very encouraging. Some officials were even angry at 
Huiling for exposing the case to Hong Kong media, accusing it of attempting to 
tarnish the image of Guangzhou. They were not keen to help Huiling, saying that 
the case was a purely commercial dispute, therefore the government should not get 
involved. Huiling then mobilised its entire social network to try to make the 
government intervene in the dispute on its behalf. Some parents of the disabled 
youth whom Huiling was trying to help had personal connections with 
representatives to the municipal or provincial People's Congress and Political 
Consultative Conference. They asked these representatives to contact the 
Guangzhou municipal government about the case. A vice president of the 
Provincial Political Consultative Conference wrote a personal letter to the mayor of 
Guangzhou asking him to come to Huiling's aid. At this juncture, by sheer good 
luck Huiling's director also had a chance meeting with the mayor, which gave her 
the precious opportunity of presenting her case directly to the mayor.90 Afterwards 
the mayor ordered a government agency to help bring a solution to the dispute. 
With the mediation of this agency, Huiling and the real estate company eventually 
reached an agreement whereby the company returned to Huiling the 720,000 yuan it 
had received for the apartments plus another 580,000 yuan as compensation for the 
cancellation of the sale. Huiling later used the money to purchase a property 
elsewhere to open the residential home.91
from the government in resolving the dispute with the company (Interview, 5 March 2000). Since 
there is no clear separation of power between the judicial and executive branches of the 
government in China, administrative agencies can often exert strong influence on the decisions 
of the court as well as on the enforcement of court rulings, which is one reason why people 
usually try to enlist the help of administrative agencies to settle disputes first.
90 In China, ordinary citizens rarely get the chance of speaking directly to a high-ranking 
government official such as the mayor of a big city about their problems. The government at all 
levels have Letters and Visits Offices (xinfang bangongshi) that deal with citizens' complaints or 
requests for assistance, but one has far better chances of having one's problems solved if one can 
make a high-ranking official take a direct interest in those problems.
91 This narrative of the whole event combines information from four sources: 1) interview with 
Huiling's director on 5 March 2000; 2) interview with a parent on 28 March 2000; 3) the report of 
the government agency that mediated between Huiling and the real estate company on the final 
settlement of the dispute, dated 11 December 1993; and 4) local press coverage of the event.
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4.2 NGO Dependence on the State for Resources
It is widely known that in China many employees of state-owned institutions have 
been able to attend to second jobs during normal working hours while continuing to 
receive their full salary and benefits from the state. For example, as Saich describes 
the situation of researchers at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS):
[They] only have to report for work two mornings a week and publication 
requirements are minimal. Their housing has been subsidized by the work-unit as 
are their medical expenses, basic salary and other costs. Thus, costs are minimal 
should they wish to go into business and they can use state-subsidized offices and 
facilities to pursue entrepreneurial goals. Should the company fail, they can simply 
walk away and wait to start again (Saich 2001: 207).
While Saich was talking about what would happen should these researchers decide 
to go into business, the same situation applies should they wish to set up NGOs 
instead. A large percentage of popular NGOs, including some of the most 
celebrated "genuine NGOs" in China, were created by academics who have 
remained in state employment but have sufficient free time to pursue parallel 
careers. They have won the epithet of "amphibious people" (liangqiren). The 
consensus in NGO circles is that to remain "amphibious" is the most advantageous 
arrangement,92 since amphibious people can have the best of both worlds.
Popular NGOs in China often complain that unlike officially-organised NGOs or 
NGOs in other countries, they receive no funding from the state. They tend to 
highlight to outsiders the hardships they have to bear while working under such 
conditions, but neglect to acknowledge the hidden subsidies from the state in such 
forms as the salaries of their staff who remain government employees. Once one 
scrutinizes the history of popular NGOs in China, however, there is rarely an
92 Talk by a Chinese researcher on women's NGOs in China at Tsinghua University on 25 
December 1999.
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organisation that has not relied on personnel paid by the state to operate it, at least 
in its early days. For example, the Jinglun Family Centre, an NGO that provides sex 
education for adolescents, was founded by a CASS researcher, Ms Chen Yiyun. As 
she spoke of the first phase of her organisation's existence: "All the initial members 
of Jinglun were government employees, such as CASS researchers and doctors 
[from state-owned medical colleges or hospitals]. We depended on both 
government resources and international funding. Government resources included 
salary, housing, other benefits, such as health care, which the members received 
from the state. Government resources also included free classrooms for our 
activities, the government's networks, and volunteers [mobilised through 
government networks]."93
It is not just academics who have been able to pursue an NGO career while holding 
on to their state jobs. All the popular NGOs which I studied intensively were 
founded by non-academics. Like their academic counterparts, these founders also 
kept their state jobs and the concomitant pay and social security coverage for years 
while they devoted most of their time and energy to the NGOs. For example, since 
1995, Zhang Shuqin had spent her time almost entirely on the SPRSRA and the 
PCVs under its aegis, but she continued to receive her salary from the Shaanxi 
provincial Prison Bureau, where she remained an employee. It was not until 
sometime in 1999, after she had moved to Beijing to start setting up a PCV there, 
that the Shaanxi Prison Bureau finally suspended her pay. In another case, the 
founder of a women's NGO is a section chief in a local government bureau. She has 
continued to serve in that capacity while running the NGO and has been drawing 
her salary from the bureau rather than the NGO. A few other staff members of the 
NGO are also employees of the bureau and like the founder continue to be paid by 
the bureau. In addition, the NGO has been able to use some of the founder's bureau
93 Interview, 16 November 1999.
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colleagues as volunteers.94 In a final example, the founder of a private orphanage 
used to be a middle-school teacher. When she decided to set up the orphanage, her 
work unit relieved her of all her teaching duties so that she could concentrate on her 
charity work. Meanwhile, the work unit carried on paying her salary and bonuses.95
The importance of staying on the government payroll for NGO practitioners can 
hardly be exaggerated. Since most popular NGOs find it difficult to raise money for 
staff salaries and administrative cost at the beginning, their founders and initial staff 
would not have been able to enter NGO work if they were not supported by the 
income from their state jobs. Furthermore, the continued connection of these 
amphibious people to their state work units means that they usually have access to 
other government resources as well. For example, the above-mentioned women's 
NGO was allowed to use an unoccupied office of the local government bureau free 
of charge. The bureau also allowed the NGO's staff to use its vehicles to travel to 
remote rural areas to carry out their work.96 While this kind of support cost the 
bureau very little, it was a big help to the NGO, especially in the first couple of years 
when it did not possess a vehicle of its own.
Not only can popular NGOs access government resources through the connections 
of their staff, they can also do so through the connections of their clients. In the early 
days of one of my case studies, the Zhiling special education school for mentally 
disabled children, many parents mobilised the resources of their own work units for 
the school. As a founder of Zhiling recalled, once, when the school was due to move 
to a new location, it asked the parents to borrow vehicles and drivers from their 
work units to help transport the school's possessions. On the day of the move, so 
many vehicles turned up that they filled up an entire street.97 Parents also obtained
94 Interview, 24 April 2000.
95 Interview, 21 April 2000.
96 Interviews on 17 April 2000 and 26 April 2000.
97 Interview, 5 March 2000.
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free equipment from their work units for the school. One parent was an electrician 
employed at a state-owned organisation. He installed the electric power system for 
Zhiling using equipment which he took from his work unit. As a result, the system 
did not cost the school a single penny.98
Chinese NGOs have drawn on state-owned resources in so many ways that it is 
impossible to produce an exhaustive list of all the different ways in which they do 
so. So far I have discussed some common ways for popular NGOs to tap into 
state-owned resources. In addition, my case studies show that each individual NGO 
has also manifested its resource dependence on the state in its specific ways. In the 
case of the Prisoners' Children's Village (PCV) in Xincheng District, Xi'an City, 
through the intervention of the district government, the children were able to attend 
a local state school even though they did not have local resident status. Furthermore, 
the school waived all fees for them. Similarly, the district Health Bureau agreed to 
provide free medical treatment and examination for all the children (Chang 2000: 
121). Since the PCV was home to about 40 children, the remission of educational and 
medical charges for them relieved the PCV of an enormous financial burden.99
The aforementioned private orphanage that was founded by a middle-school 
teacher also relied heavily on state-controlled resources. To give just one example, 
to generate income for the orphanage, the founder set up a couple of businesses, 
including a tea plantation. The middle school where she worked was a subsidiary 
unit of a giant state-owned enterprise, an iron and steel company that employed 
over 100,000 people. While her immediate employer was the middle school, she was 
ultimately an employee of the iron and steel company. To support this woman's
98 Interview, 26 May 2000.
99 The majority of the children in the PCV were from rural areas, therefore they were not eligible 
for public health services which were only available to the urban population. If the district 
government had not extended its assistance, the PCV would have had to pay the full cost of any 
medical treatment the children might need, which would be very expensive. The same situation 
applies to the school fees. Since the children were not local residents of Xi'an, local schools could 
have charged each of them a big fee for a place.
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orphanage, the company purchased its tea from her plantation. Given the enormous 
size of the company, its orders were always for large quantities, which ensured 
handsome profits for the plantation.100
In a final example of popular NGOs taking advantage of state-controlled resources, 
a private residential home for disabled children was located near a military camp, 
which prompted its director to exploit the manpower of the army. The Chinese 
army has a long-running policy of encouraging its members to build up good 
relations with civilians by contributing to the material and cultural life of the local 
communities where they are stationed. Knowing this tradition of the army, the 
director asked the army camp to supply volunteers for her residential home. The 
camp granted her request and sent soldiers to lead physical exercises and training 
for the children every morning.101 Later, the director decided to move the residential 
home to a new location. She found some premises that had been unoccupied for a 
long time, which left them in a poor condition. The premises included a very large 
garden that had become covered with weeds and garbage. The cleaning bill would 
have cost the NGO a fortune. Fortunately, the premises were again in the vicinity of 
a military base, so the director approached the base for volunteers again. The base 
sent dozens of soldiers to help clean up the place, which saved the NGO both time 
and money.102
Thus far I have given examples of how Chinese NGOs benefit from the material and 
human resources controlled by the state. Next I discuss how they make use of the 
symbolic resources of the state. While many NGOs are in fact subsidised by the state, 
typically in the form of staff salary and free office space, most of them receive very 
limited, if any, project funding from the state,103 therefore they need to raise such
100 Informal interview, 22 April 2000.
101 Interview, 23 March 2000.
102 Informal interview, 1 September 2000.
103 For a statistical analysis of the income structure of Chinese NGOs see Deng 2001a.
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funds themselves. Although their project funding does not come from the 
government budget, NGOs rely heavily on their formal and informal ties to the 
government to raise money. In other words, when they do not draw directly on the 
economic resources of the state, NGOs capitalise on the state's symbolic resources, 
which are converted into economic resources for them. Given their better 
connections to the government, officially-organised NGOs are generally in a more 
advantageous position than popular NGOs to exploit the symbolic resources of the 
state. The CYDF's experience in mobilising corporate donations provides a typical 
example of how such exploitation takes place.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, in its first decade the CYDF raised a total of 
1,78 billion yuan under Project Hope, whereas the direct allocation it received from 
the state was only 110,000 yuan. Of the total amount the CYDF raised, the majority 
was in corporate rather than individual donations. Most businesses considered 
donations to Project Hope a form of advertising that was cheaper and more effective 
than commercial advertising. In the words of a CYDF staffer: "Our fundraising 
department has become an advertising agency" (Sun et al 1999: 162). The most 
important reward which the CYDF could offer corporate donors was donation 
ceremonies which were attended by top state officials and guaranteed coverage by 
major news media. Organising such ceremonies soon became the main task of the 
CYDF's fundraising department. This service became so standardised that all a 
corporate donor had to do was to sign a detailed agreement with the CYDF that 
specified the amount it was going to donate. Depending on the amount, the CYDF 
would promise to invite state officials of a certain rank to the ceremony and bring in 
a certain number of media units to cover the event. Once an agreement had been 
signed, the corporate donor could leave everything to the CYDF to organise. The 
donor just needed to get the cheque ready, so that its representative could hand it 
over to the CYDF, then shake hands with state leaders in front of media cameras at 
the ceremony. Initially the CYDF depended on the Youth League to secure the
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presence of top-level officials at these donation ceremonies. Later, because it had 
organised so many ceremonies, it became very familiar with all the government 
offices that handled the public engagements of top officials, so it could approach 
those offices directly without bothering the Youth League any more (Sun et al 1999: 
162-163).
In their book, Sun et al provided an example of the efficacy of the kind of advertising 
which the CYDF and the provincial Youth Development Foundations (YDFs) 
offered corporate donors. A newly-founded, little-known private company 
approached a provincial YDF for help to raise its profile. The YDF suggested that 
the company donate a vehicle to it. In return, the YDF organised a donation 
ceremony for the company which received live coverage by the local media. In 
addition, the YDF managed to invite a depute secretary general of the provincial 
Party Committee to the ceremony who personally received the key to the vehicle 
from the owner of the company. The company also agreed to make an annual 
donation of 40,000 yuan to the YDF. In return, the YDF organised an event for die 
company every year which were all covered by the media. To thank the media for 
their support, the YDF also arranged for some journalists to receive commendation 
and cash award from the Propaganda Department of the provincial Party 
Committee and the provincial Youth League Committee. Although the 
commendation was given in the name of these two organisations, the cash award 
the journalists received was provided by the private company. Afterwards, the local 
media became even more supportive in giving publicity to the company's 
philanthropic activities. With the assistance of the YDF in raising its public image, 
the private company grew from a tiny operation with a capitalization of only 
300,000 yuan into a big business with over 100 million yuan in assets within 10 years. 
The YDF had in actual effect functioned as the company's advertising department 
(Sim et al 1999:164-165).
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Most corporate donors prefer giving money to big, well-known officially-organised 
NGOs rather than small, obscure popular NGOs, because not only can 
organisations like the CYDF offer businesses more publicity for their money, they 
can also introduce them to high officials whom they might be able to approach later 
for assistance.104 Organisations like the CYDF can even arrange for big corporate 
donors to meet a member of the Standing Committee of the Party's Politburo,105 the 
supreme decision-making body of the state. Little wonder, then, that popular NGOs 
often complain that corporate donations are motivated primarily by "political 
considerations", consequently they only end up in the bank accounts of high-profile 
GONGOs.106 Nonetheless, popular NGOs with good connections can also exploit 
the symbolic resources of the state to their own advantage, just like their GONGO 
brothers. One popular NGO I studied enjoyed the patronage of a retired senior 
official who still played an active role in a big GONGO. This allowed him to go on 
frequent business trips to foreign countries. Because of his previous positions in the 
central government, this official had many contacts in Western countries. The 
popular NGO was able to persuade a business company to let it use one of its 
properties for free. In exchange, the NGO's patron agreed to search for foreign 
investors for the company next time he went on a business trip abroad.107
When NGOs exploit the symbolic resources of the state, such as the influence and 
connections of high officials or the propagandists power of state-owned media, 
they are offering their donors access to these resources in exchange for economic 
resources. Such exchanges take place on a voluntary basis, consequently they fall 
under the rubric of the so-called "socialised" fundraising methods. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, Chinese researchers have contrasted socialised methods with 
administrative methods. In the latter case, NGOs rely on the government to use its
104 Big foreign businesses, for example, often use philanthropic activities in China both for 
publicity and networking purposes. See Wang 2001.
105 Interview, 8 November 2001.
106 Interview, 16 November 1999.
107 Interview, 10 November 1999.
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administrative authority to do things for them. The CYDF has been widely praised 
by Chinese researchers for consciously pursuing a socialised mode of operation 
instead of depending on administrative methods, which distinguished it from many 
other officially-organised NGOs. However, even the CYDF cannot afford to discard 
administrative methods completely. The study by Sun et al has offered some 
examples of the CYDF's administrative fundraising methods. When such methods 
are put to work, NGOs are no longer merely exploiting the symbolic resources of 
the state. They are depending directly on the political power of the state and its 
administrative system to procure economic resources for them.
As Sun et al related, although the CYDF constantly urged provincial YDFs108 to 
reduce their dependence on administrative fundraising methods, many provincial 
YDFs complained that, unlike administrative methods, socialised methods did not 
always deliver results. When the CYDF launched a national-wide fundraising 
campaign called "Volunteers in Action" in 1998, provincial YDFs initially 
conducted their local campaigns according to the CYDF's plan, which was to recruit 
volunteers who would try to persuade their friends, colleagues, or work units to 
donate money to Project Hope. Obviously this was intended as a 
non-administrative operation. However, local YDFs soon discovered that such 
purely socialised methods could not raise much money. As one provincial YDF told 
Sim et al, they initially recruited six volunteers on a trial basis. After one month, only 
one of them managed to raise any money at all—a paltry 100 yuan. The YDF also 
found a volunteer who was the principal of a business school. Thinking that he 
would have no difficulty persuading at least a few people from the school to 
become Project Hope donors, the principal committed himself to raise a minimum 
of 500 yuan. In the end, he failed to raise a single penny, and gave the YDF 500 yuan 
from his own pocket (Sun et al 1999: 208-209).
108 As explained before (Chapter 3, footnote 44), not all provincial-level organisations are named 
Youth Development Foundations (YDFs), but to simplify matters I use "YDF" to refer to all of 
them.
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Seeing that socialised methods were ineffective, some provincial YDFs went back to 
the old method of mobilisation through the state's organisational system, in 
particular the work unit. According to one provincial YDF:
This time volunteers are supposed to persuade others to donate money on a purely 
voluntary basis. In fact, this is still unrealistic in China. Later we changed our 
strategy. We made the Party Secretaries of various enterprises our volunteers, so 
the number one leaders of these enterprises were our volunteers, then we 
appointed liaison persons for these volunteers...we made the Youth League 
Secretaries of these enterprises their liaison persons. So how do you suppose these 
volunteers persuaded others to donate money to Project Hope? This is still 
organisational behaviour. Genuine volunteers are those whom I just mentioned: 
individuals who phoned our office to say they wanted to work for Project Hope. 
What will be his effect [in fundraising]? There will be no effect. (Sim et al 1999:126).
Exactly how are donations raised within work units? As the secretary of the Youth 
League Committee in a large state-owned enterprise said:
Recently our workers have been asked to donate money to various causes. The 
labour union, various departments came one after another to ask for donations in 
cash or in kind. ...Our enterprise is not making a lot of profit this year [which has 
affected workers' pay], so our workers cannot afford to keep giving away money. 
Some workers are very unhappy about this, but they must hand in a donation 
whether they like it or not (Sim et al 1999:127).
Clearly, within work units charitable donations are often mobilised through 
administrative command, which leaves the employees no choice whether to 
participate or not. Sometimes work units even deduct money directly from their 
employees' pay cheques. As the general secretary of a provincial YDF told 
researchers, she recently made an unsuccessful fundraising trip to a city where 
government employees had had money deducted from their salaries every month to 
go to various government-supported charitable causes, until everybody grew 
resentful. The municipal leaders told her straightaway that they would not support
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the new Project Hope fundraising scheme she was promoting (Sun et al 1999:138).
In one provincial YDF, reflecting on the disappointing results of their socialised 
fundraising methods, a staff member told researchers:
Where Project Hope fundraising has been successful, it is not because volunteers 
are in action, it is because the orders of the Party and the government are taking 
effect. For example, in W City, to launch the "Volunteers in Action" campaign, the 
General Secretary of the municipal Party Committee and the Mayor all made 
personal donations and attended a big rally to launch the campaign. At the rally, 
the director of the Propaganda Department of the Party Committee delivered the 
mobilisation speech. Party Committee secretaries at county and district levels all 
went into action, so the whole campaign became organisational behaviour. Their 
volunteers were Party leaders, so naturally they achieved good results (Sim et al 
1999:133).
In the end, although researchers have made much of the clever deployment of 
socialised fundraising methods by the CYDF, which they praise as a model for other 
Chinese NGOs, especially officially-organised NGOs, they also recognise that the 
success of Project Hope is founded on the combination of both administrative and 
socialised methods. As Sun et al (1999: 294) concluded in their study, if the CYDF 
had relied solely on socialised methods, it would probably have disappeared, or 
would at best be on its last legs by now. Therefore, although the CYDF has not 
received any direct funding from the government save for the 110,000 yuan start-up 
cost, it nonetheless presents a good example of Chinese NGOs' resource 
dependence on the state.
4.3 NGO Dependence on the State for Project Implementation
If the state apparatus has played an important role in the fundraising for Project 
Hope, then its importance has been even more pronounced in the implementation 
of Project Hope. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the CYDF has used the Youth League's
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nation-wide organisational network to dispense Project Hope funds. On the one 
hand, this arrangement benefits local Youth League organisations, as they get the 
chance to spend the money raised by the CYDF. On the other hand, the CYDF 
benefits directly from this arrangement as well, since it does not have the 
organisational capacity to implement Project Hope itself. Although there are YDFs 
at the provincial level, because of the government regulations that prohibit NGOs to 
set up regional branches, the provincial YDFs are all independent organisations 
rather than branches of the CYDF. In fact, some provincial YDFs have a closer 
relationship with provincial Youth League Committees than with the CYDF. Even if 
provincial YDFs could function as branches of the CYDF, it still would not enable 
the CYDF to implement Project Hope itself, since there are very few independent 
Project Hope Offices below the provincial level. In most places, Project Hope related 
work at sub-provincial levels is simply carried out by the local Youth League 
branches. If the CYDF were to perform the concrete tasks of project implementation 
itself, including identifying individual students eligible for sponsorship, ensuring 
that the money is delivered to each and every one of them at the beginning of every 
term, supervising the construction of new schools, and monitoring the construction 
expenditures, it would need to have an organisational presence down to the village 
level. Since it does not have such a presence, the CYDF has no choice but to use the 
Youth League's network.
In addition to grassroots Youth League organisations, the CYDF has also relied on 
government education departments at local levels to implement Project Hope. As 
noted before, at the central government level the CYDF has had rather strained 
relations with the Ministry of Education. However, at the local level it has enjoyed 
excellent co-operation from education departments. Unlike the ministry, local 
education departments do not need to be concerned about who gets the limelight 
for improving basic education in the country. Their primary concern is their 
achievements in providing education for their local areas, which are measured by
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such pointers as school attendance rate and the number of new schools that have 
been built Therefore, local education departments can only benefit from the 
implementation of Project Hope in their localities. Consequently they are all happy 
to offer their assistance.
To the CYDF, the involvement of local education departments is often as 
indispensable as that of local Youth League branches. The Youth League has 
organisations at county and township levels all over the country. They have 
assumed the main responsibility for implementing Project Hope. However, in some 
places the Youth League has no effective organisation at the village level. In such 
places, the co-operation of education departments becomes crucial, as village 
schools are then asked to help identify students in need of financial assistance and 
to help maintain the contact between Project Hope and these students. In some 
places, Youth League organisations may also be understaffed below the county 
level. In these places, the CYDF relies on education departments to take charge of 
any work that is carried out below the county level. Even where the Youth League is 
fully functional down to the village level, the participation of the education 
department is still very important, since after new schools are built with Project 
Hope funds they need to be assigned teachers, allocated budgets, and supervised 
and inspected regularly. These matters all need to be taken care of by the education 
department (Kang 1997).
While other NGOs may not have the CYDF's ready access to the Youth League's 
network and local government education departments, they rely on similar 
arrangements with the state administrative system to implement their projects. The 
reason that NGOs need the assistance of the state to carry out their operations is 
obvious: Although the Chinese state in the reform era can no longer be called 
"totalitarian", it is still the only institution with a fully-developed organisational 
network that extends into every grassroots community in the country; and its
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administrative system remains highly efficient in mobilising popular participation. 
At the same time, the state has prevented NGOs from developing their own 
organisational networks by forbidding them to establish branches outside the sites 
where they are registered. Under the circumstances, NGOs have no alternative but 
to turn to state organisations for help with project implementation.
From a book commissioned by the China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA) 
which documents the poverty alleviation work of over a dozen Chinese NGOs, it is 
evident that in many cases local governments have taken the main responsibility for 
implementing projects, whereas the NGOs' role has been to provide funding and 
technical support. This situation is unavoidable when, as is often the case, the NGO 
is based in Beijing or the provincial capital city, while the poverty alleviation 
projects are located in rural areas many miles away from the cities. For example, the 
Yunnan Reproductive Health Research Association (YRHRA) based in Kunming, 
the capital city of Yunnan Province, has a micro credit and health promotion project 
for rural women in Luoping County. The day-to-day management of the project is 
in fact entrusted to the Louping county women's federation, as members of the 
YRHRA all live in Kunming and cannot spend a lot of time in Luoping. Initially 
YRHRA representatives would go to Luoping every time new loans were handed 
out; later they did not even find their presence on such occasions to be necessary. At 
the time the YRHRA was interviewed about the Luoping project, it appeared that 
more than a year had passed since its members' last visit to Luoping (Yang 2001b).
Among the NGOs featured in the CFPA book, a few are physically closer to their 
projects than the YRHRA. These are typically county-level NGOs that carry out 
projects in the same county where they are located. Not surprisingly, these NGOs 
are more directly involved in project implementation. Nevertheless, they show a 
strong dependence on government structures at the township and village levels for 
their operations. As the general secretary of the Yilong County Rural Development
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Association (YCRDA) describes the process whereby they select townships to 
participate in their micro credit scheme:
We will check the township's geographic condition, and we need to see if the 
township government is enthusiastic about the project...We work this way: If the 
government and Party committee of the township are supportive of the scheme, 
then we send our staff to the villages to explain directly to the peasants how the 
scheme works.. .We ask the township government to gather together all the village 
cadres and tell them about the project. The village cadres then go back to their 
villages to pass on the information to the peasants. If the peasants say they are 
willing to participate in the project and the village cadres are also willing to support 
it, then we send our staff down there. The village cadres will help us convene a 
general meeting of the peasants and we will tell them about the project (Yang 2001a: 
88).
The YCRDA's need for assistance from township and village administrations is 
inevitable, as Yilong county has a total population of almost a million, which is 
divided into 69 townships and 844 villages, whereas the YCRDA only has 40 staff 
(Yang 2001a). It is impossible for the YCRDA to run everything itself without the 
support of the highly effective government administrative system at grassroots 
levels. Another county-level NGO featured in the CFPA book, the Linqu County 
Poverty Alleviation and Economic Development Association, has only 20 staff 
members. It has implemented over 30 projects since 1987, largely through the 
assistance of county government bureaux and township governments. Again, this is 
not surprising, given the limited human resources of the Association against the 
large size of even a single township. For example, a rabbit raising project of the 
Association was implemented in only one township, but this township had a 
population of 22,000. The project involved a vast amount of administrative work, 
from selecting suitable households to participate in the scheme, purchasing the 
breeding stock and delivering them to those households, to providing the 
households with the necessary training and ongoing technical support, and helping 
them to market the rabbits when they were ready for sale. The township 
government was the natural and indeed the only candidate for this job (Lu 2001).
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While the examples just cited demonstrate how NGOs often work through the 
government in rural areas, other examples suggest that the government's assistance 
is also indispensable to NGOs operating in urban areas. A case in point is the 
"Green Community" initiative which the popular NGO Global Village of Beijing 
(GVB) has implemented in an urban community (shequ) in Beijing. As the first step, 
the GVB obtained the support of a district government to experiment with waste 
recycling in one of its communities. At the suggestion of the GVB, a project leading 
committee was formed at the district level whose members included the directors of 
the relevant district government agencies, in particular the General Sanitation 
Bureau and the Environmental Protection Bureau. The district government then 
issued the order to implement the project to the Street Office109 in charge of the 
selected community. The Street Office in turn ordered the community's 
Neighbourhood Committee to organise the recycling. As a GVB member said: "The 
government's administrative system is very well-organised. To get things done it is 
very important to have the government sending orders down its hierarchy. The 
Neighbourhood Committee would not have undertaken the work if it was not 
ordered to do so by the Street Office."110 When this GVB worker visited urban 
communities in other cities to promote the Green Community initiative, she found 
that Neighbourhood Committees were usually uninterested in such schemes. This is 
hardly surprising. Neighbourhood Committees in China are often saddled with a 
large number of tasks by higher levels, from mediating civil and domestic disputes, 
maintaining public safety and security within their communities, to providing 
social welfare services to elderly and disabled residents. Government officials have 
estimated that Neighbourhood Committees typically have 40 tolOO legal obligations
109 Districts are divided into sub-districts which are administered by Street Offices. Sub-districts 
are further divided into a number of "communities" (shequ), at which level there are 
Neighbourhood Committees. While defined as "mass self-managing organisations at the 
grassroots level" by the Constitution, neighbourhood committees have in reality served as 
branches of street offices, and can therefore be considered the lowest level of urban 
administration.
110 Interviews, 6 December 2001 and 22 November 2002.
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or responsibilities, yet they are only provided with enough money for staff salaries, 
office space, and utilities by Street Offices (Derleth and Koldyk 2002). As a result, as 
the GVB worker observed, neighbourhood committees had no incentive to take on 
extra work, such as organising garbage recycling, unless they were ordered by 
higher levels.
The government's involvement in the GVB project in Beijing was by no means 
limited to instructing the Neighbourhood Committee to assist the GVB with its 
effort. In mobilising the participation of community residents in the recycling 
scheme, the GVB has relied on government support every step along the way. At 
first, residents complained that the bins used for recycling were difficult to operate, 
as the lids must be lifted by hand. They preferred to have pedal-operated bins. The 
GVB contacted the district General Sanitation Bureau about this complaint; the 
Bureau changed the bins the following day. Next, residents suggested that a 
glass-fronted notice-board should be erected in the community to serve as a vehicle 
for disseminating environmental protection information. The GVB brought this 
matter to the attention of the district Spiritual Civilisation Office, also a member of 
the project leading committee, and the Office gave the community 25,000 yuan to 
install the notice-board.
As residents were urged by the GVB to join the recycling scheme in order to help 
protecting the environment, they also started to complain that the immediate 
environment of their own community was itself suffering from serious pollution. In 
particular, they complained about the noise made by the air-blower of a 
supermarket located in the community and the oily smoke emitting constantly from 
the kitchen of a restaurant. If the GVB failed to address these complaints of the 
residents about the environment of their own community, it would have a hard 
time arousing their enthusiasm for other environmental protection activities which, 
after all, would bring them no direct benefit Once again, through the project
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leading committee the GVB was able to make the head of the district take immediate 
action on the two complaints. A solution was quickly identified and implemented 
by the relevant government agencies. More recently, residents have also asked that 
a wall behind the glass-fronted notice-board be demolished. Since the wall is owned 
by the Sanitation Bureau, its consent is necessary, and at the time of my interview 
the GVB was in the process of contacting the Bureau to obtain its approval.111
Unlike the poverty alleviation projects mentioned earlier, the Green Community 
initiative needed government support not only because the GVB lacked the 
organisational capacity to implement the project itself, but also because in the 
process of mobilising community participation the GVB needed to respond to 
various requests from the residents. Addressing the immediate concerns of the 
residents was crucial to drawing their participation in wider environmental 
protection schemes and the GVB needed the government's assistance to do so, since 
it had neither the administrative authority nor the resources necessary for 
addressing those concerns.
NGOs in other sectors often face a similar situation. When I conducted a review of 
the role of NGOs in HIV/AIDS prevention and care programmes in China in 
2002,112 it was clear that without the support of government agencies NGOs would 
find it very difficult to work with the key target groups of these programmes, such 
as injecting drug users (IDUs) and commercial sex workers (CSWs). To begin with, 
drug use and commercial sex work are illegal. The police have the duty to arrest any 
CSW or IDU they come across. Therefore, to attract the participation of IDUs and 
CSWs in HIV/AIDS prevention activities, such as training, needle exchange, or 
condom promotion, at the very least NGOs need to guarantee that they will not be
111 Interview, 22 November 2002.
112 As part of the review I carried out a number of interviews in Beijing, Yunnan, and Sichuan in 
October and November 2002 with NGO staff, managers of HIV/AIDS programmes, and the 
beneficiaries of these programmes. The following information is based on these interviews.
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facing waiting police cars when they come to take part in these activities. To do so 
NGOs must obtain the agreement of police departments that they will wink at their 
activities with IDUs and CSWs.
Often, NGOs would need more active support from the government than its mere 
acquiescence to draw the participation of IDUs and CSWs. For example, when 
working with CSWs, it is essential for NGOs to gain the co-operation of 
establishment owners. However, these owners often ignore approaches by NGO 
workers. Consequently, it is necessary for NGOs to bring government officials with 
them, as establishment owners dare not ignore requests for co-operation from 
government agencies, which can close down their businesses if they do not 
co-operate. In HIV/AIDS prevention projects with IDUs and CSWs, a commonly 
used method is peer education. To give IDUs and CSWs incentives to work as peer 
educators, the government's assistance is again required. For example, some NGO 
projects made arrangements with government health departments to allow their 
peer educators to receive subsidised medical treatment at public clinics. Other 
projects obtained the police's agreement that they would not arrest any IDU or CSW 
who worked as their peer educators. In projects focusing on care for people living 
with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), NGOs are equally dependent on government 
interventions. At present, once their conditions are exposed, PLWHA usually face 
strong discrimination from their local communities, and it is often necessary for the 
government to use its authority to persuade communities not to ostracize their 
HIV-infected members. When NGOs try to help PLWHA to improve their economic 
situation, for example, by starting some small businesses, once again the support of 
local governments is vital. Such support can take any form from simplifying or 
waiving the registration requirements for these businesses, exempting them from 
taxation, to helping persuading local communities to patronize these businesses.
So far I have only discussed NGO dependence on the government in implementing
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projects which can be roughly classified as service delivery. A similar picture 
emerges when one looks at NGOs that engage in advocacy work. The director of a 
highly successful popular NGO that provides legal aid to socio-economically 
disadvantaged people knows some high-ranking officials who have agreed to serve 
as the NGO's advisers. As a researcher explains the way the NGO operates, when 
defending cases that have a poor chance of being adequately settled in court, the 
director appeals for help from his government friends, whose intervention will in 
most situations lead to an amicable solution. The researcher observes: "While not 
necessarily conducive to [bringing about] greater effectiveness of China's legal 
system, this method yields the most instant results" (Raab 1997: 46, footnote 115).
Similar factors are accountable for the success of another legal aid and legal research 
centre. This centre's two directors are renowned law professors who serve as 
advisers to the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate. 
Some of their former students already hold high positions in those two institutions. 
Because of the connections and influence of its directors, the centre has excellent 
access to the judicial authorities and has been invited by the government to take 
part in drafting important new laws.113
The same pattern can be observed in other policy arenas. To the extent that NGOs 
can have some influence on policy making, it is usually owing to their special 
connections to the government rather than any other attributes or qualities they 
might possess. For example, when I asked the executive vice president of the China 
Association of STD/AIDS Prevention and Control (CASAPC), Professor Dai, how 
could NGOs like the CASAPC influence government policies on HIV/AIDS, 
Professor Dai explained that he was the director of the Disease Control Department 
of the Ministry of Health for 11 years before moving to the CASAPC and was still a 
key member of the Ministry's expert panel on HIV/AIDS. He was often invited to
113 Interview, 18 November 1999.
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ministerial-level meetings where specific policies were decided. Professor Dai then 
asked rhetorically: "If I am able to have some inputs into government policies, is this 
because I am a member of the CASAPC, or because I am a member of the expert 
panel, or because I am the former director of the Disease Control Department?"114
The fact that effective advocacy depends on good connections in the government is 
well appreciated by Chinese NGOs. The director of a popular NGO told 
international consultants that in 10-20 years' time she wanted to see her 
organisation having "more communication" with the government on the issues it 
was interested in. When asked how she intended to achieve this goal, the director 
replied that she would invite more professionals who were able to attend 
government meetings and conferences to join the NGO's board of directors. She 
would ask these people not to quit their jobs in government institutions in order to 
work for the NGO, but to endeavour to become more deeply embedded in 
government institutions. "To penetrate deeper and more extensively into the 
government structure", as the director put it. This way they would be more useful 
to the NGO.115
4.4 NGO Dependence on the State for K nowledge and Information
One of the main discoveries of my review of NGOs' role in HIV/AIDS programmes 
is that the effectiveness of NGOs can be seriously constrained if they fail to gain 
access to information held by government institutions. For example, an NGO 
project aimed at providing psychological counselling to PLWHA encountered 
tremendous difficulty in achieving its objective, because the project workers could 
not locate PLWHA. Widespread discrimination against PLWHA had made them go 
to great lengths to conceal their identities. Government institutions such as Disease
114 Interview, 8 October 2002.
115 Interview with the director by international consultants on 16 November 1999.1 acted as the 
interpreter for the interview.
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Control Centres had detailed information on PLWHA. To contact PLWHA, 
therefore, the project must gain the cooperation of these centres first. In this case, 
however, for their own institutional reasons some centres chose to withhold the 
information on the whereabouts of PLWHA from the project, which resulted in its 
failure to find the people it was designed to help.
The information involved in this case is obviously of a special nature and is out of 
the public domain. It is therefore to be expected that NGOs would need the help of 
government institutions in order to gain access to such information. However, other 
cases show that NGOs are also dependent on the government for ordinary 
information which is not restricted in any way. In such cases, although the 
information is not kept secret, NGOs often lack the capacity to collect the 
information themselves, therefore they would still be crippled if the government 
did not supply them with the information. When Zhang Shuqin tried to set up a 
Prisoners7 Children's Village (PCV) in Beijing, one of the main challenges she faced 
initially was to find prisoners7 children who needed residential care. Zhang Shuqin 
and her colleagues could no doubt acquire the information they needed by visiting 
every neighbourhood in Beijing in person to search for such children. However, 
with only two people working for her and a large number of other pressing tasks in 
hand, Zhang Shuqin had neither the time nor the resources to search the city for 
prisoners7 children herself. With its highly developed administrative system, the 
government could easily find out how many such children existed and where they 
lived. In fact, the municipal Justice Bureau initially agreed to compile a list of 
prisoners7 children in Beijing for Zhang Shuqin. It asked each district justice bureau 
to carry out a survey of such children in their own districts. However, after the 
districts had done the work and submitted their reports to the municipal Justice 
Bureau, certain officials in the municipal government who opposed the PCV idea 
told the Bureau not to give the information to Zhang Shuqin. Her repeated efforts to 
make the government surrender the information all failed, Zhang Shuqin was left in
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an awkward situation. Luckily, a young woman in a government office 
sympathized with Zhang Shuqin and gave her a tip in private. Following her advice, 
Zhang Shuqin approached district justice bureaux directly and tricked them into 
giving her the reports they submitted to the municipal bureau.116
Apart from NGOs' lack of information collecting capacity, their dependence on the 
state for information is largely a result of the government's lack of transparency and 
the reluctance of officials to keep ordinary citizens informed of government policies. 
As scholars point out, in China many government policies and regulations are 
communicated in the form of government documents instead of laws. Unlike laws, 
documents are not required to be open to the public. In fact, they are usually kept 
semi-secret. Ordinary people are often denied access even to documents containing 
policies which directly affect their daily lives (Shi 1997: 12). There are several 
reasons for officials' reluctance to publicize government policies and regulations. In 
addition to the cost involved in printing and disseminating such formation (Li and 
Xu 2001), officials' monopolization of documents increases their power, as it allows 
them to interpret policies according to their own preferences without being 
challenged by the public (Shi 1997).
The experience of the parent of a disabled child in a government office is fairly 
representative of the reception which ordinary citizens might expect from officials 
when they ask for information on government policies. This parent heard that a new 
policy had been put in force that entitled disabled people to more government 
subsidies, so he went to a government agency to inquire about it. After he asked a 
few questions, the official who spoke with him grew impatient and said: "If you 
think there is such a policy, then why don't you show me the document?" This 
effectively put the parent off. He left none the wiser about social welfare
116 Informal interview, 6 November 2001.
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entitlements of disabled people. 117 An incident I witnessed personally while 
interviewing an official presents another poignant example of the difficulty for 
ordinary citizens to obtain information from government agencies. During the 
interview, which was in a provincial Civil Affairs Bureau, a couple who wanted to 
adopt a child came into the office to ask for information on adoption law and 
procedures. Apparently they had been to some sub-provincial level government 
agencies already. Those agencies could not provide them with the relevant 
information and had advised them to come to the provincial bureau. Instead of 
giving them any information, the official told them to go to the civil affairs bureau at 
the city level, which was the administrative level immediately below the province. 
After the couple left, the official explained to me that he could have furnished the 
couple with the information they were looking for, but he did not do so because 
government agencies at lower levels should take care of such inquiries instead of 
referring people to the provincial bureau. The official complained that lower levels 
often did not do their jobs properly and tried to pass the buck to the provincial 
bureau instead, and the provincial bureau must hold its ground and not take on any 
work which should be the responsibility of lower levels.118
Operating in such an environment, Chinese NGOs are often dependent on special 
relations with government agencies or officials simply to keep abreast of 
government policies. For example, Friends of Nature relies on its contacts in the 
National Environmental Protection Agency to inform them of government 
environmental policies so that they can avoid open clashes with the government 
(Raab 1997). Perhaps even more frequently, NGOs rely on their friends in the 
government to inform them of government practices, which can be even more 
elusive than policies, as no written information on such practices may exist. For 
example, the founder of a popular NGO in a southern city had tried for a couple of
117 Informal interview with the parent on 20 February 2000.
118 My interview with the official took place on 22 May 2000.
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years to set up a similar organisation in Beijing, but local policies in Beijing 
stipulated that nobody who was not a Beijing permanent resident could serve as the 
legal representative (faren daibiao) of Beijing-based NGOs. This NGO director had 
cultivated the friendship of a Beijing official who kept her informed of new 
developments on this front. I was once invited to lunch with the NGO director and 
her official friend.119 In the course of the lunch, the official told the NGO director 
that the Beijing municipal government might now be willing to take a more flexible 
approach towards this issue. Recently, a Beijing-based NGO that wished to change 
its legal representative had proposed a replacement who did not possess permanent 
Beijing resident status. The NGO had submitted the candidate's information to the 
government for approval. The official said that he would keep the NGO director 
informed of the government7 s decision on this matter. If it gave its approval in this 
case, the NGO director could then ask the government to allow her to be the legal 
representative of her Beijing NGO, citing this precedent to support her application.
The experience of the Shaanxi Province Returning to Society Research Association 
(SPRSRA) provides a happy example of NGOs benefiting from inside information 
on government practices. In 1999, the Communist Party's Central Supervisory 
Committee on the Construction of Spiritual Civilization gave the SPRSRA 600,000 
yuan to upgrade the facilities of its three PCVs in Shaanxi. This has given a strong 
boost to the image of the PCVs, and Zhang Shuqin often mentions it to government 
agencies and potential donors to demonstrate the legitimacy of her work. As Zhang 
Shuqin said of the grant "This is not about money. This is about government 
approval. It sends out the message that we are backed up by the government." 
When I asked Zhang Shuqin how she managed to get the money from the 
Committee, she told me that she simply sent a letter to Ding Guangen, the 
chairperson of the Committee. This surprised me greatly on three accounts. First, 
senior central state officials like Mr. Ding rarely reply to letters from members of the
119 22 August 2000.
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public. In fact, most such letters do not even reach these officials. Besides, state 
funds are not allocated this way. One simply would not expect a central state 
agency to give money directly to a local NGO. Finally, the Committee seems to be a 
central Party organ that is responsible for providing policy guidance to Party and 
government units on spiritual civilization related work. It does not seem to be an 
agency with a budget to fund individual projects. Putting all these facts together, 
few people would have thought it anything but a total waste of time to write a letter 
to Ding Guangen to ask for money, so why did Zhang Shuqin do it and obtained 
such a good result? The answer was that she received inside information from 
somebody who knew Mr. Ding's habits and the Committee's finances well. This 
friend told Zhang Shuqin that, unlike other senior state officials, Mr. Ding usually 
read letters from the public rather than leaving them to his secretaries to deal with. 
He enjoyed being able to give out money and had recently procured some funds for 
his Committee to spend. This friend suggested to Zhang Shuqin that she write to Mr. 
Ding. Within a week, Mr. Ding had awarded the PCVs 600,000 yuan.120
NGOs not only need good knowledge of government policies and practices, they 
also need to know how to interact with the state bureaucracy with which they 
inevitably come into frequent contact. If they are not skilled in dealing with the 
bureaucratic system, they are likely to get into constant trouble, and their activities 
can be hampered at every step. Even though many NGO staff are amphibious 
people, as mentioned before, and are therefore not ignorant of the conduct of 
government affairs, dining my fieldwork I found that NGOs usually had a circle of 
informal advisers who were well versed in the way the government and its officials 
operated. Not surprisingly, these advisers were mostly incumbent or retired 
government officials who were friends of NGO staffers or who supported the goals 
of the NGOs and were therefore willing to lend their assistance. NGOs relied 
heavily on the advice of these friends to manage their relationships, particularly
120 Conversations with Zhang Shuqin in January 2000.
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those with the government. Sometimes NGOs might also receive advice from 
people in the government who were not their friends but who sympathised with 
their causes, as in the aforementioned case of the young woman suggesting a way of 
obtaining the information on prisoners' children in Beijing to Zhang Shuqin.
The issues on which NGOs need the advice of their official friends are extremely 
wide-ranging. One NGO director was invited to a conference in Hong Kong, but she 
did not realise that applications for the necessary documents for travelling to Hong 
Kong would take a few weeks to be approved. By the time she submitted the 
application, there was not enough time left for her to obtain the documents. 
However, some officials suggested an alternative route that involved declaring the 
purpose of her visit to be conducting business affairs instead of attending a 
conference. Since the processing of such applications took less time, it enabled her to 
receive the travel documents in time for the conference.121 NGOs also frequently 
rely on their advisers to edit their reports and applications and to coach them on 
how to present themselves to the government and the public. The SPRSRA 
summarises its work in the slogan "Eliminating potential problems for the 
government, taking on social responsibility of our own accord". As Zhang Shuqin 
revealed to me, she was taught these words by a former vice governor who was a 
supporter of her PCV initiative.122 It seemed that many of Zhang Shuqin's important 
applications had benefited from the skilful editing of her advisers. For example, the 
letter she submitted to the China Charities Federation, an officially-organised NGO, 
asking it to host her activities in Beijing, had been edited by a retired senior Beijing 
official.
NGOs may even need advice on how to bribe officials. An NGO needed to build an 
extension to its premises, for which it must obtain the approval of the Bureau of
121 Informal interview, 21 July 2000.
122 Interview, 3 January 2000.
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Land Administration. The section chief who reviewed the NGO's application 
refused to give his approval. The NGO managed to bring the matter to the attention 
of a director of the Bureau, who asked the section chief to approve the extension. 
However, the section chief spoke to another director who was at odds with this 
director and made him back up his original decision. The NGO sought the help of 
an adviser, who told it to give the section chief a bribe and advised the NGO on the 
appropriate amount as well as the appropriate way to offer the bribe. Acting on the 
advice, the NGO successfully brought the section chief around.123
While NGOs most frequently rely on the guidance of their advisers to deal with 
government agencies and officials, they also draw on the knowledge and 
information of these advisers in managing other important relationships, such as 
those with the business community. I once witnessed a meeting between an NGO 
director and a government official during which they discussed how to raise funds 
for the NGO from Chinese entrepreneurs. The official told the NGO director that 
she possessed a list of rural entrepreneurs who were willing to pay a good price for 
a meeting with top state officials. The official offered to share the list with the NGO 
director. She then went through the names of some top officials whom she thought 
the NGO could approach to see if they were willing to be its board members or 
advisers. Once the NGO succeeded in getting these officials on board, it would 
easily make the entrepreneurs open their purses by arranging for them to meet 
these officials in exchange for a big donation to the NGO.124
Over a dinner I had with an NGO director and a government official who was a 
close friend of hers,1251 also found out how advisers might help NGOs deal with 
problems they had with local communities. The NGO wished to extend a school it 
had built, but the area surrounding the school was the graveyard of a local village.
123 Informal interview, 19 April 2000.
1241 witnessed the meeting in January 2000.
125 This happened in April 2000.
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To extend the school, the graves must be removed first; but as can be expected, the 
villagers strongly objected to the idea. The official had been helping the NGO 
director to persuade the local government to order the villagers to move the graves. 
In the mean time, he also suggested to the NGO director that she continue to work 
directly on the villagers by spreading a rumour that the area had bad fengshui, 
which was why the villagers were so poor. To improve their luck, therefore, the 
villagers must move the graves of their ancestors to a place with better fengshui.
Conclusion
For the sake of the analysis I have broken up Chinese NGO's dependence on the 
state into four thematic areas and discussed them separately. In reality, it is often 
impossible to separate the different types of support which NGOs draw from the 
state. For example, when an NGO receives some funding from the state, not only 
has it gained resources from the state, it has also gained legitimacy that will 
facilitate the NGO's future attempts to win cooperation and support from 
government agencies and the public. Similarly, when an NGO relies on local 
governments to implement its projects, not only does it benefit from the 
organisational and human resources of the local governments, it also 
simultaneously benefits from the information and knowledge possessed by the local 
governments of their local situation. In reality, Chinese NGO's dependence on the 
state is usually comprehensive rather than confined to one of the four areas 
discussed in this chapter.126
More than two decades after the inauguration of market-oriented reforms, the state
126 Although my analysis in this chapter has been based on qualitative research, it is fully 
corroborated by existing quantitative data. When the Tsinghua University NGO Research Centre 
conducted a questionnaire survey of Beijing-based NGOs in 1999, 87.5% of the NGOs said that 
they needed support from the government both in carrying out their activities and in pursuing 
their organisational development. Only 4.8% of the NGOs said that they did not need the 
government's support. See Deng 2000: 34-35.
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still has a dominant presence in economic and social spheres. It has retained 
extensive control over the allocation of resources and opportunities. It is this basic 
situation that has given rise to Chinese NGOs' dependence on the state, just as it has 
created the dependent relationship between private businesses and the state. In this 
context, skilful NGOs, just like skilful private businesses, are the ones that have 
managed to draw as much support and supply from the state as possible while 
maximising their autonomy from the state at the same time. Exactly what kinds of 
skills do these NGOs possess? This is the topic of the next chapter.
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5. The Skills of Chinese NGOs
In recent years, the international development community has shown a strong 
interest in supporting capacity building for Chinese NGOs. The eagerness of donor 
agencies to give money to this cause has contributed to an outburst of NGO capacity 
building programmes. Not only have international organisations started to run such 
programmes in China, but an increasing number of Chinese organisations are also 
offering training courses for NGOs. One thing the various training programmes 
have in common is that they all rely heavily on materials that have been designed 
and used in other countries, and they are all keen to invite experts from outside 
mainland China, such as Europe, America, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, to give the 
training. Observers of the Chinese NGO sector generally share the view that the 
sector is still "in its infancy",127 and its capacity building needs are vast. 
Assessments of such needs have generated long lists that include everything from 
strategic planning, programme management, staff training, public relations and 
image-building, to fundraising and communication skills, and the ability to 
mobilise volunteers.128 Under the circumstances, those who are concerned to build 
up the capacity of Chinese NGOs have naturally sought to improve these 
organisations by introducing them to the latest international NGO management 
theories and practices.
While there is no doubt that learning how foreign NGOs are managed and listening 
to international experts can do Chinese NGOs a lot of good, the usefulness of 
current training programmes has been diminished by their failure to tailor their 
curricula to the specific needs of Chinese NGOs. Chinese NGOs' lack of capacity is 
indeed only too obvious, especially if one uses well-managed NGOs in countries
127 Such vocabulary is most enthusiastically embraced by Chinese NGO practitioners themselves, 
who often use similes such as "child", "infant", or even "embryo" to emphasize the 
underdeveloped state of the NGO sector and to call for more support from the government and 
international donors to foster its growth.
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where the sector is long established as one's frame of reference. However, current 
analyses of the capacity building needs of Chinese NGOs have failed to recognise 
that many of them already possess advanced skills which may be very different 
from those taught by standard NGO training programmes but which are crucial to 
their survival and development in the Chinese context. Instead of viewing NGO 
capacity as consisting of a universally applicable set of skills and use it as the 
yardstick for measuring the performance of Chinese NGOs, analysts and organisers 
of capacity building programmes would do well to first examine the skills Chinese 
NGOs have. A good understanding of these skills would probably help them to 
design capacity building programmes that are more relevant to the needs of 
Chinese NGOs.
*
Current capacity building programmes could also benefit from a better 
understanding of the root causes of the poor management of many Chinese NGOs. I 
suggested in Chapter 2 that NGO research in China has suffered from a managerial 
approach that neglects political analysis. Partly as a result of this deficiency in NGO 
research, many people attribute the governance problems afflicting Chinese NGOs 
to their lack of management skills, therefore management training has been seized 
upon as a solution to the problems. In fact, many ostensible management issues 
with Chinese NGOs, such as the lack of clearly defined goals and objectives, the lack 
of rational governance structures, poor financial management, inadequate human 
resource development, and so forth, have little to do with the capacity or skills of 
these organisations. The explanation needs to be sought elsewhere, for instance, in 
the motives behind the establishment of these organisations and the purposes they 
serve. Often, NGOs are badly managed because those who are in charge have little 
incentive to change the situation. Instead, they may have every reason to maintain 
the status quo.
128 See, e.g., Young and Woo 2000; Deng 2001a; Kang 2002.
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Finally, NGO capacity building programmes can only be of limited efficacy if they 
just focus on NGOs themselves while ignoring the institutional environment for 
these organisations. Once the management of NGOs is no longer considered in 
isolation but examined in the context of the specific institutional environment of 
present-day China, then certain management practices that clearly qualify as "bad" 
or "irrational" under normal circumstances may actually make very good sense. In 
other words, there may well be rational justifications for certain "irrational" 
management practices of Chinese NGOs. One can argue that instead of proving that 
Chinese NGOs lack skills, such practices indicate that these organisations possess 
good skills that allow them to adapt to the specific environment in which they 
operate.
In the first two sections of this chapter I discuss the skills which Chinese NGOs have. 
I focus on their skills in two particular areas. Section 1 examines how NGOs manage 
their relationship with the state, arguably the most important of all their 
relationships, while Section 2 looks at the methods they use to mobilise public 
support and raise money. In the third section I explore some of the root causes of the 
poor management of Chinese NGOs. In the final section I use some examples to 
suggest that the skills of NGOs should be understood in relation to their specific 
institutional contexts rather than left to standard capacity building programmes to 
define.
5.1 M anaging Relationship w ith the State
The previous three chapters have already offered some examples of the skilful 
handling of their relationship with the state by NGOs. Chapter 2 introduced some 
cases of NGOs manoeuvring to gain or claim political legitimacy, defined as 
political acceptability in the eyes of the state. Chapters 3 and 4 discussed how NGOs 
managed to evade government control and supervision while at the same time
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making use of the power, authority, and resources of the state for their own 
purposes. As has been mentioned, a common strategy adopted by NGOs to achieve 
their desired relationship with the state is to find patrons and allies in the 
government to provide them with the necessary protection and access. While 
sometimes outright bribery may be involved in NGOs' attempt to win friends in the 
government,129 usually they would resort to more subtle means.
One method often used by popular NGOs to develop good relationship with 
government officials is to invite them to go on study tours to foreign countries or to 
attend international conferences outside China. The donor community has been 
very keen to provide Chinese NGOs with international exposure, which is 
considered an important and effective means of NGO capacity building. Donors 
pay for these trips while NGOs assemble the delegations. Often, NGOs would invite 
some government officials to be members of the delegation. Since the opportunity to 
go on a foreign trip is still a highly coveted prize in China, such invitations would 
greatly endear the NGOs to the officials. During these trips, members of the 
delegation inevitably spend a lot of time together, not just during day-time but also 
in the evenings and over weekends, when they go sightseeing or shopping together. 
This often ends in the development of warm friendships between the NGO staff and 
the officials on the delegation. Often, after these trips, the officials become good 
friends of the NGO staff and can now be counted on for various favours.130
Although a less grand treat than foreign trips, free trips within China can also go a 
long way towards winning NGOs official friends. When I interviewed a senior 
manager of an international NGO that had been the main donor of a local NGO, the 
manager complained that the local NGO often requested them to fund the trips of
129 For example, in the case of the NGO that sought permission from the Bureau of Land 
Administration to build an extension to its premises (see Chapter 4).
130 Interviews with several NGOs that are located in different cities and work in different sectors. 
Also drawing on my personal experience of several such study tours.
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officials from its sponsoring agency. Just the day before, said the manager, he had 
received a phone call from the local NGO asking if the INGO could pay for a trip of 
the director of the agency to Beijing. The manager felt that these so-called study 
visits or conference trips had simply been used as gifts by the local NGO.131
Another method frequently used by NGOs to gain allies in the government is to 
invite officials to serve as their board members, directors, or advisors. NGOs do not 
really expect the officials to do any concrete work, but the titles allow NGOs to pay 
them salaries and offer them other benefits. For example, NGOs may pay the 
officials' mobile phone bills for them or reimbursement them for any taxi receipts 
they can produce. I once interviewed the director of a popular NGO whose 
relationship with the official whom she initially appointed the president of her 
NGO had turned sour. The director complained that since the official's retirement 
he had not been of much help to the NGO but had tried to take control of it. Since he 
had more free time on his hands now, he had asked to be informed of every detail of 
the NGO's operation. The director paid the official a monthly salary that was much 
higher than that of the other staff. She also reimbursed him for various expenses, 
even though he did little actual work. Furthermore, his salary must be delivered to 
his home every month, as she could not possibly ask him to come to the NGO's 
office himself to collect the money. The NGO director felt that the official was no 
longer an asset but had become a liability, so she had managed to get rid of him.132
Not only do NGOs make friends with individual officials by offering them 
economic benefits, they also use this method to establish good relationship with 
government agencies. A good example can be found in the book by Guo, Yang and 
Ying. It shows how a provincial YDF improved its relationship with the provincial 
education commission. Initially, the education commission resented the YDF's
131 Interview, 9 May 2000.
132 Informal interview, 21 July 2000.
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success, just as the Ministry of Education resented the CYDF's success. Later, the 
education commission was given the responsibility of building some new schools in 
a poor area using not the government's education budget but its own institutional 
resources.133 The education commission turned to the YDF for help, as the latter 
controlled Project Hope funds which were raised precisely for the purpose of 
supporting basic education in poor areas. The YDF obliged and disbursed funds for 
three new primary schools in the name of the education commission. Afterwards 
the strained relations between the two organisations thawed noticeably (Guo, Yang 
and Ying 1999: 31).
I heard a similar story from a member of the aforementioned NGO that frequently 
asked its INGO donor to pay for the trips of officials from its sponsoring agency. 
When I asked about one of the NGO's main projects, the person told me that the 
project was originally the government agency's idea, since it was the official 
responsibility of the agency to organise such activities. However, the agency did not 
have sufficient funds to carry out the project, so the NGO sought and obtained 
funding from the INGO to implement the project in collaboration with the agency, 
which meant the agency would get credit for the project without having to pay for 
it.134
Some popular NGOs have been able to establish good relationship with 
government agencies by applying for funding from international donors, then 
spending the money together with these agencies. A Chinese NGO practitioner I 
interviewed described this phenomenon as "NGO-government collusion."135 Given 
the enthusiasm of many international donors for funding Chinese NGOs, especially
133 The state's poverty alleviation strategy in China has involved pairing up individual 
government agencies with poor localities. The government agencies are asked to use their own 
institutional resources to help their assigned localities as opposed to using funds from the 
government budget they happen to control. Many agencies mobilise the resources by using such 
methods as asking each of its employees to make a personal donation to the cause.
134 Interview, 28 April 2000.
135 Interview, 7 November 2001.
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the ones perceived as "genuine NGOs" as opposed to GONGOs, it is often easier for 
NGOs to obtain certain small-scale project funding from donors than government 
agencies.136 It should be pointed out that this kind of collaboration with government 
agencies suits the NGOs too. As mentioned in Chapter 4, few NGOs have the 
capacity to implement even medium-sized projects themselves, so they depend on 
the government for project implementation anyway. Therefore, they are usually 
happy to leave most of the actual work to their government collaborators. A 
common perception among Chinese NGO researchers and practitioners is that 
when international donors fund an NGO project, they usually do not pay much 
attention to the process of project implementation as long as the NGO delivers 
results,137 which leaves ample scope for "NGO-government collusion."
In addition to economic benefits, NGOs have also managed to win the goodwill of 
government officials and agencies by offering them political benefits. Although the 
NGOs I encountered during my fieldwork had varying degrees of affinity to the 
government, without exception their managers showed shrewd judgement of the 
potential political advantage to government agencies or officials of supporting their 
organisations. They appeared to be highly adept at catering to the political needs of 
government agencies and officials in exchange for concrete assistance to their 
organisations. For example, a popular NGO persuaded a district government to 
help it establish an institution for disadvantaged children. It made a deputy chief of 
the district government the Director of the institution, although the institution's 
day-to-day operation was in fact under the charge of the NGO's manager. The NGO 
had carried out a tremendously successful publicity campaign from the day it was 
founded. Its earlier projects had received much praise from both the provincial and 
the central government As a result, the institution it set up with the help of the 
district government was guaranteed on-going positive media coverage as well as
136 It is a different matter with large-scale projects, which can only be implemented by the 
government.
137 Interviews, 7 November 2001,12 November 2001, and 28 June 2000.
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visits by high-ranking provincial and central-govemment officials. Whenever the 
media or higher-level officials came to the institution to witness its achievements, 
the NGO manager would make sure that the district government and in particular 
the deputy chief, who had been the most staunch supporter of the NGO in the 
district government, would receive sufficient credit for the success of the institution. 
The NGO manager considered the deputy chief to be the kind of person who sought 
the spotlight and longed for opportunities to present his good work to senior 
officials, so she had taken care to "satisfy these needs of his."138 In return, she had 
been able to count on his unreserved commitment to the institution and through 
him various material assistance from the district government.
Some popular NGOs I studied have even sought government support by directly 
offering their political service to the government. One NGO director wrote an 
application for funding to a government bureau in which she enumerated as many 
as eight advantages to the bureau of supporting her organisation. One advantage 
was that the bureau could use the NGO to do certain things which would be 
inconvenient for it to do itself. Another advantage was that the NGO could serve as 
a bridge between the bureau and certain segments of society who were usually 
suspicious of the government and were therefore difficult for the bureau to reach 
directly. Finally, the NGO could also provide employment for retired bureau 
officials.139
One of the most important forms of political assistance which NGOs can offer the 
government is their public endorsement of government projects that need to be 
evaluated by international bodies. The government has received some international
138 Informal interview, 3 August 2000.
139 Informal interview, 21 July 2000. The placement of retired officials was listed as an advantage 
because government agencies in China are often under pressure to look after their retired 
officials. As mentioned in Chapter 3, many officially-organized NGOs have been created mainly 
in order to place retired officials, and have been sarcastically called "retired officials 
reemployment projects".
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development assistance funds that demand NGO participation in the projects as a 
conditionality. Although NGOs often complain that they have no real involvement 
in these projects and are simply put there for show, they have nevertheless played 
the part expected of them: turning up at government-organised ceremonies and 
attaching their signatures to government-prepared documents to help present a 
facade of government-NGO partnership.140 While a popular environmental NGO 
claimed that the purpose of its existence was to "criticise the government" and even 
to act as "the government's opponent", when the government proposed to stage a 
"Green Olympic" in its effort to win the bid to host the Olympic Games in Beijing in 
2008, the NGO immediately put itself at the government's disposal and joined 
wholeheartedly the government's campaign to show how much it cared about the 
environment. It is said that around the time of the Olympic bid some NGO activists 
were so eager to offer their services to the government that their behaviour totally 
disgusted their peers.141
The government at all levels has been used to presenting the work of NGOs as its 
own achievements. For example, in its 1995 white paper on the progress of human 
rights in China, the State Council has described Project Hope as a project of the 
Chinese government to ensure its citizens' right to education (Kang 1997: 250). 
Given Chinese NGOs' comprehensive dependence on the state, the government is 
indeed justified to some extent in claiming credit for NGO projects. What is really 
interesting from the point of view of this study is that not only do NGOs fail to 
protest against the stealing of their honours by the government, but they often 
deliberately leave honours to the government.142 They even willingly assist the state
140 Interviews, 10 November 2002. A particularly outspoken NGO manager I know once accused 
some key figures in the Chinese NGO community of being two-faced: They are effusive in their 
criticism of the government in meetings with foreigner donors but become rather quiet when 
there are government representatives present.
141 Interview, November 2002.
142 I learned about an internal discussion of a popular NGO from its director while I was 
studying the organisation. The director said that after the discussion they decided that they 
would "let the government have the praises." She summarized their strategy in two sentences: 
"Using the [political] advantages to persuade the government to support us. Using the miserable
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in using their projects for its own propaganda purposes.
A case in point is the Shaanxi Province Returning to Society Research Association 
(SPRSRA) and the Prisoners' Children's Villages (PCVs) it set up. A Vice Minister 
from the Ministry of Justice in Beijing attended the inauguration of the first PCV. In 
her speech the vice minister declared that the establishment of the PCV was "a 
forceful rebuttal to the attacks of some Western countries on the human rights 
situation in our country".143 This speech seems to have set the tone for all 
subsequent presentations of the PCVs in the official media. An article in the People's 
Daily (27 May 2000: 6) even claimed that the PCVs represented pioneering work in 
international human rights history and showed that the Chinese people had led the 
world in protecting the human rights of prisoners' children. The SPRSRA, for its 
part, danced faithfully to the government's tune. For example, Mr. Guo, a peasant 
entrepreneur and village chief who was appointed a deputy director of the SPRSRA 
after he agreed to host the first PCV in his village, told the media that the reason the 
villagers were happy to support the PCV was because they had become rich thanks 
to the Party's reform and open policy. To show their gratitude to the Party, the 
villagers wanted to make contributions to their country and society by supporting 
the PCV. At the same time, they wanted to show the world that "Chinese peasants 
also attach great importance to human rights and they enjoy a broad range of 
human rights."144
After the SPRSRA set up a second PCV in the provincial capital Xi'an, it asked the 
provincial Foreign Affairs Office to grant it the status of an "institution open to 
foreign visitors." Since then, the Xi'an PCV has received dozens of foreign 
delegations and has supplied the media with many quotations from these
condition [of our target group] to persuade the public to donate money to us."
143 The Vice Minister's speech was quoted in over a dozen newspapers that reported the event, 
for example, Democracy and Law, 28 August 1996:1.
144 Mr. Guo's comments were also reported in several newspapers, for example, Workers' Daily, 
19 October 1996:3.
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delegations that commend the human rights situation in China. According to one 
SPRSRA report, the head of a US press delegation said: "The Chinese people are 
truly remarkable. In our country there is also crime and there are also children 
living on the street, but nobody pays any attention." The head of a delegation from 
the European Parliament said: "The West says that China treats its children with 
cruelty, but we have seen that even prisoners' children are so healthy and lively. 
Therefore children who have parents must be leading even better lives." After 
giving a number of such quotations, the SPRSRA report concluded: "The PCV has 
become a window on human rights in China for foreigners and a powerful 
demonstration of our country's fulfilment of our obligation under the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and our defence of human rights."145
The China Green Shade Children's Village (CGSCV) provides another example of 
NGOs offering themselves to the state as propaganda tools. The CGSCV was a 
private orphanage founded by Ms. Hu Manli, who began by adopting two 
orphaned children of a deceased neighbour. Local newspapers covered the story, 
which resulted in many orphans and abandoned children being sent to Hu Manli 
for help.146 Since she could not adopt all the orphans who arrived on her doorstep, 
with the support of the local government Hu Manli set up the CGSCV in 1992 to 
provide institutional care for orphans. It seems that Hu Manli named the orphanage 
"Green Shade" because a newspaper article once likened her to "a big tree that 
provides a stretch of green shade for unfortunate children." (China Youth Daily, 13 
April 1991: 1) In her various public statements, however, Hu Manli always 
described herself as merely a small leaf on the big tree of the Party. In a 1991 speech, 
she said:
After the media reported my story, I received several hundred letters...Some
145 "Summary of the Work of the Shaanxi Province Returning to Society Research Association" 
dated 17 August 1999.
146 Because of the narrow coverage of the state welfare system in China, only a small number of 
orphaned children can gain admittance into the limited number of state welfare institutions.
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people called me a "Chinese philanthropist" in their letters. I replied that I was not 
a philanthropist. Philanthropists in the West are very rich people. Their charity is 
simply window dressing or carried out in order to ease their conscience. I am just 
an ordinary schoolteacher. I could not have done these things if I was not living 
under the socialist system.
A newspaper article compares me to a big tree that provides a stretch of green 
shade for unfortunate children. In the course of helping these children, it has 
become my deepest conviction that I am not a big tree. The real big tree is the Party. 
I am just a leaf on that tree (Wugang Workers' Newspaper, 26 July 1991:1).
The same message was repeated by Hu Manli in a newspaper article in 1994:
Through the experience of rearing orphans and setting up a child welfare 
institution in the past few years, I feel that the Party's loving care can be found 
everywhere in our great socialist motherland. The Party is a big tree. I am a leaf on 
that tree. I am confident that with the support of the Party and the entire society I 
will turn the Children's Village into a success, and let it help to make our society 
full of love and kindness and make children who have lost their parents remember 
forever the Party's loving-kindness (Workers' Daily, 9 March 1994: 2).
The skills of Chinese NGOs in dealing with the state are not only demonstrated at 
times when they cater to the latter1 s political needs in exchange for its support. They 
are also demonstrated at times when NGOs use political blackmail instead of 
political payoff to get what they want from the government. Once an NGO project 
such as the PCV or the CGSCV has been widely publicized and used to prove the 
flourishing of human rights in China or "the Party's loving-kindness", the 
government's ability to control the NGO also becomes somewhat constrained. If the 
government shares the credit for these projects, then it must also share the blame if 
anything goes wrong. In any case, the government needs showcases and has a 
strong incentive to ensure that they do not fail. Knowing this mentality of the 
government, NGOs have used the high profile of their projects to fend off criticism 
and to force the government to provide them with continuous support. For example, 
under strong criticism from some local people, an NGO director who had achieved 
national fame and had been promoted as a role model by some central government
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agencies simply told local authorities that they should protect good models, 
otherwise they might face serious consequences.147 Even without national fame, 
NGOs can still gain considerable bargaining power over government agencies once 
the latter have tried to score political points by associating themselves with the 
NGOs' work. A popular NGO I studied was unhappy about the way it was treated 
by its sponsoring agency, therefore it persuaded another government organisation 
to be its sponsor. The new sponsor asked the NGO for a "management fee" in return 
for its sponsorship, but the NGO manager was determined to refuse the request. As 
the manager said, she had enabled the sponsor to gain a good reputation by 
presenting itself as the organisation behind the charitable deeds of her NGO. 
Therefore, if the sponsor insisted on charging her a management fee, she was "not 
going to be courteous anymore" and would give them a hard time.148 Having 
portrayed itself in public as being very supportive of the NGO's effort to help 
disadvantaged people, it would indeed be awkward for the sponsor to withdraw its 
sponsorship using the non-payment of management fee as the reason.
NGOs without the status of a political showcase can still blackmail the government 
by threatening to stop the services they provide. This is especially true in the case of 
NGOs that provide welfare services for marginalised groups, such as orphans or 
disabled people. Many such NGOs serve people who fall outside the narrow scope 
of the state welfare system. For example, the PCVs provided institutional care for 
prisoners' children who had not received welfare provision from the state and who 
could not be cared for by their relatives. The CGSCV, similarly, took in orphaned 
children from rural areas whom state welfare homes could not accommodate. Once 
a large number of vulnerable people have been gathered in these private welfare 
institutions, however, should the institutions collapse, the government could not 
simply shut its eyes but would have to step in and make arrangements for their
147 Materials supplied by the NGO director.
, 148 Informal interview, 1 September 2000.
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clients. Since these private institutions raise the bulk of their funds themselves, 
taking them over would impose heavy financial as well as administrative burden on 
the government. As a result, the government is often willing to provide the 
necessary assistance to these institutions to keep them open.
NGOs are quick to use the government's fear of their collapse to demand support 
and resist any attempt by the government to influence their management or services. 
Zhang Shuqin, for example, confessed that many local government organisations 
and officials did not approve of her management of the SPRSRA, but nobody dared 
to disband the SPRSRA or remove her as the SPRSRA's general secretary because of 
the large number of prisoners' children living in the PCVs. When criticized by 
unfriendly local officials, she would tell them: "As a matter of fact, I have wanted to 
quit this work for a long time. Why don't you take these children home with 
you?"149 The manager of an NGO that provides institutional care for mentally 
disabled people employs the same tactics whenever the civil affairs bureau, which is 
responsible for ensuring standard in social welfare institutions, asks the NGO to 
make some changes to the way it provides its service. After another 
non-governmental welfare home for mentally disabled people in the same city went 
bankrupt, the civil affairs bureau bailed it out through a semi- government 
take-over, which turned out to be a costly operation. This has given the NGO 
manager a handle against the civil affairs. Whenever civil affairs tried to tell the 
NGO what to do, the manager would challenge it to take over her institution just as 
it did the other welfare home, so that it could have its own way.150 This tactics has so 
far deterred the civil affairs from taking any action against the NGO despite its 
recalcitrance.
The constraint on the government's ability to fully control large private welfare
149 Informal discussion, 5 January 2000.
150 Based on various letters from the NGO manager to the civil affairs department.
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institutions was most clearly conveyed in an interview I had with some officials in 
Lijiang, Yunnan Province, where Hu Manli, the founder of the CGSCV, set up 
another NGO called United Moms Charity Association (UMCA) in 1999. The 
UMCA ran a welfare home, a boarding school, and a vocational training school for 
orphans. Together they housed over 200 children. The three institutions were 
largely supported with overseas funding raised by Hu Manli. The officials I 
interviewed admitted frankly that without Hu Manli and the money she brought in 
they would not be able to maintain the institutions. As they said: "The bottom line is 
that we have no money, so even if we want to take charge of things we are not able 
to do so. Every time Hu Manli falls sick, we become very nervous."151
While NGOs may occasionally resort to blackmail to wring concessions from the 
government, this is mostly a defensive rather than offensive weapon. To gain active 
support from the government NGOs rely primarily on the strategies mentioned 
earlier, namely offering government agencies and officials various economic and 
political enticements. One reason why blackmail can only be of limited help to 
NGOs is that the government is comprised of diverse interests. To civil affairs 
departments, which are responsible for taking care of vulnerable members of 
society, such as orphans and disabled people, the closure of NGO welfare homes is 
a serious threat, as they will have to clear up the mess. However, to other 
government agencies with no responsibility for social welfare, the same threat may 
carry little weight. The skills of Chinese NGOs in dealing with the state are partly 
reflected in their superb understanding of the different interests within the 
government, and their ability to exploit the existence of these different interests.
Although NGOs recognise the crucial importance of good relations with 
government officials, as a veteran NGO manager said, if unfortunately one did 
offend some officials and turned them into one's enemies, it would not be the end of
151 Interview, 20 April 2000.
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the world, since there was frequent turnover in the government. One only had to 
wait a couple of years until the incumbents were replaced by new ones, then one 
could start anew by making friends with the newcomers.152 Few NGOs I studied, 
however, had the patience to wait a couple of years if they encountered hostility 
from certain officials. Under these circumstances, they would usually search out 
other officials in the same agency who were more supportive of their cause and 
secure the assistance they needed from the agency through these officials. One NGO 
whose progress I followed for two years managed to obtain the necessary support 
from its sponsoring agency by putting its requests to the official who backed it 
while avoiding as much as possible sending its applications to another official who 
usually withheld his approval. When this strategy does not work, NGOs can also go 
around different agencies until they find one that is most willing to support its work. 
When Zhang Shuqin tried to replicate her PCV initiative in Beijing, the first thing 
she needed to do was to find a sponsoring agency in Beijing. She had discussions 
with several organisations, including the All China Women's Federation, the State 
Family Planning Commission and its subsidiary the China Population Welfare 
Fund, and the China Human Rights Research Society, until she found the 
organisation that was most receptive to her ideas, the China Charities Federation, 
and opened her office there.
Finally, NGOs can also move around different cities in search of a more supportive 
environment. Under increasing criticism from some local government agencies, the 
founder of one of my case studies simply relocated to another city. Hu Manli, who 
initially established the CGSCV in Wuhan City in central China, moved her entire 
orphanage to Fujian Province on the southeast coast when her relationship with the 
local government in Wuhan deteriorated. A few years later, she moved again to 
Lijiang, Yunnan Province in southwest China, where the local government invited 
her to set up institutions for orphans there and was prepared to mobilise its own
152 Informal interview, 18 April 2000.
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administrative and financial resources to aid her effort.
NGOs take advantage of the different interests and attitudes towards their 
organisations within the state not only to get round less supportive agencies or 
officials, but also to gain stakes in government projects. For example, an NGO in the 
health sector was allowed to coordinate the first stage of a new HIV/ AIDS 
prevention project funded with multilateral aid money, because the Ministry of 
Health and the State Pharmaceutical Administration were competing with each 
other to control the project. Each considered the work as falling under its 
jurisdiction and neither would consent to let the other one take the leading role. The 
NGO cashed in on the rivalry between the two agencies and won their approval to 
coordinate the initial activities.153
5.2 Public Relations and Fundraising Skills
During my field research I was often struck by NGOs' skills in forging positive 
public images for themselves. One NGO manager told me that many critics of her 
organisation had accused it of financial irregularities and corruption. These 
accusations reached the ear of the chief of the Popular Organisation Management 
Division of the provincial Civil Affairs Bureau, the government office responsible 
for supervising NGOs. The division chief warned the manager that he intended to 
send people to audit the NGO's accounts. The manager then invited the division 
chief to visit the NGO's administrative office, a dark room furnished with 
dilapidated desks and chairs of different sizes and colours, all donations from 
different places. After he saw the poor condition of the office, the division chief was 
very moved and said to the NGO manager: "No matter what rumours I hear again 
in the future, I would not believe a single word of them any more." He then 
cancelled the request for a formal audit of the NGO's books. The NGO manager had
153 Interview, 15 November 2002.
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used this incident to stress to her staff the importance of always keeping a modest 
office. She also told them that the organisation should only pay its staff low salaries, 
in order to appear honest and clean, but could "compensate the staff in other 
ways".154 These other ways included buying a mobile phone for every staff member, 
buying cosmetics for them (justified on the ground that their skin was over-exposed 
to the elements as they had to go outdoors frequently on official business), 
reimbursing the staff for their various expenses (such as mobile phone bills and bus 
tickets to and from the office everyday), and allowing the staff to partake of some of 
the goods donated to the NGO by the public.
I found that many NGOs would take meticulous care to show themselves in a good 
light in front of visitors, especially important visitors, such as current and potential 
donors. When I arrived to study a non-governmental social welfare institution, it 
was expecting a visit by a group of foreign tourists the following day who were 
going to make a donation to it. Some staff members were organising the residents of 
the institution to give it a cleanup. However, they were stopped by the manager, 
who said the place would become dirty again if it was cleaned too early, so they 
should hold the cleanup until shortly before the arrival of the visitors. In another 
non-governmental institution, a residential home for mentally disabled people, I 
saw some written instructions from the manager to the staff before the visit by an 
INGO from which it hoped to receive funding and technical assistance. The 
instructions, which were extremely detailed, told the staff how to prepare the place 
in order to make a good impression on the visitors. For example, the staff were told 
to hang photographs showing the daily lives of the residents on the walls of each 
room, to put unlocked shelves containing books and toys in the communal living 
room, and to install a small kitchen. In short, the manager wrote: "The place should 
have as much a family atmosphere as possible."
154 Informal interview, 1 August 2000.
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Not only did many NGOs I came across know how to look good, but they also knew 
how to talk in ways that would generate good feeling in others. An NGO director 
was invited to take part in a television programme in Beijing. The television station 
sent her a plane ticket, but the director asked the station if they could have it 
changed to a train ticket and let her keep the difference, saying that the money thus 
saved would allow the NGO to buy 20 sacks of flour, which could feed the people 
under its care for quite a few days.155 This director also told me a story about how 
she impressed visitors from a foreign company that wanted to give some money to 
local charities and was referred to her organisation. The director took the visitors to 
lunch in a restaurant. When her guests were getting ready to order, she told them 
not to order too many dishes or anything expensive. This was in total violation of 
Chinese social etiquette, as hosts are supposed to put their best food on the table 
and to offer it in quantities that exceed the capacity of their guests, especially when 
the guests are foreigners. Chinese organisations often regale foreign visitors with 
lavish feasts that involve a lot of waste, usually paying for them with public funds. 
Many foreigners in fact feel uncomfortable about such feasts, thinking the waste is 
unjustifiable and distasteful. Nevertheless, most Chinese organisations continue to 
treat foreign visitors in this fashion. The NGO director in this case, however, 
deliberately went against the common practice. She explained to the visitors that 
she was going to pay for the lunch out of her own pocket rather than using the 
NGO's funds in order to save the organisation money. With her modest income, she 
could not afford to treat them to an expensive meal. According to the director, her 
uncommon and seemingly rude behaviour immediately won her guests over, who 
quickly decided that her organisation would be worthy of their support.156
Other NGO directors I met were similarly skilled in using measured remarks and 
presentations to create favourable impressions. One director told journalists that she
155 Interview, 10 November 1999.
156 Informal interviews, July 2000.
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spent every penny of her lifelong savings to set up her NGO. Her son, who was 
living in America, was so moved by her dedication that he sold his business there 
and sent the money to her to put into the organisation as well. This director also 
liked to tell a story about how her devotion to work forced her to neglect her duties 
to her family: While she was restoring a run-down premises where the NGO was to 
be housed, her mother fell very ill and eventually died. The other members of the 
family tried to break the news to her but could not reach her, because she was 
working around the clock on the premises and hardly went back to her flat to eat or 
sleep. When she eventually received the sad news, she flew home to attend her 
mother's funeral in the morning, then flew back in the afternoon to resume her 
work. As this director once spoke of the personal sacrifices she had made at a public 
forum: "Running an NGO means that you cannot see your mother before she dies 
and you cannot be a filial daughter to your father. Running an NGO means that you 
must be prepared to see your husband leave you. Running an NGO means that you 
will have to put aside all your human emotions and desires."157
NGOs also know how to choose different words for different audiences. As 
mentioned earlier, Mr. Guo, who agreed to host the first PCV in his village, told the 
media that as a peasant who had become rich thanks to the Party's reform policy, he 
wanted to find ways to repay the Party and make contributions to society. Although 
this explanation of his motivation for supporting the PCV would please the 
government, the SPRSRA felt that it would not have much effect on the public and 
foreign donors from whom it wished to raise money. Therefore, Mr. Guo was asked 
to give another explanation for his actions to these latter audiences. He was advised 
to say that while he was in prison himself during the Cultural Revolution as a result 
of political prosecution, his wife and children were left uncared for. For years they 
suffered terrible discrimination and lived in great hardship. This unfortunate
157 Interviews, 23 March 2000 and 30 July 2000.1 have also consulted several newspaper feature 
articles about the director and the NGO she founded.
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experience of his family in the past was what made him decide to help prisoners' 
children once his situation improved.158
In trying to forge a favourable public image, big officially-organised NGOs usually 
have more means at their disposal than small popular NGOs. Given the existence of 
rampant corruption in the country, a major factor that deters many people from 
giving money to charities is the concern that their donations might be embezzled or 
misused. NGOs like the CYDF which raise the bulk of their funds from private 
citizens and businesses realize that their survival depends on winning the trust of 
the general public. Therefore, they have devised various strategies to persuade the 
public that their donations are used properly and efficiently. One strategy 
employed by the CYDF was to invite deputies to the National People's Congress 
and members of the People's Political Consultative Conference (PPCC) to supervise 
the use of Project Hope funds. Such supervision typically took the form of short 
inspection tours by members of these institutions to selected sites in the country. As 
a study commissioned by the CYDF itself describes this kind of supervision:
In truth, the CYDF's move to invite deputies to the People's Congress and members 
of the PPCC to supervise Project Hope was no more than a strategy to show the 
public that it attached great importance to external supervision. It was also an 
attempt to expand the influence of Project Hope. It was aimed at persuading the 
public of the transparency and trustworthiness of Project Hope, in order to attract 
more donations...
As far as the deputies to the People's Congress and the members of the PPCC who 
took part in the inspections were concerned, no department had explicitly given 
them the authority to supervise Project Hope or to impose sanctions. Most of them 
lacked a clear, strong sense that it was their responsibility to supervise Project Hope, 
and they were more used to carrying out "inspections" than "supervision".159 
Furthermore, they were easily "moved" by the CYDF's sincerity in inviting external
158 Interview, 4 January 2000.
159 Inspections typically take the form of quick tours which are formalistic and carried out 
according to prearranged programmes. The places being inspected are often given advance 
notice to prepare themselves, therefore inspections are usually not very effective for discovering 
the true situation of a project or uncovering problems. The point which the authors are making
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supervision of Project Hope. Therefore, even if they did detect problems during the 
inspections, most of them adopted a "lenient" attitude. Their final reports tended to 
"report the good news but not the bad", or were "strong on praises but weak on 
criticisms." (Zhou and Chen 1999: 236)
In short, the authors of the study concluded that while external supervision of 
Project Hope by high-profile delegations from the People's Congress and the PPCC 
had generated a lot of publicity, "in fact it has very limited real impact. Its function 
is 'propaganda'. It is to help creating an image of the CYDF as being unafraid of 
societal supervision and having nothing to hide." (Zhou and Chen 1999: 269)
In the last couple of years, with more NGO corruption cases being uncovered, 
including the exposure of financial transgressions by the CYDF in 2002, several big 
officially-organised NGOs including the CYDF have jointly launched an initiative to 
promote "self-discipline" within the NGO sector. They propose to draw up and 
abide by a set of standards that are stricter than the laws and regulations currently 
enforced by the government to govern the behaviour of NGOs.160 Once again, as a 
researcher and long-term advisor to some of these big NGOs confided to a small 
donor group at a briefing, the organisations behind the self-discipline campaign 
were by no means well-disciplined themselves. Their advocacy of self-discipline "is 
more a tool for pursuing certain self-serving goals."161 From the point of view of this 
study, the ability to stage such acts as inviting external supervision of Project Hope 
and advocating NGO self-discipline for propaganda purposes is a clear indication 
of the sophisticated PR capability of Chinese NGOs.
Expert management of public relations often necessitates making good use of the 
media. Many Chinese NGOs have demonstrated considerable skills in this respect, 
as can be seen from the following examples. The first example is taken from the
here is that inspections do not constitute proper supervision.
160 See China Youth Daily, 25 March 2002 for some comments on the self-discipline proposal by 
some key advocates of the initiative.
161 20 November 2002.
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book by Sun et al on the CYDF's fundraising methods. As Sim et al observe, a key 
technique which the CYDF has used to "build up a momentum for Project Hope" is 
to create non-stop publicity, which serves to ensure that Project Hope would always 
stay in the public's view. An interviewee working in the CYDF's PR department 
told Sim et al how they achieved such sustained publicity using the example of a 
benefit performance for Project Hope in 1994:
I gained a lot from taking part in this event. I learned what spin was all about. A 
show is after all just a show. At most you can have it televised live and put out a 
news report about it afterwards. But those who organised the show were all PR 
veterans. The whole process leading up to the performance became a spin exercise. 
During the preparations for the performance, which singer had gone into the 
recording room, which singer carried on with the recording despite having caught 
a cold, [these were all turned into news]. Our budget was very tight. Some singers 
had one recording session, but the result was not satisfactory, so they needed to do 
it again, but we had run out of money, so what? The singers paid for the recording 
themselves....We continuously supplied such titbits to the media. The show was 
turned into a hot news item. So I say it was a "plot". When you plan an event, you 
must have a "plot" like this in order to attract everybody's attention (Sun et al 1999: 
146).
All the major activities organised by the CYDF have been characterised by such a 
media strategy. While making sure the main activity receives intensive coverage, 
the CYDF also continuously creates related stories and feeds them to the media, so 
that public attention is captured for an extended period of time around the time of 
the main activity. The result of this media strategy has been very impressive. 
According to a survey conducted in 29 cities across the country, 93.9% of urban 
residents aged over 16 in China knew about Project Hope (Sun et al 1999:148).
The ability to harness the media is by no means confined to big and resource-rich 
NGOs like the CYDF, which can easily enlist the service of top PR specialists.162 My 
second example of NGO's media management skills comes from a small popular
162 The CYDF was even able to pay a big sum to hire an American PR company to help it 
promoting itself overseas (Shen and Sun 1999:14, footnote 26).
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NGO, an old people's home in Tianjin City called Hetong Old Age Welfare 
Association (hereafter Hetong). At a 2002 forum on the interactions between NGOs 
and the media, Hetong's deputy director gave a speech on his organisation's 
experience in dealing with the media. The following are some excerpts of the 
speech:
Secondly...[we need] a passion for creating news...[I] know there is a concept 
called "planning news". In practice, we often discuss the issue of how to produce 
and plan news with our friends in media circles....For example, an old man or 
woman [living in our rest home] who usually cannot move suddenly moved today. 
Is this news? At the grassroots this may not seem a significant event, but if we take 
it to the media we can create a vivid little story about the rehabilitation of old 
people [in our rest home], and we have many such examples at Hetong Old Age 
Welfare Association.
Thirdly...1 summarise this point in the phrase "interest driven"...Talks about NPO 
[non-profit organisation] doing noble things and being public-spirited are fine 
words, but at present the remuneration a journalist can receive from doing a report 
on an enterprise is different from what he/ she can receive from writing an article 
about an NPO.163 But NPOs have our own advantages...the media have slack 
seasons. News does not occur in large quantities every day from January to 
December, but the media needs news everyday. Therefore, I choose to approach the 
media during their slack seasons...In addition, we try as much as possible to give 
journalists some remuneration. Of course the remuneration we provide cannot 
match that offered by big enterprises, but we NPOs have our own strength. 
Organisations like ours tend to have a lot of contact with foreign organisations, so if 
we have opportunities to go abroad we invite journalists to come with us164...
Fourthly...it is crucial to create our own media, our own channels of 
communication, and a comprehensive feedback system...We set up Hetong Old 
Age Welfare Association in 1995. By 1996 we had already started our own journal 
Hetong...Although the content of our journal consists of scissors-and-paste articles, 
at least we have gained a channel for making our own voice heard. Some media 
simply reprint materials from our journal as their own news stories (Fang 2002).
163 The deputy director is referring to the well-known fact in China that journalists often expect 
payments for writing a positive story. Many enterprises have given money or other material 
rewards to journalists to produce such "paid news", which serve the function of advertisement 
but can be more effective as they are disguised as objective reports by "independent" journalists.
164 Here the deputy director is talking about donor-funded foreign trips. As discussed in the 
previous section, NGOs often use such trips to build up good relations with government officials. 
Obviously they can also use such trips to win friends in press circles.
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The speech by its deputy director provides ample evidence of the highly developed 
media skills of Hetong. While Hetong's knowledge of the working of the media is 
outstanding among small popular NGOs,165 it is by no means unusual. Most 
organisations I studied attached great importance to the media as a powerful PR 
and fundraising tool, and they all seemed to have very good ideas as to how the 
media could be used most effectively. In recent years, media professionals in China 
have increasingly resorted to the technique of "stirring up emotions" (shanqing) to 
maximise the impact of their productions on the public. It means appealing to 
people's heart rather than their head. As a journalist whom I met in the office of an 
NGO said: "Stories that stir up people's emotions will be most effective in rallying 
public support for you."166 The journalist was discussing with the NGO's director 
about a PR campaign for her organisation. This director appeared to be extremely 
good at providing journalists with dramatic stories that had powerful shanqing 
effect, such as graphic descriptions of the sufferings of vulnerable people before 
they came to her NGO, which were then contrasted with their happy life after they 
were taken under the NGO's wing. She was also able to supply the media with 
vivid stories to show how many hardships she had personally endured in order to 
pursue her cause. For example, one story goes that on a new year's eve the NGO 
had rim out of money, so she went home to see if there was anything of value which 
she could sell, but her search yielded nothing. The television set had been sold long 
ago. The only thing left was a second-hand refrigerator bought from a flea market, 
obviously worthless. She wanted to sell her flat, but unfortunately she did not have 
full ownership of it.. .167 As a result of this NGO director's ability to tell such moving 
stories, she became a favourite with the media. Her office was frequently visited by
165 The deputy director mentioned in his speech that he had studied journalism by 
correspondence. Obviously not every small popular NGO has people trained in journalism 
working for them.
166 November 1999.
167 This story has been mentioned in several newspaper articles that are based on interviews with 
the director.
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journalists. As another journalist I met in her office told me, the reason he enjoyed 
covering her work was because she was such a good narrator and understood so 
well what kind of materials journalists wanted that it required little work to write a 
story after an interview with her. All he needed to do was to type up the notes and it 
would be a good article already.168
This NGO director was certainly not unique in following the strategy of giving 
shanqing interviews to the media. Earlier I mentioned another NGO director who 
told the media how she could not attend her mother on her death-bed because she 
was working day and night at the NGO's site. This is another example of a typical 
shanqing story. A third NGO director I met was described by a colleague of hers as 
being so good at this kind of presentation that she never failed to move her audience 
to tears. This colleague of hers appeared to be well versed in shanqing techniques 
himself, as he told me several such stories in praise of the director's selfless 
immersion in her work. For example, he said that the director worked so hard that 
at the end of every day she often had no strength left to pour herself a glass of water, 
but the moment she saw the NGO's beneficiaries she became full of vigour again. 
Because of serious problems with her back, she was not even able to lift a kettle from 
the ground, but when she saw suffering children she bent and lifted them into her 
arms as if her back problems had completely disappeared.169 This director also had 
a photographer working for her who over several years supplied the media with 
many photos that vividly portrayed the director's devotion to the NGO's 
beneficiaries and their love and affection for her. These photos appeared to have 
played an important role in drawing popular support for the NGO.170
One reason why NGOs often prefer to present their work in shanqing style is 
because they consider it to be most effective for fundraising purposes. As
168 3 January 2000.
169 Informal interview, 18 April 2000.
170 Informal interview, 22 April 2000.
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mentioned above (footnote 142), one NGO I studied summarised its fundraising 
strategy in one sentence: "Using the miserable condition of our target group to 
persuade the public to donate money to us." Highlighting the suffering of their 
intended beneficiaries is a method that has been used by NGOs worldwide to 
arouse public sympathy. For example, images of starving children have often been 
used by western NGOs during appeals for donations to help famine victims in 
Africa. The point here is that such methods are already well known to many 
Chinese NGOs and have already been used by them to great effect. For example, in 
the early days of Project Hope, the CYDF funded a professional photographer to 
spend one year in poverty-stricken areas to photograph poor children suffering 
from educational deprivation. The carefully chosen images of children who were 
"dirty, thin, and clothed in rags, but innocent, good-looking, and loved to study" 
(Sun et al 1999: 149) made a tremendous impact on the public and moved many 
people into donating money to Project Hope. The CYDF's general secretary once 
said that a single such picture could often bring in enough money to build an entire 
new school (Kang 1997: 273).
Further evidence that many Chinese NGOs already possess sufficient imagination 
and ingenuity when it comes to fundraising can be found in the following 
discussion which I witnessed between the director of a small popular NGO and two 
journalists in November 1999. The journalists were from different media 
organisations but had both interviewed the director about the NGO's work. It 
seemed that they both became friendly with the director after the interviews and 
were interested in getting involved in the NGO's fundraising activities. Hereunder I 
refer to the director as D and the two journalists as JA and JB:
D: We can set up something like a supporters7 club. People can join the club by 
donating as little as 5 yuan each month. This way we should be able to accumulate a 
good sum... We can design a "Kind-heart Contract" and ask movie and pop stars to 
sign such contracts which commit them to do a certain number of benefit 
performances for us every year. These stars often have bad reputations because
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they demand exorbitant prices for their performances and engage in tax evasion, so 
joining our scheme will help to improve their public images.
JA: The Kind-heart Contract can be expanded. We can also sign contracts with 
ordinary people and businesses, not just with celebrities. Anybody can sign such a 
contract with us.
JB: Yes. And we can launch this campaign under the name "Kind-heart Contract 
Action".
JA: The contract can take different forms and can be set at different levels. For 
example, people can have the option of signing a contract for a fixed term, say one 
year. Or they can sign a contract to donate a fixed amount of money. They can 
choose from different amounts. The minimum amount can be set at a very low level 
in order to attract wide participation.
D: Yes. The contract can be very flexible. For example, law firms can sign a 
Kind-heart Contract to provide us with free legal service. Computer companies can 
set up a website for us for free. Television and radio stations can promise to do 
regular programmes about our children. They can also carry our advertisement for 
free. Magazines can sign contracts to donate one day's profit to us each year. We 
can also encourage women to donate their salaries on March 8, the International 
Women's Day, to us, and so on.
JB: If we give this thing a good spin these goals are all achievable.
D: We should sign the contract widely. We can also sign it with the police, who can 
promise to issue temporary local resident certificates to our people from other 
places. Enterprises can donate their products instead of money to us. We will take 
anything they produce, even toilet tissues. In future we can set up our own related 
businesses [to process and sell donated goods].
D: The media can also benefit from covering our Kind-heart Contract activities. The 
success of the media depends on how close you bring your stories to the lives of 
ordinary people. The media in China cannot thrive by criticising the government, 
like the media in Hong Kong.
D: We need to work on the celebrities gradually. We mustn't ask them for money 
immediately. If we ask them for money up-front, they are likely to get nervous. At 
the beginning, we will only ask them to do a benefit performance for us. Once we 
have developed a friendship with them, they will take out their purses voluntarily. 
The laid-off workers we hired initially only did the work in order to earn their 
salaries of a few hundred yuan, but through frequent contact they grew fond of the 
children, so they started to put in more than a few hundred yuan' s worth of effort. It 
will be the same with celebrities.
JB: We must launch the campaign within this month. Once we enter December the 
media will be focusing on celebrations for the new year and the new millenium. 
The emphasis will be on creating a joyous atmosphere. We can no longer make
175
people shed tears and give money to the unfortunate, so we must hurry up.
This discussion shows that NGOs can be very creative and determined in their 
effort to increase their resources. Moreover, it shows that their fundraising ideas are 
firmly grounded in the realities of Chinese society, even though many of the 
methods proposed in this particular discussion sound similar to those routinely 
used by NGOs in other countries. Often, however, one finds Chinese NGOs 
resorting to methods that are more specific to the Chinese context to raise money. 
The following are some examples of such methods.
A consumer rights NGO raises money by recommending products to consumers, 
for which they charge a large fee from the manufacturers. During the discussions 
following a talk by an official from the Popular Organisation Management Bureau 
(POMB) of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the official tactfully expressed concern 
about the NGO's practice, saying that it had recommended such a wide range of 
products to consumers that it was bound to make mistakes sometimes regarding the 
quality of the products it recommended. Furthermore, from the way the 
organisation operated, one might get the impression that any manufacturer could 
have its product recommended as long as it was willing to pay. A representative of 
the NGO defended its practice by pointing out that another consumer rights 
organisation received even more money from manufacturers. He then said that 
when it was first set up the NGO had no money and few staff, so it had to survive 
somehow. Because of its successful fundraising, it now had more staff and funds, 
which meant it could be more effective in defending the rights of consumers.171
One popular NGO I interviewed had made money by investing in informal finance 
schemes that yielded extremely high returns. Such practices are illegal and are 
subjected to periodical crackdowns by the state, but they continue to exist.
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Fortunately for this NGO it pulled out after earning a 24% interest on its deposit and 
before a major crackdown was launched.172 Many other organisations were not so 
lucky. Lured by the promise of high returns, a number of foundations invested their 
money in high-risk non-banking financial institutions in violation of government 
regulations and ended up losing millions of yuan.173
It has been a common practice for Chinese NGOs to raise money by organising 
workshops, conferences, and training. They make a profit by charging fees from 
participants that exceed the cost of hosting the events. Several NGOs I interviewed 
said that workshops and training had been their main source of income, even 
though none of them was established as an organisation specialising in this kind of 
activity.174 Apparently many NGOs have charged exorbitant fees without being able 
to deliver good conferences or training. A researcher with a central government 
policy research unit told me that among the letters of complaint the government 
received everyday a large number concerned profit-making workshops and 
training organised by NGOs. Along with workshops and training, many letters also 
pointed to a third common money-making scheme of NGOs, which was to organise 
the publication of edited volumes and promise people to include their writings in 
these volumes for a certain amount of money.175
Many NGOs have also raised money by organising competitions and appraisals. A 
lawsuit involving a children's arts foundation throws some light on how this works. 
In 1999, the Foundation organised a national competition of children's paintings in 
collaboration with a travel agency. Several thousand families all over the country 
received notifications that their children's paintings had won the competition and 
would be displayed at an exhibition to be held in Beijing on December 31. These
171 April 2000.
172 Interview, 5 March 2000.
173 Talk by an official from the POMB, Ministry of Civil Affairs, April 2000.
174 Interviews, 21 March 2000,22 November 2002, and 23 November 2002.
175 Informal interview, 9 December 1999.
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families were invited to bring their children to Beijing to receive their certificates 
and were asked to pay sundry fees towards that end. When these families arrived in 
Beijing on December 30, however, they were not met at the train station and taken to 
their hotels by the organisers as promised. Many of them remained stranded in the 
train station for hours. The next day, many families found that their children's 
paintings were in fact not included in the exhibition. This resulted in nearly a 
thousand parents forming an angry crowd that temporarily threatened public order. 
Afterwards a newspaper reported the incident and denounced the Foundation for 
swindling money out of innocent children. The Foundation laid the blame on the 
travel agency, claiming that the travel agency had usurped its name to invite all 
those families to Beijing, and it took the travel agency to court. Although the court 
ruled in favour of the Foundation, it would seem that the Foundation was hardly 
blameless in the matter. For example, the invitations which the travel agency sent 
out bore the official seal of the Foundation, which was supplied to the travel agency 
by the Foundation. In a memorandum from the Foundation to its professional 
management unit, the Ministry of Culture, entitled "Self-criticism", the Foundation 
admitted that it had learned about the travel agency's usurpation of its name at 
some point, but had neither informed the Ministry of the problem nor taken action 
to avert the disastrous consequences.176
Whether the Foundation in this particular case was really innocent or not, a POMB 
official told me that a large number of NGOs had indeed been guilty of using 
competitions and product appraisals to fleece participants of their money. In the 
case of product appraisals, NGOs target enterprises rather than individuals. 
Products by different manufacturers are compared and appraised, then medals are 
awarded to those products that are judged to be of high quality. If enterprises are 
willing to pay a good price, their products can easily win medals, therefore this kind 
of appraisal is meaningless to those who know how it works. According to the
176 The information on this case comes from an unpublished Ministry of Civil Affairs document.
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official, many enterprises understand perfectly that the NGOs are merely trying to 
squeeze money out of them. Nevertheless, they are happy to participate in these 
appraisals, because they can use the medals to fool ordinary consumers who are 
unaware that they are of little value. Since both NGOs and enterprises have strong 
incentives to continue such appraisals, the government has been unable to put the 
lid on this practice even though it has tried to do so for quite some time.177
5.3 Reasons for the "Bad Management" of NGOs
In this section I discuss two common problems of Chinese NGOs which have been 
widely regarded as management issues that need to be addressed by organisational 
capacity building programmes. I will attempt to show that these problems are often 
not caused by any deficiency in the skills and capabilities of NGOs. Their real causes 
become clear once we understand the motivation and incentives of the people and 
organisations that create and manage these NGOs.
Lacking Clearly Defined Goals and Poor Strategic Management
Raab mentioned that while carrying out an assignment to identify potential projects 
in China for a foreign foundation, she met some Chinese NGOs which declared 
themselves to be willing to undertake any project, even if it was only tangentially 
related to their stated missions (Raab 1997: 12, footnote 25). What Raab has 
witnessed is a fairly common phenomenon among Chinese NGOs, many of which 
will take on any project as long as it brings funding. This could indeed be 
considered a management problem, if it diverts NGOs from pursuing the goals they 
originally set for themselves, or if it impairs their long-term organisational 
development. However, many NGOs were not set up to fight for any particular 
cause in the first place, nor were the people who founded these organisations very
177 Interview, 31 October 2001.
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concerned about their long-term development. During my field research I came 
across many such organisations, which fall into several categories. In the following 
space I shall describe three of them.
The first category consists of NGOs set up by researchers employed in government 
research institutes or state-owned universities who use the NGOs to take on 
consultancy work. One researcher told me that the NGO he was involved in 
afforded him more freedom to undertake projects that were not related to the area 
of research he was paid to do in the government research institute. If he accepted 
such projects through the institute, it would appear that he was not attending to his 
proper duties. The NGO solved the problem for him.178 Another advantage of 
registering an NGO for academics is that it makes it easier for them to publish their 
works. NGOs allow them to raise money to pay publishers, so that their papers 
which otherwise will never see print can be published. According to a member of a 
society of traditional Chinese philosophy I interviewed, the main attraction of the 
society to its members lies in the fact that it has been able to mobilize donations 
from some Taiwanese businessmen, which have been used to fund the publication 
of several edited volumes by its members.179 NGOs also serve the purpose of giving 
government research institutes access to funds that are intended only for NGOs, for 
example, in the case of donor-funded projects that earmark some of the funds for 
NGO activities. In such cases, government research institutes can submit proposals 
in the name of the NGOs they have created, although in fact it is the institutes and 
their employees who will implement the projects.180
NGOs in this first category are often just empty shells, since their members are all in 
full-time employment elsewhere. They only use the NGOs to facilitate certain 
pursuits of theirs from time to time. The second category of NGOs tends to have
178 Informal interview, 9 December 1999.
179 Interview, 27 November 2002.
180 Informal interview, 11 October 2002.
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more substance to them. They are typically NGOs established by government 
agencies which are not given a clear purpose by their creators. There are several 
reasons why this may be the case. One reason is that the agencies created these 
NGOs not because they envisaged any particular roles for them but because they 
were simply emulating agencies at higher levels. Whenever a government agency at 
a higher administrative level sets up a GONGO, usually the corresponding agencies 
at lower levels will follow suit and establish similar GONGOs of their own. For 
example, after the State Family Planning Commission created the China Family 
Planning Association, provincial, municipal, and county level family planning 
commissions also created their own family planning associations. Sometimes local 
GONGOs also anticipate their higher level counterparts. For example, Associations 
of Foreign-Invested Enterprises had been set up in three coastal cities that were 
among the first cities in China to open up to foreign investment before a national 
association was formed (White, Howell and Shang 1996). The first GONGOs, 
whether at the national or local level, usually have specific functions to fulfil, but 
this may not be the case with some of the copycat ones created later.
When local government agencies set up NGOs not because they feel a real need for 
such organisations but because they want to (or, in some cases, are told to) emulate 
their superiors, it is not surprising that these NGOs lack clear purposes. In fact, the 
agencies that created them may well have good reasons to prevent them from 
developing a distinct role for themselves, as the following examples from Foster's 
study of officially-organised NGOs in Yantai City demonstrate:
Several Yantai government agencies, emulating their superiors at the provincial 
and national levels, have set up associations for the explicit purpose of having them 
take over the function of promoting product quality and certifying compliance with 
quality standards. One bureau, for instance, created a Packaging Association and 
devolved to it responsibility for promoting and policing standards among Yantai 
manufacturers and shippers. However, bureau leaders had second thoughts when 
it became apparent that giving away one of the bureau's major functions could 
potentially affect its level of funding. The result was that the association was left
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dormant. The Quality Management Association, created by the Technology 
Supervision Bureau in response to a request from the provincial level, was basically 
banished to dormancy from the beginning. Its stated purpose, to promote and 
certify the quality of Yantai-made products, virtually duplicated the function of the 
bureau itself. Bureau leaders saw little reason to transfer any real responsibilities to 
the association (Foster 2002: 57).
Another reason why some officially-organised NGOs lack well-defined goals and 
objectives is that government agencies created them mainly to place their 
supernumerary and retired personnel. Once this goal is achieved, the agencies are 
not very concerned whether these organisations have a clear direction to follow or 
not. Often the staff of these NGOs are not concerned about the lack of clarity about 
their missions either, since their salaries or pensions are paid by the government 
agencies. Therefore, even if the NGOs do nothing at all, it will not affect their 
personal incomes. To show why there is often little incentive for such organisations 
to identify clear objectives for themselves and to focus on achieving these objectives, 
I shall cite the example of a provincial children's NGO set up by the provincial 
Women's Federation.
The NGO defines its mission in very vague terms. Its goal is said to be "to share the 
government's burdens and to bring benefit to society." It has changed the direction 
of its work several times since its inception. Initially it built libraries and other 
cultural facilities for children. Then it moved into the area of health and nutrition. 
At the time I conducted my research, its focus was on disabled children. It seems 
that the NGO takes on projects mainly in response to various kinds of external 
stimulus rather than according to any clear plan of its own. One type of external 
stimulus is government policies and priorities. For example, the NGO's initial focus 
on building libraries followed directly a new provincial government policy which 
decreed that children's libraries and reading rooms should be established across the 
province. Another type of external stimulus which the NGO responds to is business 
opportunities. For example, a nutritionist developed a new rice powder for infants
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and gave the formula to the NGO, thereupon it teamed up with a food products 
factory to produce and market the rice powder. At one time the NGO had a 
puppeteer on its board of directors who supplied it with some of his puppet designs. 
Consequently the NGO joined forces with a toy factory to produce puppets. The 
third type of external stimuli is short-term social demand for particular services. For 
example, in the late 1980's there was an acute shortage of kindergartens in some 
parts of the province. In response, the NGO offered consulting service for 
organisations or individuals who were interested in setting up kindergartens. It also 
organised training for kindergarten teachers.181
The NGO is staffed mostly by retired women's federation officials as well as retired 
officials from other relevant government agencies, such as the education 
commission. Since these retired officials all receive government pensions, they do 
not draw any salary from the NGO. The women's federation provided the NGO 
with a house to use as its office, for which no rent is charged. As a result, the NGO 
only needs a small overhead to keep it going. It raises money mainly through the 
influence and connections of the women's federation and its senior officials. In its 
first years, it was able to raise enough money to cover both its overhead and its 
project expenditures, but in mid 1990's its income started to dwindle. Thereupon 
the NGO sought and obtained from the government a small annual subsidy to cover 
its overhead. With its staff salaries and administrative expenses thus taken care of, 
the NGO's survival is not contingent upon how much money it raises, how many 
projects it implements, or how much impact its projects make. Its staff do not need 
to be concerned about the NGO's performance for other reasons, such as their own 
career advancement, either, since they are already retired. Therefore, they appear to 
be very relaxed about their work. As the NGO's deputy director said: "We just do 
what we can. As long as we organise a few activities each year, we are all right."182
181 Based on documents provided by the NGO and interviews with its managers in May 2000.
182 Interview, 19 May 2000.
183
Whenever it finds some money, the NGO will do some work, otherwise it will He 
dormant Similarly, the staff go to the office if there is work to do, otherwise they 
stay at home. Under the circumstance, there appears to be no reason for the NGO to 
burden itself with any specific goals or targets.
The third category of NGOs that lack strategic planning includes some popular 
NGOs whose leaders are said to be more interested in personal gains than in the 
healthy development of their organisations. For example, the founder of one of the 
best-known popular NGOs in China has achieved national celebrity status since she 
set up the NGO in the mid 1990's. Although I did not interview the founder herself, 
many people I have spoken to, including researchers who have studied her 
organisation, other NGO practitioners, and above all some staff members of her 
organisation, all agree that the NGO has a serious problem with regard to strategic 
management. As a key member of the NGO told me, the reason for the haphazard 
manner in which the NGO had conducted its business was because the leader was 
more interested in achieving fame than in doing concrete work. Therefore, she was 
constantly launching new projects and giving interviews to the media about these 
new projects, in order that she could stay in the spotHght, but did not want to invest 
the necessary time and effort in seeing the projects through. The priority of the NGO 
was determined primarily by the leader's judgement as to what kind of project 
would attract attention at any given time rather than by any other considerations. In 
the analysis of this member of the NGO, unless the motivation of its leader was 
changed, the strategic management problem with the NGO could never be 
solved.183
183 Interview, November 2002.1 have good reasons to believe that the person I interviewed is not 
in any way biased against the leader but gave an accurate description of the situation within the 
organisation, however, to maintain confidentiality I cannot reveal the reasons here. My 
interviewee's analysis of the problem with the NGO has also been corroborated by the 
comments of other people who know the NGO and its leader well.
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Bad Financial Management
A Chinese researcher delivered a paper at a conference in which he criticized some 
popular NGOs for refusing to publish their accounts and called for tighter financial 
supervision of NGOs. Afterwards he was "beleaguered" by the popular NGOs that 
were present The NGOs pointed out that on the one hand the Chinese government 
did not provide them with any funding; on the other hand, while foreign donors 
would give them money to implement projects, they would not fund their 
administrative expenses. The NGOs argued that to survive they had to find money 
somewhere to maintain themselves. Therefore, they had no choice but to use some 
of the project funding to cover their administrative cost. Since this breached the 
terms under which project funding was provided by donors, they had to engage in 
creative accounting to cover this up, hence their reluctance to subject their accounts 
to public scrutiny.184
This anecdote highlights the fact that the chaotic financial affairs of many Chinese 
NGOs is not the result of their lack of accounting skills but their deliberate decision 
to muddle up their books. The popular NGOs that protested against the researcher's 
recommendations of tighter financial control understood that publishing financial 
statements was good for their images and that it was wrong to divert project funds 
to administrative budgets, but they failed to do what was both right and good for 
their public images. In the case of these particular NGOs, it is possible that they 
engaged in improper financial practices for the benefit of the organisations as a 
whole rather than the individuals within them. As these NGOs would argue, given 
the difficult funding situation they faced, such practices helped to ensure the 
survival of the organisations, so that they could continue to do good things. 
However, my own experience as well as the experience of other observers of the 
Chinese NGO sector whom I have interviewed all suggest that frequently NGOs
184 Conversation with the researcher, 17 June 2002.
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abandon financial discipline not in order to keep the organisations alive but in order 
to benefit their individual members. During my field research I came across many 
such cases. The following are just a few examples.
One general secretary of an NGO I interviewed admitted that she was guilty of 
petty corruption by using the NGO's funds for her personal consumption. The 
things she had paid for with the NGO's money included books and magazines for 
herself, personal telephone calls, and occasional meals with her friends. This was 
facilitated by the fact that she alone controlled the NGO's funds. There was no 
monitoring by other members of the organisation. This person was also the member 
of another NGO whose general secretary had similarly used the NGO to benefit 
herself and her family. For example, a sponsor gave the NGO some money to hire a 
new staff member. The general secretary hired a new person but paid him a salary 
that was less than the amount provided by the sponsor and pocketed the difference 
herself. Her manoeuvre was made easier by the fact that the NGO's accountant was 
a relative of hers whom she had hired when he was out of a job.185
One NGO director has used the money donated to her organisation by the public to 
set up several small businesses registered under her name. In one instance, she let a 
friend who had been discharged from public employment for corruption to manage 
the business. Unfortunately, according to the director, the businesses all failed after 
losing some of the initial investment. Nevertheless, she still hoped to launch new 
business adventures in the future. This director managed several projects in 
different locations. In one location, the project's finances were under rigorous 
supervision by the NGO's sponsoring agency. The agency refused to reimburse the 
director for some of the expenses she tried to claim, so she simply took the receipts 
to another project at a different location where she had full control over financial 
matters and got reimbursed there. Her expenses incurred at the first location which
185 Interview, 23 November 2002.
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were paid out of the budget of the project at the second location included, among 
other things, the salary of a housekeeper who worked for her at the first location.186
In 2001, Hu Manli, the founder of two orphanages mentioned above, was sued by a 
US-based charity that had donated nearly three million yuan to her organisation, the 
United Moms Charity Association (UMCA) in Lijiang. The plaintiff charged that the 
UMCA had not used the donated funds according to its wishes and had produced 
false accounts. Shortly afterwards, investigations by a newspaper uncovered 
considerable evidence of financial misconduct by Hu Manli. For example, in 1998, 
the US-based charity asked Hu Manli to purchase a batch of clothes and give them 
to victims of a major flood in central China on its behalf. The clothes Hu Manli 
purchased were priced 55 yuan a piece, but her report to the charity claimed that the 
clothes cost 150 yuan a piece. In published accounts, Hu Manli quoted the figure of 
250 yuan as the monthly cost of meals for each orphan at the boarding school in 
Lijiang, but the actual expenditure on meeds was only 70 yuan per person per month 
(Southern Weekend, 13 December 2001:1). The newspapers' investigations also 
discovered that Hu Manli had purchased an expensive house in Lijiang and had 
sent her daughter to study in New Zealand. When questioned, she was unable to 
give convincing explanations as to how she could afford these things (Southern 
Weekend, 8 February 2002).
The examples I have just given all concern popular NGOs whose managers appear 
to have engaged in various forms of corruption. In such organisations, the chaotic 
state of their financial affairs is inevitably. Again, this is not owing to any lack of 
knowledge or skills on the part of the NGOs and their staff. It is bad financial 
management by design. Despite the misbehaviour of their managers, at least these 
NGOs have all provided some concrete services to their members or vulnerable
186 The information is based on a number of interviews, both formal and informal, with the 
director over the course of several months in 2000.
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social groups. Alongside these organisations, there are also some NGOs that are 
simply profit-making entities disguised as non-profit organisations. Those who 
created these organisations never intended to provide any service for any 
constituency. This fact is well known to government officials responsible for 
exercising oversight over the NGO sector. For example, the POMB official whom I 
interviewed said: "Many officially-organised NGOs at local levels are simply tools 
for local government agencies to create slush funds (xiaojinku). NGOs allow these 
agencies to set up bank accounts where they can put their off-the-book incomes. 
They use the NGOs to make money, through such methods as extorting donations 
from enterprises and collecting illegal fees."187 More seriously, another POMB 
official wrote: "Some profit-oriented social organisations set up businesses that are 
active in the domain of the circulation [of money and commodities]. They have 
disturbed the normal economic order of the country." (Chen 1992: 22)
A recent book by Tsai on informal finance in China contains an apt example of 
profit-making "NGOs" with the potential to seriously disturb normal economic 
order. Mr. Zhang, a former employee of the People's Bank of China, opened an 
unsanctioned private bank in Henan Province which was disguised as a magazine 
reading club. Anybody could join the club, called the Henan Reading Here and 
Reading There Society (Henansheng dulai duqu dushuhui), by making a monthly 
deposit of five yuan, which was refundable at the end of one year with a bonus. Mr. 
Zhang used these deposits to trade futures and was able to attract many members 
by offering a higher rate of return on their deposits than state banks. The operation 
had apparently been very successful. As Tsai tells:
When I visited the reading club in the summer of 1996, half of the first floor had 
wide reading tables flanked by displays of magazines around the world. Large red 
banners hung from the ceiling with politico-inspirational slogans such as "Serving 
the People by Fostering Literacy" and "Promote Spiritual Civilization by Investing
187 Interview, 31 October 2001.
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in Our Reading Club." In the other half of the room were rows of bank teller-type 
windows where people were lined up to make deposits....A uniformed security 
guard stood watch along the back side of the room that lead to a stairway. As he led 
us upstairs, Mr. Zhang explained that members now had the option of investing in 
increments of 10, 20, and even 1,000 yuan', 1,000-yuan investors were generally 
rewarded with a 15 to 20 percent "reading bonus" (jiangdujin)... .When asked if he 
had ever experienced official interference in his unusual operation, Mr. Zhang said, 
"Of course not. My business promotes the spiritual civilization of the country, so 
the highest officials of the Henan provincial government support it....In fact, a 
number of cadres are members of the club as well."
.. .the reading club earns a net income of approximately 100 million yuan per month 
and has an aggregate of 200 million yuan in debt outstanding with all the state 
banks except for the Bank of China and the China Construction Bank (Tsai 2002: 
193-194).
Although the Henan Reading Here and Reading There Society is an extreme case, 
with organisations registered as NGOs whose real motive is profit, one can hardly 
expect to find clean and honest accounting systems that reflect their true financial 
situation. The existence of large numbers of such organisations serves as a good 
reminder that the financial management of Chinese NGOs can be a very 
complicated issue. While the problem regarding the lack of financial discipline 
among NGOs needs to be tackled, capacity building programme is often not the 
right answer.
5.4 The Rationality of the "Irrational" Management of NGOs
This section continues the discussion of the "bad management" of Chinese NGOs. 
While the previous section focused on "bad management" by design, the emphasis 
of this section is "bad management" by necessity. My first example of bad 
management by necessity concerns the irrational governance structure of NGOs. It 
has been a long-standing criticism of Chinese NGOs that their governing boards 
and top positions are often occupied by incumbent and retired government officials. 
The criticism of this state of affairs has come from all sides. Researchers and NGO
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practitioners charge that this undermines the autonomy of NGOs, prevents them 
from developing independent identities and goals, and diminishes their usefulness 
as civil society actors. The government is concerned about this situation as well, not 
least because such arrangements have often created openings for corruption. 
Almost everybody agrees that incumbent and retired officials are often unable to 
devote sufficient time and energy to NGO work. Many of them are too used to 
bureaucratic style of administration to be able to adjust to the different 
requirements of NGO management. Consequently, NGOs dominated by incumbent 
and retired officials are often characterized by undemocratic, irrational 
management and decision-making.188
To tackle the problem the central government has issued at least two specific 
directives since 1994 asking incumbent officials to resign from leadership positions 
in NGOs (General Office of the State Council 1994; General Office of the Communist 
Party Central Committee and General Office of the State Council 1998). With regard 
to retired officials, in 1997, at the recommendation of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, 
the central government laid down the rule that key management and 
decision-making positions in NGOs should not be held by people aged over 70 
(General Office of the State Council 1997). Although the central government appears 
to be very serious about barring officials from running NGOs, it has nevertheless 
allowed that there may be "special circumstances in which it is indeed necessary 
[for incumbent officials] to hold concurrently leadership positions in social 
organisations" (General Office of the Communist Party Central Committee and 
General Office of the State Council 1998). Under these circumstances, incumbent
188 Officials of the POMB, Ministry of Civil Affairs, complain that NGOs dominated by retired 
officials are particularly troublesome, as they are often bogged down in infighting. POMB 
officials have spent a lot of time mediating between different factions within these NGOs who 
fight each other for control. The director of the POMB said in a lecture in 2000 that in one such 
NGO there were constant frictions between the 70-year-olds and the 80-year-olds. Eventually the 
80-year-olds convened a board meeting which passed a resolution to expel all the 70-year-olds. 
The 70-year-olds countered by convening another board meeting which decided to expel all the 
80-year-olds.
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officials can still be granted permission to serve in NGOs. Similarly, although as a 
general rule people over 70 are not allowed to lead NGOs, special permission can 
always be granted in individual cases.189
Government directives did not specify why there might be special circumstances 
that called for flexible application of the rides. While there are probably multiple 
reasons for this, one important reason seems to be that many NGOs would be 
unable to function without making use of the power and influence of incumbent 
and retired officials, who are best placed to wield their power and influence on 
behalf of the NGOs if they hold important formal positions in them. The 
dependence of NGOs on official backing does not need to be further elaborated here, 
since it has been discussed in great detail in Chapter 4. Suffice it to say that although 
the appointment or election of officials to top positions in NGOs is often initiated by 
government agencies and the officials themselves, especially in the case of 
officially-organised NGOs, there are also many cases when it is pushed by NGOs. 
The book by White, Howell and Shang contains several examples of NGOs asking 
officials to assume leading positions in them. One such example has been 
mentioned in Chapter 2. In another example, a leader of the Chinese Association of 
Certified Public Accountants said that "his association invited senior officials 
retiring from the Ministry of Finance to take on leadership or honorary roles in the 
association because 'young people want these retired people to do this since it can 
raise the social status of the accountancy profession as well as the Association'." As 
White, Howell and Shang note: "This case mirrors the practice common to most 
associations of seeking to enhance their prestige by enlisting the participation of 
influential serving or former officials. These officials bring power with them as well 
as prestige and thus enhance an association's ability to influence the state on behalf 
of itself and its members." (1996:122)
189 Interview, 25 August 2000.
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The study of White, Howell and Shang only covered business and professional 
associations. My own research shows that the practice of offering leading positions 
to officials is also common to other types of NGOs. One popular social service NGO 
I studied only had eight staff, but it had over 100 board members and over 50 
deputy chairmen of the board, most of whom were incumbent and retired officials. 
The NGO's director complained that she had made a big mistake by inviting so 
many officials to join her organisation, which had caused many management 
problems. For instance, with over 100 board members it had been extremely 
difficult to achieve an attendance rate of 50% or above at board meetings. As a result, 
often no decision could be made. The officials were entrenched in their bureaucratic 
mentality, so they often blocked innovative ideas put forward by the director. Their 
philosophy was "the less trouble the better." The retired officials in particularly had 
given the director a lot of headache. She charged that they "cannot raise any money, 
cannot do any work, and cannot even walk on their own legs", but they liked to 
issue orders and she even had to write their speeches for them. The director had 
concluded that the retired officials were not there to make any contribution but only 
to relive the experience of being able to order other people about.190
Despite her grievance against officials, the director nevertheless continued to attach 
great importance to her organisation's official links and indeed continued to invite 
new officials to join her organisation. She admitted that although some of the retired 
officials had been a nuisance, their support at the beginning was vital for her. 
Without their backing she might not have been able to set up the NGO in the first 
place. In the end, as the director said: "If the government and its officials do not 
stand by you, then anybody can push you around."191 Therefore, she knew that 
having a pack of difficult-to-please officials sitting on the board of her NGO was a 
necessary compromise.
190 Interviews, January 2000.
191 Interview, January 2000.
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Another popular NGO faced a similar situation. Its governing board comprised 
officials from a number of agencies, all of which the NGO needed to draw support 
from every now and then. The NGO's manager complained that some of the 
officials treated the NGO as if it was part of the government bureaucracy. For 
instance, they asked that the manager submit written requests for permission before 
the NGO made any decision on even relatively minor issues. Furthermore, the 
requests must be written in a particular bureaucratic format, so that they read as if 
the NGO was asking the officials for instructions. After they had given their 
permission, in a typical bureaucratic fashion, these officials often told the manager 
to take the request to other agencies and officials for further approval, even though 
it was not really necessary. Such requirements from the officials had added to the 
administrative burden of the NGO, wasted the time and energy of its staff, and 
lowered its efficiency. The NGO also faced another problem from the officials on its 
governing board. Two officials from different agencies both thought that his/her 
agency had given the NGO the most support, consequently each wanted his/her 
agency to receive more credit for the NGO's achievements. In order not to offend 
either of them, the manager had had to resort to such measures as preparing 
different reports for the two officials. Even on occasions when she could show them 
the same report, she still needed to be careful as to whom she gave the report to first. 
Needless to say, attending to such delicate matters took time and prevented the 
manager from concentrating on real issues. Despite all the hassles, the manager 
acknowledged that having officials from all the relevant government agencies on 
the NGO's governing board had been "very useful." While they had given her some 
trouble, their support had probably saved her even more.192
In addition to filling their leadership posts with government officials, Chinese 
NGOs are also frequently criticized for practising nepotism. Many NGO managers
192 Interviews, April 2000.
193
have the habit of hiring their relatives and trusted friends. This has led to the 
accusation that they run the NGOs like "family businesses". There is no doubt that 
often such practice is indeed the result of managers treating the NGOs as their 
private properties and using them to benefit themselves. However, some NGO 
managers I interviewed argue that they are justified in entrusting important jobs to 
friends or relatives. Evidence suggests that sometimes there is indeed an element of 
necessity in such practices. For example, one NGO manager told me that she had 
only hired the children of her friends as cashiers, because, if the cashiers lost or stole 
any money, she could always ask their parents to make up the loss. She could not 
set her mind at ease if the NGO's money was handled by total strangers. A cashier 
she once employed secretly lent the NGO's money to her friends. She also stole 
some money when she left the NGO. By the time her misdeeds were discovered, 
over 40,000 yuan had been lost. Because the manager knew the parents of this 
cashier, she was able to get the money back from them.193
The manager's reason for hiring friends' children as cashiers might seem farfetched 
if one did not take into account the fact that at present the judicial system in China is 
often unable to investigate and prosecute small-scale economic crimes like the one 
committed by this cashier. As a former board member of a now defunct Beijing 
NGO told me, after she discovered that the NGO's manager had embezzled some of 
the NGO's funds, she reported the crime to a district Public Security Bureau. The 
captain of the economic crime investigation team heard her story, then told her they 
did not have enough resources to investigate cases involving small amounts of 
money. The captain appeared to be very sincere when he told my informant that 
they had many cases involving huge sums of money on their hands. They did not 
even have enough manpower and funds to investigate those cases. The captain, 
who seemed to my informant to be genuinely snowed under and overwrought, said 
to her: "I am telling you the truth even if this costs me my job. I am really sorry, but
193 Interview, 4 August 2000.
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we are not able to help you."194
When NGOs cannot depend on formal institutions for protection, they have no 
choice but to invoke the help of informal institutions, such as personal networks 
and relationships of trust, to compensate for the inadequacy of formal institutions. 
While hiring friends and relatives is clearly a bad management practice whose 
long-term effect on NGOs can be particularly pernicious, it may be a necessary evil 
under certain circumstances. It is similar to another phenomenon I observed during 
my fieldwork: that many NGOs tend to hire cheap labour such as rural migrants 
and laid-off workers who are unskilled and inexperienced. The reason is simple: 
they cannot offer good salaries and benefits to their staff, so they are unable to 
attract skilled people. Therefore, what we see in such cases are perhaps best 
described as bad management by necessity.
Conclusion
In the previous chapter I suggested that there are similarities between Chinese 
NGOs and private businesses in their relationship with the state. In discussing NGO 
capacity and skills, perhaps we can also draw some lessons from the private sector. 
In the last few years a succession of corporate scandals around the world has 
attracted considerable public attention to the issue of corporate governance, but no 
one seems to think that bad corporate governance has been caused by lack of 
business administration skills which can be addressed by more MBA programmes. 
Rather, the general prescription for corporate maladies has been new governance 
rules and tighter regulation and supervision. With regard to NGO governance, my 
study suggests that many existing problems with Chinese NGOs are not caused by 
their lack of skills either. It seems that these problems need similar prescriptions to 
those offered to the private sector, such as better regulation and supervision.
194 Interview, 13 October 2001.
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International donors are zealously funding capacity building programmes for 
Chinese NGOs these days, but such programmes are unlikely to be very effective if 
they fail to understand the root causes of the poor performance of Chinese NGOs, 
and if they only focus on NGOs themselves without trying to improve their 
institutional environment. Above all, NGOs need skills that are suited to their 
specific environment. In this chapter, I have argued that many Chinese NGOs 
already possess sophisticated skills which are well suited to the Chinese context but 
which have not received enough attention from NGO researchers and analysts. 
Obviously some NGOs have better skills than others. The examples in this chapter 
are all taken from the more skilled NGOs. Dining my fieldwork, I also came across 
less skilled organisations that were unable to mobilize sufficient support either from 
the state or from other sources, such as the Chinese public or foreign donors. These 
NGOs are often unable to survive very long, let alone achieving organisational 
growth.
The skills and techniques that enable some Chinese NGOs to thrive, especially the 
techniques they use to establish advantageous relationships with the state and 
mobilize societal support, have direct implications for their performance in both 
service delivery and advocacy. No analysis of Chinese NGOs can be complete 
without at least some discussion about their performance, so this issue will be taken 
up in the next chapter.
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6. The Limitations of Chinese NGOs
As I explained in Chapter 1, this thesis was originally planned as an assessment of 
the performance of social welfare NGOs in China. However, after starting the 
fieldwork, I quickly realized that not just social welfare NGOs, but the Chinese 
NGO sector in general, were still at such an early stage of their development that the 
majority of them were unlikely to measure up to even the most minimalist standard 
of good performance. However, the emergence of even the worst performing NGOs 
often represents progress, since they are providing services where none existed 
before. Therefore, rather than describing how badly youthful Chinese NGOs are 
performing, a more interesting and meaningful task for researchers is to find out 
what factors may have contributed to the poor performance of Chinese NGOs. In 
this chapter I attempt to address this question. Whereas one can easily identify a 
large number of factors that directly and indirectly affect the performance of 
Chinese NGOs, I focus on four of the most salient ones in this chapter.
6.1 State Policy and Capacity
Wary of the potential threat to its authority and rule posed by organisations such as 
the Falun Gong, the government has adopted the policy of forestalling the formation 
of NGOs which might challenge it politically, weaken its control over society, or 
constrict its autonomy in formulating economic and social policies. For example, a 
set of internal guidelines followed by civil affairs departments in considering 
applications to establish NGOs stipulate that no NGO set up by "specific social 
groups", such as migrant labourers, laid-off workers, or ex-servicemen, should be 
allowed to exist.195 Apparently the government fears that these often disgruntled 
social groups would cause it big trouble once they are able to organize themselves.
195 These guidelines were referred to in some unpublished speeches by high-level Civil Affairs 
officials.
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In a collection of Ministry of Civil Affairs documents, several reports by provincial 
governments highlighted their achievements in thwarting attempts by members of 
these social groups to form their own organisations. A report from Shanghai 
mentioned that some rural migrants from Jiangxi Province who were employed at a 
Shanghai factory had formed a union which sent a letter of petition to higher 
authorities demanding reduced working hours and increased pay and threatened 
further actions if their demands were ignored. The report said that the local 
government successfully persuaded the union to disband. A report from Shandong 
Province mentioned that several peasants had tried to organize a peasants' 
association whose stated purpose was to resist unreasonable levies by the local 
government. This organisation was swiftly banned by the civil affairs department 
(Popular Organisation Management Bureau of the Ministry of Civil Affairs 2000).
Not only does the government proscribe NGOs that are liable to make difficult 
demands on it or challenge its policies, it also wants to prevent any NGO from 
growing too big and powerful by developing an extended organisational network. 
This is demonstrated by two clauses in the current government regulations for NGO 
management and registration. The first clause prohibits NGOs from establishing 
regional branches. The second one bars any individual from serving as the legal 
representative of more than one NGO. The first clause means that national NGOs 
cannot set up any branch outside Beijing, while provincial and county level NGOs 
must confine their organisations to the provincial capital city or the county seat. 
NGOs carrying out the same activities can exist simultaneously at all the different 
administrative levels, but they must remain separate organisations, as in the case of 
the CYDF and provincial YDFs. As mentioned in previous chapters, because they 
are separate organisations, the CYDF cannot issue commands to provincial YDFs, 
even though it tried to gain some control over the operation of the latter. As a result, 
the CYDF has had to rely on the Youth League's nationwide organisational network 
to implement Project Hope. The clause concerning NGO's legal representative also
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has the effect of restricting the organisational expansion of NGOs. Legal 
representative is the role usually assumed by the leader of an NGO. After 
successfully setting up and running a popular NGO that provides innovative social 
services, several founders I interviewed have tried to establish similar organisations 
in other cities, in order to make the services available to more people and to spread 
their ideas. However, because of the "no regional branch" rule, any extension of the 
original organisation in other locations must be registered as independent NGOs, 
which means the founders cannot be the legal representative, i.e. the leader, of both 
the original and the new organisations. In other words, the services they set up in 
different places could not be run as a unified operation under a single leadership, 
which made the scaling-up of the services more difficult.
The government's regulation of the NGO sector has also been guided by a desire to 
improve efficiency and eliminate unproductive competition between NGOs. While 
these appear to be very sensible objectives, the means whereby the government tries 
to achieve them —one of the most heavily criticized clause in the current NGO 
regulations—has often amounted to further cramping of the living space for NGOs. 
This clause says that the government will not allow any new NGO to be established 
if in the same administrative area there is already an NGO doing similar work, 
hence there is no need for new NGOs. Because of this stipulation, not only have 
many popular NGOs been denied approval to be established, but some existing 
ones have also been forced to either disband or be incorporated into 
officially-organised NGOs. For example, since the Disabled Persons' Federation 
(DPF), a semi-official organisation, already has local chapters in every city, popular 
NGOs formed by disabled people have not being allowed to register, even though 
many disabled people and their relatives are dissatisfied with the DPF and feel that 
it has done a poor job in representing their interests.196 In one of my fieldwork cities,
196 This view has been expressed by many disabled people and the relatives of disabled people 
whom I interviewed.
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a popular membership NGO for disabled youth had existed alongside a similar 
NGO that was affiliated with the DPF for over 10 years, but after the central 
government ordered an overhaul of the NGO sector in 1998, the local civil affairs 
department refused to renew the popular NGO's registration and forced it to merge 
with the organisation affiliated with the DPF. At the time of my research the merger 
had just begun, but there were already worrying signs that the popular NGO's 
ability to promote the interests of its members would be constrained after the 
merger.197
The tight regulation of NGOs by the state is just one side of the story. As many 
examples given in the previous chapters show, the state's desire to keep effective 
control over NGOs has not been matched by its capacity to enforce its policies. 
Researchers have observed that in this particular arena the familiar problem of the 
Centre in Beijing experiencing increasing difficulty in securing compliance with its 
policies from the localities has once again manifested itself. As Saich (1999: 140) 
wrote: " [LJocal governments will approve social organisations or other non-state 
bodies that contribute to the local economy and well-being. This is irrespective of 
formal regulatory requirements." In fact, to pose the problem in terms of the Centre 
versus the localities simplifies the situation. The central government is not dealing 
with recalcitrant local governments as single entities on this issue. Rather, the 
challenge it faces is how to discipline myriad individual government agencies from 
the national all the way down to the lowest administrative level, which often put 
their narrow departmental interests before the overall strategic interest of the state. 
As the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA) official I interviewed said, many government 
units simply use the cover of NGOs to create agency slush funds and to make 
money through charging illegal fees or extorting donations from enterprises (see 
Chapter 5). Apparently, these agencies have every incentive to circumvent central 
government policies in order to protect their NGOs.
197 Interview, 18 May 2000.
200
On the one hand individual government units often throw the reins to NGOs under 
their sponsorship, on the other hand Civil Affairs, the agency charged with policing 
NGO activities, is seriously constrained in its ability to perform this duty. The 
MCA's Popular Organisation Management Bureau only has 25 staff, who in 
addition to developing and coordinating NGO-related policies, drafting strategic 
plans for the sector, and providing guidance and advice to local civil affair 
departments, are also responsible for registering and conducting annual reviews of 
all national and cross-regional NGOs as well as foreign NGOs that operate in China. 
As one Chinese researcher said, the POMB staff probably do not have enough time 
to read the annual reports of all the NGOs they directly supervise, let alone 
effectively monitoring and reviewing their activities.198 The situation at provincial 
and lower levels is similar or even worse. Many provincial civil affairs bureaux have 
just 5 or 6 staff working on NGO administration, who must exercise oversight over 
thousands of NGOs, including at least several hundred provincial-level NGOs 
which they directly supervise. Below the provincial level, many civil affairs bureaux 
have so limited human resources that they cannot dedicate a single full-time staff to 
NGO-related work. Therefore, as many civil affairs officials openly admit, and 
indeed complain, they are woefully ill-equipped for the NGO management duty 
which the state has laid on them.199
Given its limited capacity, the state appears to have given priority to monitoring 
and controlling NGOs which it suspects on political and ideological grounds while 
worrying less about NGOs that are only guilty of economic misdeeds. The 
combined effect of the state's NGO policy and its limited policy enforcement
198 MCA statistics show that at the end of 2002 there were 1,712 registered national and 
cross-regional social organisations that were directly supervised by the POMB. The MCA has not 
released the number of PNEUs and foreign NGOs that have been registered by the POMB. More 
statistical information is available from the MCA's website: www.mca.gov.cn.
199 Interviews with civil affairs officials, 8 May 2000; 25 September 2000; and 31 October 2001. 
Many civil affairs documents also mention their lack of resources for NGO administration work.
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capacity is that certain types of NGOs, particularly those that are likely to perform 
the political functions often ascribed to civil society organisations, such as 
challenging state policies, championing the rights of disadvantaged social groups, 
and promoting pluralism and diversity, have little space to pursue their activities, if 
they are able to come into being at all. Meanwhile, many NGOs that engage in 
economic corruption and malfeasance, in other words conducts that constitute the 
antithesis of civil society virtues, have been able to continue their operations 
unhindered.
The resultant NGO sector is characterized by the flourishing of NGOs that are 
well-connected to or even embedded in the state administrative system, which are 
predominantly (but not exclusively) officially-organized NGOs, and the 
underdevelopment of NGOs that lack powerful bureaucratic patrons, which are 
mostly small popular NGOs. The privileged position of the former type of NGOs, 
however, has often been used to serve illegitimate private interests, such as those of 
government agencies and their employees, rather than broad public interests. 
Meanwhile, popular NGOs that represent marginal interests and work for the 
welfare of underprivileged people tend to face many obstacles in their path, which 
have reduced their effectiveness.
The healthy development of the NGO sector has been further hampered by the 
government's inclination to keep stories of NGO corruption and mismanagement 
from the public. In some cases where high-profile NGOs were involved, it had 
stepped in to prevent the media from carrying negative reports about those NGOs. 
On the issue of NGO malpractice the state not only suffers from insufficient rule 
enforcement capacity, but is also tom by conflicting goals. On the one hand, it 
genuinely wishes to put a check on various shady activities of NGOs, since even 
when such activities benefit individual government agencies, they harm the interest 
of both society and the government as a whole. On the other hand, it also wishes to
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encourage NGOs to play more active roles in certain areas from which itself has 
retreated in the process of reform, or areas where it believes NGOs can make unique 
contributions. For example, while in the planned economy era the state alone paid 
for the social welfare system in urban areas, now it wishes to mobilize societal 
inputs into the system to alleviate its financial burden. Following the success of the 
CYDF in raising money from the general public to support basic education in poor 
rural regions, many similar organisations have been set up by various state agencies 
that sough to imitate the CYDF. Officially-organized NGOs predating the CYDF 
which used to survive on government allocations also started to expand their 
funding bases by soliciting voluntary donations from businesses and private 
citizens.
To succeed in their fundraising efforts these organisations must gain the trust of the 
public in their honesty and competence. Once an organisation became caught up in 
scandals, its ability to mobilize public donations would be severely damaged. If 
many such organisations became caught up in scandals, then the public might lose 
confidence in all of them and stop giving money even to the ones which had not 
been found doing anything wrong. If the philanthropic impulse200 of the public thus 
dried up, it could upset the state's long-term plan of tapping societal resources to 
complement the government's social spending. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
the government has tried to hush up cases involving the misuse or mismanagement 
of donated funds by well-known NGOs. A couple of years ago, some serious 
financial problems were discovered at a big-name national foundation which 
resulted in a new director from outside the foundation being appointed to sort out 
the mess. When I asked the MCA official I interviewed about it, however, he denied 
that anything had gone wrong at the foundation. During the interview, this official 
spoke freely about the fairly frequent occurrence of NGOs "swindling people out of 
their money" or misusing donated funds, but when I asked for some specific
200 For an analysis of the "philanthropic impulse" in contemporary China see Shue 1998.
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examples, he refused to name any organisation.2011 explained to him that unlike 
other researchers who focused on how the government restricted the development 
of autonomous NGOs, I would like to know more about the bad behaviour of NGOs 
which might have justified some of the stringent government policies. Instead of 
appreciating my sympathy for the government's position, this official was visibly 
worried and almost pleaded with me not to dwell too much on the problems of 
NGOs. I was told that "the positive role of NGOs must be fully affirmed". Other 
MCA officials I approached were equally evasive about cases of NGO malpractice. 
One of the POMB's responsibilities is to "investigate and prosecute" the illegal 
activities of NGOs. I once spoke with a junior POMB staff who had sitting right on 
his desk some summaries of NGO corruption cases which the POMB had dealt with. 
I asked if he could pick just one of those cases—a relatively minor offence involving 
a little-known provincial NGO if he liked — and either show me the summary or tell 
me about it. Although this person apparently thought the information I requested 
was harmless, out of caution he decided to go and check with his superiors first. 
Returning from their office five minutes later, he told me that they had said no.
It was in this climate of secrecy surrounding NGO malfeasance that stories of the 
CYDF's financial problems were suppressed by the government. In February and 
March 2002, a Hong Kong newspaper carried several reports which accused the 
CYDF of illegally investing over 100 million yuan of Project Hope funds in real 
estate projects, stocks, and high-risk business ventures, many of which ended in 
heavy losses (Mingpao, 28 February 2002; 1 March 2002). The CYDF immediately 
issued a statement refuting the charges. Following this, a mainland Chinese 
newspaper Southern Weekend carried out its own investigation into the financial 
affairs of the CYDF. Based on the information they gathered, Southern Weekend 
journalists wrote a lengthy article which made even more serious and detailed 
allegations against the CYDF. The article cited a large number of CYDF's internal
201 Interview, 31 October 2001.
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documents which the newspaper had obtained as well as the testimonies of former 
accountants of the CYDF. When the newspaper was in the press, however, a phone 
call from the Party7 s Propaganda Department in Beijing came through which 
ordered the article to be removed. By then 300,000 copies of the newspaper had 
already been printed. These were ordered to be sealed up (The Epoch Times, 2 May 
20002: 4). Some employees of the newspaper, however, put the article on the 
Internet, so eventually many people did see it.202
This was not the first time the government had tried to suppress bad news about the 
CYDF. Interestingly, when I interviewed Xu Yongguang, the CYDF7s general 
secretary, in 2001, he also complained about the governments over-protection of 
the CYDF and Project Hope. During the implementation of Project Hope, some 
problems had apparently occurred regarding the selection of students for financial 
assistance. In one instance, the head teacher of a school in Shaanxi province had 
allowed the children of some local cadres to receive Project Hope aid rather than 
distributing the money strictly based on the recipients7 financial needs. After it was 
discovered, the head teacher and the cadres were punished. The CYDF thought this 
case was rather typical, so it asked a prime-time television news programme, 
Jiaodian Fangtan, to do a report about it. As Xu Yongguang explained, they intended 
the exposure of the case by Jiaodian Fangtan to have a deterrent effect on grassroots 
cadres and organisations responsible for implementing Project Hope, because 77it is 
not good if they do not face any pressure.77 However, Jiaodian Fangtan said they 
could not make such a programme, because the Party's Propaganda Department 
had warned media units not to produce any negative report about Project Hope. Xu 
Yongguang wisely saw that this kind of protection was not really helpful to Project 
Hope. In his words, with too much protection like this, Project Hope might "get out
202 1 have no way of verifying such details as 300,000 copies of the Southern Weekend being sealed 
up which was reported by The Epoch Times, a newspaper published outside mainland China. 
However, the story of the Southern Weekend article being censored is no doubt true. I obtained a 
copy of the article through a friend who downloaded it from the Internet.
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of control."203
It is not just organisations like the CYDF which are models and showcases 
promoted by the central state that have been sheltered from public scrutiny and 
criticism. Small popular NGOs at local levels can also receive this kind of official 
protection on account of their complex ties and relations with local government 
agencies and officials. For example, as discussed in Chapter 5, local government 
agencies often fear the collapse of NGOs such as private welfare institutions, since 
they will have to take over the NGOs' charges once this happens. Therefore, it is in 
their interest to help sustain these NGOs, even if they are poorly managed and their 
services are below standard. To sustain such NGOs, it is naturally important that 
unsavoury facts about their failings are hidden from the public. Often there are 
other reasons for local governments to smooth over the problems of NGOs under 
their jurisdiction as well. As mentioned earlier, even popular NGOs in China are 
heavily dependent on the state and have numerous formal and informal ties with 
the state bureaucracy. When NGOs7 patrons and friends in the government have 
very openly helped and supported them, the problems of the NGOs would reflect 
discredit on them too. Even more seriously, sometimes these patrons and friends 
may have had such close relationships with the NGOs that they are implicated in 
the NGOs7 dubious deeds. Therefore, to protect the NGOs is also to protect 
themselves.
One can see all these factors at work in the following example involving a seriously 
mismanaged non-governmental residential home for disabled people which
203 Interview, November 2001. It should be pointed out that the corruption case which Xu 
Yongguang wanted exposed was a very minor incident that only involved school fees for a few 
students. It did not seem to be a significant problem given the scale of Project Hope. Also, the 
case concerned the allocation of Project Hope funds at the grassroots level for which the CYDF 
was not directly responsible, so it would not damage the reputation of the CYDF itself. In fact, it 
would probably boost public confidence in the CYDF since it would show that the CYDF was 
determined to have anybody who abused Project Hope funds punished as soon as they were 
discovered. The CYDF apparently did not appreciate it when its own problems were exposed by 
the media later.
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eventually went bankrupt The manager of this NGO had an old friend who was a 
middle-ranking cadre in the municipal Disabled Persons7 Federation (DPF). With 
his help the NGO received the DPF7s sponsorship which allowed it to register. The 
DPF cadre sat on the NG07s five-member board of directors. Through his influence, 
the NGO received subsidies from the DPF several times. Although the DPF had also 
given money to other NGOs in the disability field in the same city, the amount 
involved was much less than what had gone to this particular NGO. The DPF also 
helped this NGO in other ways. For example, it once used its connection to make a 
major national newspaper carry a half-page advertisement for the NGO for free. The 
manager had taken liberties with the NG 07s funds from the very beginning. At one 
time she put 270,000 yuan of the NGO's money into a personal account and used it 
to speculate in shares. One of the NGO's board members had suspected foul play 
and urged an audit. Instead of supporting this board member's action, the DPF 
cadre helped the manager to cover up the problems, even usurping the name of a 
DPF subcommittee to sign a false IOU for her, so that she could claim that 25,000 
yuan belonging to the NGO which she had misappropriated was lent to the DPF 
subcommittee. As the NGO's deputy manager later charged, there were indications 
that the DPF cadre had colluded with the manager to steal the NGO's funds, e.g., by 
submitting false expense accounts. That was why he spared no effort in protecting 
the manager which allowed her to continue her corrupt practices. He was motivated 
by more than his friendship with her.
While the manager was playing havoc with the NGO's finances the organisation as 
one of the first private welfare institutions for disabled people in its city and one 
sponsored by the municipal DPF continued to receive a lot of positive media 
coverage. The DPF apparently used the NGO as a showcase of its endeavor to 
promote the "socialization of social welfare", a national government policy aimed at 
encouraging private investment and NGO participation in the social welfare field. I 
personally witnessed a visit to this NGO by a deputy mayor of the city which was
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arranged by the DPF.204 The purpose of the visit was for the deputy mayor to 
witness the latest service programmes for disabled people and the progress in 
socializing social welfare in the city.
When the NGO's board member who suspected wrongdoing eventually discovered 
some evidence, she formally reported it to the DPF and requested a thorough 
investigation into the NGO's financial affairs. Although the DPF did conduct an 
investigation which acknowledged various problems, it appeared to the board 
member to be intent on "reducing major issues to minor ones and minor ones to 
nothing". The DPF cadre was merely criticized internally and transferred to a 
different department. A senior official of the DPF told the board member that a 
shake-up at the NGO would disrupt its services, which would only hurt its clients. 
Therefore, in the interest of the clients, the DPF did not want the affair turned into a 
big scandal but preferred that the NGO muddle on. One could speculate that one of 
the reasons the DPF feared the disruption of the NGO's services must be that it was 
under pressure to take care of the NGO's clients should it cease operating. The NGO 
had committed itself to provide life-long care for some of the disabled people in 
residence and had received lump-sum payments from their families for this 
promised service. As the NGO's sponsor the DPF must provide for these disabled 
people if the NGO was unable to fulfil its obligations any more. Indeed, this was 
what happened when the NGO eventually went bankrupt.
After the NGO's debacle a newspaper under the sponsorship of the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs reported the story. The editorial following the story suggested that the 
DPF should bear most of the blame, since it failed to carry out effective supervision 
of the NGO, failed to rectify its problems at an early stage, and allowed the NGO to 
pass various assessments even when its finances were already in chaos, which 
resulted in more families being deceived into entrusting their disabled members
204 This took place in July 2000.
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and money to the NGO. In response, the DPF complained to the MCA, with which it 
had a close working relationship. Subsequently the editor of the newspaper was 
summoned to the ministry and scolded for "setting fire to the house of our own 
people". This incident further underscores the difficulties the media often face in 
monitoring and exposing the problems of NGOs under present circumstances.205
6.2 NGO Dependence on the State
Because they know that Chinese NGOs cannot operate without drawing various 
forms of crucial support from the state, many NGO practitioners and researchers in 
China have argued that the dependent relationship between Chinese NGOs and the 
state is not a curse but a blessing. During a session at an NGO conference in Beijing, 
one participant considered Chinese NGOs' lack of independence a serious potential 
problem and likened these organisations to "mansions built on sand". He was 
immediately challenged by another participant, who asked: "Is it necessarily a bad 
thing to be standing on sand? Why must we emulate NGOs in other countries?"206 
A similar comment was made by a different person at another forum: "Developing 
countries and developed countries have very different situations. While foreigners 
consider certain characteristics of our NGOs to be weak points, we consider them 
our strong points."207 Some foreign observers appear to sympathize with this point 
of view too. For example, Saich criticized analysts who emphasized the top-down 
control of Chinese NGOs by the state for failing to appreciate "the benefits the 
'subordinate' organisations and their members derive":
205 My information on this case comes from three sources: 1) interviews with the NGO's board 
member who reported the NGO's problems to the DPF; 2) various correspondences, reports, and 
files of the NGO, including audit reports; 3) the article in the Ministry of Civil Affairs-sponsored 
newspaper. The name of the newspaper is withheld to protect the identity of the people who 
were involved in this case. The story about the newspaper's editor being scolded was supplied 
by the NGO's board member, who heard it from the editor.
206 31 October 1999.
207 Discussions at a seminar at Tsinghua University on 3 January 2000.
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The discussion of social organisations reveals that they can have considerable 
impact on the policy-making process, indeed more than if they were to try to create 
an organisation with complete operational autonomy from the party-state....Those 
with close government links often play a more direct role in policy formulation 
than their counterparts in many other countries as they do not have to compete in 
social space with other NGOs for dominance and access to the government's ear on 
relevant policy issues (Saich 2000:139).
There is no doubt that Chinese NGOs derive all sorts of benefit from their 
dependent relationship with the state. This point has been argued at length in 
Chapter 4. However, it would be a mistake to assume that their close government 
links give NGOs much influence on state policies and practices. NGOs may have a 
cozy relationship with the state, but they are not equal partners in this relationship. 
As the dependent party, NGOs7 ability to impress their ideals on the government 
should not be exaggerated. Speaking at an international conference, Xu Yongguang 
cited "government support" as the first condition that must be met before any NGO 
initiative could succeed in China. As he explained, this meant that NGOs could only 
do two kinds of things: First, those things which the government wanted to do but 
had not got a chance to do itself. Second, those things which the government had 
not thought of doing, but if NGOs were to do them first it would not object (Xu 1999: 
3). Xu Yongguang was repeating the same message he had conveyed in an earlier 
interview, in which he also added: "We must never do anything which the 
government would object to. If we insist on doing them, then there can only be one 
outcome, and that is failure." (Kang 1997: 387)
Xu Yongguang has neatly summarized the boundaries of legitimate NGO activism 
at the present time. This understanding of what they can do and what they mustn't 
do is widely shared among Chinese NGOs and has informed their every action.208 
To the extent that NGOs have some access to the government's ear, it is only 
because they have stayed within the limits of what the government does not
208 For examples of NGOs conducting themselves based on such an understanding see Raab 
1997.
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disapprove. One might say that they can only influence the government where it is 
willing to be influenced, which hardly constitutes real influence. NGOs may be very 
comfortable with such an arrangement, but there is no question that their 
dependence on the state limits their usefulness as champions of interests and values 
that are different from those of the state.
Consider the example of an NGO active in the field of women's rights. It has 
collaborated with local radio and television stations to make programmes that 
educate women about their legal rights and the help and redress they can seek 
when their rights are violated. The programmes proved to be extremely effective in 
raising the awareness of these issues among not just women but also the local 
population at large. Despite the tremendous impact of the media, however, the 
NGO failed to fully harness its power in the service of its cause, because it was 
afraid of offending the government. The television programmes it produced 
featured typical cases in which women's rights had been trampled. The NGO was 
very circumspect in choosing the topics for these programmes. It covered stories 
such as extra-marital affairs resulting in husbands abandoning their wives and 
children, but avoided others which would show the local authorities in a bad light. 
For example, a policeman and his colleagues beat up a woman after she had a fight 
with his girlfriend. The woman sought justice but the local police force ignored her 
complaints. Although it tried to help the woman through its government 
connections, the NGO decided not to expose the case in the media, as it would 
antagonize the police department whose goodwill the NGO needed. At another 
time the NGO had intended to make a programme about a local women trafficker 
who had remained at large owing to the inaction of the judicial department. For 
understandable reasons, the judicial department objected to such a programme, so 
the NGO abandoned the plan. To the NGO, maintaining its good relationship with 
local authorities takes priority over bringing flagrant violations of women's rights to 
public attention, since without the support of the local authorities it would not be
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able to operate at all.209
This NGO was also prevented from making full use of the media to fulfil its 
advocacy and educational functions by its desire to keep a low profile. The NGO's 
director was a typical "amphibious person" (see Chapter 4) who had remained a 
full-time government employee while running the organisation. The leaders of the 
agency where she worked had been very supportive of the NGO's activities and for 
this reason had considered the agency and themselves as deserving credit for the 
NGO's good work. The director was concerned that if she appeared too frequently 
in the media the leaders of the agency would resent the attention she received and 
withdraw their support. Consequently she turned down many invitations to be 
interviewed by journalists or to take part in media programmes. The local television 
station had suggested that the director host the aforementioned programmes to 
provide commentaries on the cases, but she refused. Her cautious approach had 
ensured that her work did not arouse the jealousy of her bosses in the government 
agency, but it also undermined the NGO's ability to disseminate information, 
encourage public debate, and reach out to women who needed help. Although at 
the time of my research the NGO had been operating for over two years, it seemed 
that most local residents were still not aware of its existence. All the people I 
interviewed, including volunteers who worked for the NGO and women who had 
sought help there, heard of it from friends or were referred to it by the local 
women's federation. None of them had learnt of its work through the media or any 
information materials the NGO had produced 210
NGOs' dependency on the state not just constrains their actions, it fundamentally 
affects their attitudes towards the vulnerable and disadvantaged people who are 
supposed to be their raison d'etre. While I was studying a small popular NGO, it
209 Interviews, April and May 2000.
210 Interviews, April and May 2000.
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organized a free concert for its friends and supporters one evening. The concert took 
place in a big theatre which could host several hundred people. To save money, 
however, the NGO only printed about 100 copies of the programme. The NGO 
found a few college students to work as volunteer ushers that evening. One of their 
duties was to distribute the programme to the audience as they arrived. A senior 
member of the NGO stood with the students at the entrance to greet the guests. 
Since there were not enough copies of the programme for everybody, she made sure 
that the students only gave them to the important guests. At one point this woman 
was called away. Not knowing who was important and who was not, the students 
started to hand the programme out to everybody that arrived. Walking back a few 
minutes later, the woman saw what the students were doing and shouted anxiously 
to them while still several steps away: "Give the programme to bureau chiefs and 
section chiefs, don't give it to useless people."
I find this little incident highly indicative of the starkly different attitudes of many 
Chinese NGOs—regardless of whether they are officially-organized or popular in 
origin—towards the state and its officials on the one hand, and ordinary members 
of the society, including the very people they are set up to help, on the other hand. 
Their multiple dependence on the state has led NGOs to view their relationship 
with government agencies and officials as the most important of all their 
relationships. In contrast, their clients, who tend to be the most powerless among 
NGOs' contacts and who depend on them for services, are often treated as the least 
important people. NGOs themselves are not unaware of the contradictions involved 
in such a ranking of their relationships, but they seem to either accept that this is 
unavoidable, or think that they have got their priorities right. I once took part in a 
popular NGO's celebration of its 10th anniversary. The NGO invited government 
officials, donors, representatives from other NGOs, as well as its clients to the events 
it organized to mark the occasion. During those events, officials and donors 
occupied the central position whereas clients were left on the sidelines. Afterwards I
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learnt that the clients had talked amongst themselves about the celebration and 
were displeased about the marginal position they were consigned to.211 A few 
months later, the director of this NGO and I both attended a big ceremony of 
another popular NGO in a different city. There we witnessed a similar situation. On 
our way back after the ceremony, the director remarked that it was just like a 
government function. Then she added: "Unfortunately popular NGOs in China 
today are all doing things this way. Our 10th anniversary celebration was organized 
exactly in this fashion. We behaved just like a government organisation." She 
attributed this to the "conservative mentality" of her staff, and seemed to think that 
she alone could not make a difference 212
While this director at least deplored the fact that even popular NGOs put the 
government before the common people, thereby forgetting the purpose of their 
existence, the director of another popular NGO felt that this was the right position 
for organisations like hers to adopt. As she said:
If you are very close to the government and your work is praised by the 
government, it is beneficial. But it can also have a down side. You become distant 
from ordinary people. Ordinary people will think that you are the same as the 
government. Those people who distrust the government will not support you 
anymore. They will think that you are wallowing in the mire with the government. 
But if you don't cotton up to the government you cannot get things done. In the end, 
the support of the government is far more important than the support of the common people. 
Besides, people have different views. There are also those who will support you 
because you enjoy an excellent relationship with the government.213
With such a conviction, some NGOs showed no hesitation in invoking state power 
to bully powerless common people into submission to their wishes. Chapter 4 told 
the story of an NGO that wanted some poor villagers to move their ancestral graves 
to make room for an extension of its premises. Rather than trying to reach an
211 Interview, 25 May 2000.
212 September, 2000.
213 Informal interview, April 2000.
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agreement with the villagers through consultation, the NGO used its influence to 
persuade the local government to requisition the land, thereby forcing the villagers 
to move the graves. It also discussed with its official friend ways of putting 
additional pressure on the villagers, e.g., by spreading a malicious rumour among 
them. Such conduct is rather at odds with what is generally considered the normal 
behaviour of NGOs. Therefore, we can see that Chinese NGOs" dependence on the 
state has created some fundamental problems in terms of their ability to fulfil 
essential civil society functions.
This dependency has also been responsible for many NGOs' poor record in 
fulfilling useful functions on behalf of the state. As has been discussed, 
officially-organized NGOs are often created to assist with the administrative tasks 
of government agencies and to facilitate the implementation of state policies. Some 
government-initiated foundations, for example, are set up to raise money from 
non-governmental sources to fund government-identified programmes. However, 
the performance of these NGOs has been very uneven. Whereas organisations like 
the CYDF have achieved enormous success in mobilizing societal resources to 
supplement the government's social development spending, there are also a 
considerable number of foundations which have failed to raise a single penny.214 In 
a 1996 speech, a vice minister of civil affairs said that in the MCA's assessment, of 
the 1810 national social organisations, only 20% were able to fulfil their purposes. 
Another 20% either hardly carried out any activities or were bedevilled by internal 
strife. The remaining 60% had carried out some activities but on the whole had not 
performed many useful functions 215 The situation had not improved much a few 
years later. In 2000, the director of the POMB said in a lecture that one-third of 
national social organisations were "useful", one-third were "of limited use", and 
one-third were "completely useless or even worse", i.e., they actually created
214 According to a POMB official in a lecture at Tsinghua University in April 2000.
215 "Speech by Vice Minister Comrade Xu Ruixin at an Informal Discussion with Some Leaders of 
Social Organisations, 21 May 1996".
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problems rather than played any useful role.216
As has been explained, some officially-organized NGOs have mainly been used by 
individual government departments or officials as tools for pursuing their 
illegitimate particularistic interests, often in violation of national government 
policies. These organisations fall into the category of NGOs that are described by the 
director of the POMB as trouble-makers rather than helpers. Here I am not 
discussing these NGOs but the ones which, according to the director, were either of 
very limited use or completely useless even though they had been harmless. The 
previous chapter has touched upon the reasons why some officially-organized 
NGOs have been ineffective tools for the state. As part of its reform programme the 
national leadership has encouraged government agencies to transfer some of their 
functions to NGOs, but many agencies at the local level are reluctant to do so, as it 
would reduce their power and resources. Therefore, although they have set up new 
NGOs in response to the call from higher levels, they have not handed over any real 
responsibility to them (see, e.g., Foster 2002). This is a main factor that explains the 
limited impact of these NGOs. There are other factors as well. As mentioned before, 
many officially-organized NGOs are staffed by serving or retired government 
employees whose incomes and job security are not tied to the fortune of the NGOs. 
Some of these NGO staff, of whom Xu Yongguang and his colleagues at the CYDF 
are outstanding examples, have displayed considerable entrepreneurial flair and 
raised money themselves to undertake projects, but there are also others who will 
only carry out activities if they receive project funding from the government. When 
there is no money, they do nothing. After a field trip to a western province, a 
Beijing-based researcher told me that many staff of officially-organized NGOs he 
encountered there were unperturbed about the fact that they were sitting idly in 
their offices all day long. The general secretary of one such NGO said that they were 
"on strike", because the local government was in financial crisis and had no money
216 Lecture at Tsinghua University, 10 January 2000.
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to give his organisation.217 NGOs like this have continued to exist because they do 
not need to earn their living. By creating the dependency of such organisations, the 
state has only itself to blame for their ineffectiveness.
6.3 M otives and Skills of NGO Practitioners
So far I have discussed the motivations for officially-organized NGOs in several 
places. Clearly, impure motives help to explain many problems of 
officially-organized NGOs. When government agencies and officials simply see 
them as tools for advancing their private interests, it is not surprising that these 
organisations give disappointing performance in serving public interests. In the 
following space I turn to a discussion of the motives of people who set up popular 
NGOs. Here motivational deficiencies have also resulted in some inborn 
weaknesses of these organisations.
It is often difficult for researchers to find out the true motives behind the 
establishment of popular NGOs. As mentioned in Chapter 5, many founders of 
popular NGOs I met have excellent PR skills and are extremely good at presentation. 
Furthermore, with the donor community vigorously funding capacity-building 
programmes for Chinese NGOs, many NGO leaders have quickly picked up such 
buzzwords as "civil society", "human rights", "empowerment", and "participation", 
and have woven these themes neatly into their public discourse. As a result, at 
formal interviews with NGO leaders one tends to hear only high-sounding accounts 
of what motivated them to set up NGOs, which may or may not be accurate 
reflections of reality.
Fortunately, during my fieldwork I met some exceptionally candid NGO personae 
who were not afraid of revealing the true reasons which led them and their
217 Informal interview, 7 August 2000.
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colleagues to NGO activism. Their stories greatly aided my understanding of the 
factors that motivate people to create or join NGOs. I also benefited from many 
discussions with people such as long-term clients of NGOs who had gained insight 
into this issue through personal experience. Finally, the way I conducted my 
research usually enabled me to win sufficient trust of my interviewees, so that after 
some time most of them stopped giving me the standard explanation of their 
motives and started to show me a more genuine picture of their aspirations.
Some popular NGOs have been set up by people whose real motive is profit.218 
Loopholes in the government's NGO management system have made it possible for 
profit-oriented organisations to register as NGOs, especially at the local level. For 
various reasons, some of these organisations have been operating like true NGOs 
despite the intention of their founders, i.e./ they have delivered services without 
making a profit out of them. Hence they have deserved the name of NGO thus far. 
However, the founders of these organisations have not abandoned the hope of 
eventually turning them into profit-making entities. This factor not only calls into 
question their long-term potential as public-welfare organisations, but also exerts 
some negative effects on their current performance as NGOs.
For example, the founder of a women's NGO which had been supported by funding 
from foreign donors told me that her initial intention was to launch a profit-making 
service. The founder observed that market reform was producing more and more 
rich men. Many of them started to take on mistresses. This had created a large 
number of neglected wives who were well provided for materially but were lonely 
and bitter. The founder reasoned that if she set up a counselling service for such 
women, a place where they could go and vent their grievances before sympathetic 
listeners, it would be very profitable. However, she did not have any training or
218 Many fee-charging social service organisations, such as private nursing homes and childcare 
institutions, fall into this category.
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previous experience in marriage counselling, which meant she would have 
difficulty attracting clients if she set up such a practice. This coupled with the fact 
that the founder met some foreign donors who were keen to fund women's NGOs 
(but obviously not profit-making ventures) made her decide to launch her 
organisation as a general service NGO for women instead of a specialized 
counselling business.
Since donors were paying the piper, they called the tune. As a result, the 
organisation's activities were directed towards such issues as domestic violence, the 
sexual exploitation of women, and single mothers in financial distress due to their 
ex-husbands' refusal to pay child support, rather than extramarital affairs as per the 
founder's original plan. In other words, donor influence had made the organisation 
function as a genuine NGO rather than a money-making operation. However, the 
marriage counselling idea was still very much alive in the founder's mind. This 
appeared to have caused her to make certain management decisions that were 
probably not conducive to strengthening the organisation's performance in the 
genuine NGO work in which it had been engaged so far. For example, in addition to 
advocacy and training, the organisation also carried out case work with individual 
woman who needed protection. Even though it was understaffed and could only 
handle a small number of cases at any given time, the founder had taken on cases 
that were in line with her original idea of marriage counselling and charged fees 
from the clients in these cases—probably without the donors' knowledge —instead 
of dedicating the limited time of her staff entirely to helping women who had been 
victims of serious abuse. The founder's long-term ambition for her organisation also 
influenced her choice of staff development programmes. She seemed to have 
favoured training in psychology and counselling techniques for herself and her staff 
rather than in subjects such as law, gender studies, and human rights, which are 
areas of expertise more relevant to the kind of work the NGO had been doing.219
219 Interviews, April 2000.
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Although profit has been the driving force behind some popular NGOs, it is 
apparently not the chief motivation for most of them. It seems that most people seek 
non-material reward from NGO activism in the first place, even though they often 
welcome the material benefits too. As a particularly free-spoken women's NGO 
activist who was a university lecturer told me, there were four reasons why she took 
part in NGO activities. First, it provided her with data for her teaching and research. 
Second, it allowed her to make useful new friends, thereby expanding her social 
network. Third, it brought some extra incomes. Fourth, it gave her opportunities to 
go on foreign trips. This woman considered her case to be typical. She had worked 
for several well-known women's NGOs in China and knew many inside stories. She 
was rather cynical about the motives of most leaders of women's NGOs, thinking 
they had similar goals in mind as she did. But unlike her, she believed that these 
leaders were also after fame on top of everything else.220
As this woman pointed out, it was not that those NGO leaders did not believe in 
what they were doing. They did care about the causes they had chosen for 
themselves and had worked energetically to promote them. However, they were 
not exactly value-driven. Their NGO activism did not necessarily spring from 
deeply held beliefs or ideals. It was as much motivated by personal gains as by 
anything else. This interest in personal gains was reflected in the way these leaders 
managed their organisations. There was often a total lack of transparency and 
democratic decision-making. The leaders wanted to control everything and were 
reluctant to share opportunities and acclamation with their staff. Consequently they 
all had difficulty retaining talented people. Furthermore, my interviewee argued, 
because the leaders' actions were not founded on a passion for such ideals as 
equality, democracy, and the empowerment of women, they could hardly inspire 
others with these ideals. In fact, they often showed little regard for these principles
220 Interview, November 2001.
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in their treatment of the NGOs' beneficiaries. As to the ordinary staff of these NGOs, 
they had not experienced much equality, democracy, or empowerment themselves 
due to their leaders autocratic style, so how far were they able to go in embodying 
these values in their own interactions with the NGOs' clients?
This woman's opinion was apparently shared by many other NGO workers I 
interviewed. They often complained that their leaders treated the NGOs as their 
private properties. As one proof of this, many cited the fact that their leaders were 
extremely reluctant to set up boards of directors to supervise their actions. Some felt 
that they were working for the fame of their leaders rather than a public cause. 
Many said their leaders did not allow them to represent the organisations in 
external meetings for fear that they would start to make a name for themselves. One 
person said that at first she represented her organisation at some meetings with 
donors because her manager did not speak English. However, once she became 
familiar to the donors the manager started to worry that herself would be 
overshadowed, so she sent another person to these meetings instead, even though 
the replacement did not speak English and could therefore not understand or say a 
word. Many staff were disgruntled at the monopolization of opportunities by their 
leaders. One person said she was only able to go on a study tour to a foreign country 
because the donor agency that funded the tour specifically invited her, as it was 
directly related to the work she was doing. This greatly annoyed her manager, who 
tried unsuccessfully to find some excuses to prevent my interviewee from going on 
the trip. Not surprisingly, many staff also complained that their leaders would 
tolerate no disagreement, let alone criticism.221
Despite the complaints of their staff, to conclude that many NGO leaders started out 
with some specific targets of selfish gains, such as fame, professional opportunities,
221 Interviews, November 1999, April 2000, August 2000, November 2001, December 2001, 
October 2002, and November 2002.
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or material rewards, is probably doing them an injustice, for at the beginning many 
of them simply did not know exactly what they would achieve with the projects 
they were embarking on. On the other hand, many founders of popular NGOs did 
admit that self-fulfilment was their main motivation. Many of them were not 
satisfied with the jobs they were doing and looked for ways to put their talent to 
better use. For example, Zhang Shuqin, the founder of the SPRSRA, said that the 
idea of organizing such a project took shape on her 45th birthday, when she decided 
to find a new career for herself. That day, Zhang Shuqin reminisced:
I sat in a small restaurant, drinking by myself the whole day and thought about 
many things. I was 45 now. Suppose I would live to 90, this meant half of my life 
had already passed....[In the past 45 years] I had raised two daughters,...moved 
from a [poor] mountain area to the provincial capital city, and obtained my own 
flat. After 45...I needed a big goal. It should not be a goal that was simply about 
being able to support my children or earning a salary. It should be something 
which I could carry on doing until I was 50, 60, or even 100 (Beijing Youth Weekly, 3 
January 2000:14).
Similarly, Meng Weina, the founder of a school for mentally disabled children in 
Guangzhou, set off on a mission to help disabled people after her 30th birthday.222 
As Meng Weina explained, she was working in a factory at the time and found her 
job dull and unfulfilling. Desperate to change her life, she had tried her hand at a 
number of things, such as journalism and writing, but those attempts all failed. 
Finally she read in the newspaper that Deng Xiaoping's son had founded the China 
Disabled Persons' Federation. This gave her an inspiration:
I thought if Deng Xiaoping's son was doing it, then this kind of work would meet 
few objections, which meant I would have a better chance of success. This was the 
reason I chose to work with disabled people then. As far as I was concerned, I did 
not have to pursue this particular cause. I would be equally happy working as a 
journalist or a writer....! was heavily influenced by the idea of "taking one's stand
222 In Chinese society, 30 is considered an important milestone in a person's life. Looking back at 
his life in old age, Confucius had said: "At thirty I took my stand." Nowadays 30 is often 
described as the age by which one should have established a career for oneself.
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at thirty". I thought I would rather die if after turning 301 still could not carve out a 
career for myself."223
While there is nothing wrong for people to seek self-realization through NGO work, 
the fact that the original motivation of some NGO leaders is self-realization rather 
than passion for the specific issues addressed by their NGOs does tend to present 
problems for the organisations later on. As I just argued, wanting a fulfilling career 
and a sense of personal achievement is not the same as wanting specific selfish gains, 
such as fame or professional opportunities. However, in practice one can easily 
associate the latter with the former. Therefore, once their work has brought them 
such rewards as fame and professional opportunities, it seems that some NGO 
leaders do attach great importance to them and are unable to convince the people 
around them that they care about the NGOs7 missions more than they care about 
these personal gains. This appears to be an important reason why there is often a 
great deal of cynicism among NGO staff about the motives of their leaders and the 
purposes of their organisations.
Often this cynicism is further boosted by the way NGO leaders handle their 
organisations7 external relations. As described in the previous chapter, many NGO 
leaders seem prepared to use any means available to win the patronage of 
government agencies and officials. Such an approach may be dictated by necessity, 
nevertheless, it creates the impression that they are unscrupulous and without 
principles. In dealing with the public, the media, and donors, NGO leaders are often 
opportunistic and manipulative. They are not shy of spin and shanqing techniques. 
While such methods may be effective in gaining the sympathy and support of 
people at a distance, they make these leaders appear hypocritical and disingenuous 
to those who are close to them, and are therefore able to see the discrepancy 
between rhetoric and reality. As a trusted personal assistant of an NGO leader told 
me, their organisation had always had very high staff turnover. Almost all the
223 Interview, March 2000.
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former staff had left the organisation with ill feelings. Some of them fell out with the 
leader over pay disputes, but there were also others who became disappointed 
because they used to believe the carefully crafted public image of the leader and her 
organisation. After they came to work for her, however, they realized that instead of 
a paragon of virtue she was "after all a normal person, therefore she still had all the 
needs of a normal person." Besides, despite her high moral tone in public, she was 
not too fussy about what methods she would use in order to get things done. Once 
they had observed these facts, these staff members became disillusioned, and all 
sorts of problems tended to follow from there.224
Ironically, the more skilled NGO leaders are in PR, the more successful their 
organisations become in mobilizing support and donations from the government 
and the public, the more cynical the people working in these organisations seem to 
be. The prevalent cynicism among NGO staff has contributed to an internal culture 
of many NGOs which is characterized by a lack of trust and openness between 
leaders and other members, a lack of institutional loyalty, much backbiting, and 
incessant power struggles. As mentioned above, many NGO staff I interviewed 
complained about the self-serving behaviour of their leaders. At the same time, 
many of them also inadvertently revealed that they did not always put the interest 
of their organisations above that of their own either. For example, many staff 
members seemed to have no scruples about badmouthing their leaders to donors 
and clients, which often served to undermine the latter's confidence in not just the 
leaders but the organisations as a whole. It was not uncommon for staff members to 
make contacts with donors and other key supporters behind their leaders' backs to 
promote their own schemes. Quite a few people admitted that they planned to start 
their own NGOs or projects and were secretly exploiting the resources of the 
organisations where they were currently working to prepare for their own future
224 Informal interview, April 2000.
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ventures.225
Just as NGO staff were often full of complaints about their leaders, so NGO leaders 
also had plenty to say about the cynical tactics of their staff. One leader said that two 
senior staff in her organisation never disagreed with any of her decisions at staff 
meetings. However, if they did not like these decisions they would go to the NGO's 
patron in the government afterwards to make mischief, so that he would pressure 
her to change her decisions.226 Another leader told me that her deputy had tried to 
oust her through backstage manoeuvres rather than an open challenge. The deputy 
supplied various goings-on behind the scenes in the NGO to its clients which served 
to foment their dissatisfaction with her leadership. Eventually some of the clients 
had organized to demand that she hand over the helm to the deputy.227 Nearly all 
the leaders I interviewed felt that their staff often had personal agendas and did not 
share information with them.
Obviously, if NGO leaders can be motivated by something other than lofty ideals, 
then we cannot expect all ordinary NGO workers to be good Samaritans who are 
without any selfish motives either. The above-mentioned university lecturer who 
was active in women's NGOs, for example, admitted that she was driven chiefly by 
personal considerations. As can be expected, during my field research I encountered 
many cases of individuals who participated in NGO activities essentially out of 
self-interest. A life insurance salesman worked as a volunteer for a women's NGO 
mainly in order to meet more potential clients.228 A photographer wanted to work 
for a children's NGO since the NGO would enable him to put on an exhibition of his 
pictures.229 A recent college graduate joined an NGO because it gave him access to
225 Interviews, November 1999, April 2000, August 2000, November 2001, December 2001, 
October 2002, and November 2002.
226 Informal interview, 4 August 2000.
227 Informal interview, 27 November 2002.
228 Informal interview, 26 April 2000.
229 Informal interview, 3 August 2000.
225
certain sources of funding that would allow him to go studying abroad.230 One 
NGO invested a lot of effort into recruiting and training volunteers, only to discover 
that many of them were single women who came with the hope of meeting eligible 
bachelors. Once they found there were few male volunteers, these women stopped 
coming.231 While the motives of ordinary NGO workers are diverse, NGO leaders 
must take a large part of the blame for the cynical behaviour of their staff, since they 
often fail to move and inspire their followers through their examples and moral 
appeal. Even though many NGO staff are not idealists to begin with, the perception 
that their leaders are Machiavellian individuals who are promoting themselves 
through NGO activism has no doubt encouraged their cynicism and provided the 
justification for many of them to pursue personal agendas as well.
It is well-known among Chinese NGO researchers and practitioners that many 
NGOs are plagued by "internal problems" that threaten their organisational 
sustainability and undermine their public-service performance. Many identify 
motivational issues as major causes for these "internal problems", but nobody 
seems to have made any connection between these problems and the skills of NGO 
managers. As I have argued, at present the skills that have made some NGOs more 
successful than others in mobilizing support for their organisations from the 
government and the public are also creating some serious short- and long-term 
problems for these organisations at the same time. They can make NGOs pay more 
attention to appearance and presentation than substance. They encourage NGO 
workers to treat people outside their organisations, including their clients, as targets 
of manipulation rather than empowerment. And they lead to the neglect of 
principles and the loss of essential values which weaken the moral foundation of 
NGOs.
230 Informal interview, 22 November 2002.
231 Interviews, April 2000.
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The skills of NGO practitioners have also threatened the healthy functioning of 
NGOs in another way. As discussed before, even though the government has put in 
place a stringent regulatory framework that appears to substantially curtail NGO 
autonomy, in reality many NGOs have not only successfully evaded control and 
supervision from the government, but have also been able to use official protection 
to shut out supervision from other quarters, such as the media. The lack of effective 
checks on the actions of NGOs that know how to work the system has opened a 
floodgate to various forms of NGO corruption and dysfunctional behaviour. 
Therefore, although the skills of some NGOs in securing enormous operational 
freedom for themselves are good news for people working in these organisations, 
they are often bad news for society at large whose interest is better served when the 
actions of NGOs can be subjected to proper external supervision and held to certain 
standards.
6.4 Political Culture and Barriers to Collective Action
In NGO studies a distinction is often made between organisations set up to benefit 
their own members and those set up to benefit others. Different authors have used 
different terms to distinguish these two types of NGOs, e.g., "mutual benefit 
NGOs" versus "public benefit NGOs" (Thomas 1992), or "membership support 
organisations" versus "grassroots support organisations" (Carroll 1992). The main 
difference between the two groups lies in their accountability structures: 
Membership-based NGOs are accountable to their members whereas 
non-membership organisations are not.
Many examples given in the two preceding sections to illustrate some common 
problems of Chinese NGOs involve non-membership organisations. Many of these 
problems, such as NGOs7 arrogant attitudes towards the recipients of their services, 
their lack of transparency and healthy internal culture, and the use of NGOs by their
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staff to pursue personal gains, appear to be in large measure attributable to the fact 
that these NGOs are not accountable to their beneficiaries. The people who set up 
and staff these NGOs are usually not members of the disadvantaged social groups 
on which they target their actions. In fact, most leaders and senior staff of these 
NGOs are elite members of society who enjoy much more elevated social-economic 
status than their beneficiaries. This fact might lead one to pin the hope of seeing 
NGO actions of a more democratic and empowering kind —actions that are closer to 
people at the grassroots and are more effective in representing their interests—on 
membership organisations where people from similar backgrounds or with similar 
needs organize to help themselves.
Unfortunately, my research suggests that at present there are a number of factors 
that impede the development of popular membership-based NGOs in China. In this 
section I focus on those factors that seem to have their roots in China's political 
culture.
In Chapter 2, I introduced some relevant studies on political culture and political 
participation in China. As was mentioned, scholars have analysed China's political 
culture through both interpretive and survey studies. Both types of study have 
identified a number of features that are inconducive to collective action and civil 
society activism, such as elitism, fatalism, and lack of cooperative spirit and group 
solidarity. These features cannot be attributed to a single cause. Rather, history, 
customs and tradition, and past and present political institutions have all played a 
part in producing these features. It should be recognized, however, that both 
interpretive and survey studies have some intrinsic weaknesses, which means that 
we must use their analyses with caution. Interpretive studies allow scholars to make 
generalized statements about China's political culture, but their propositions tend 
to lack precision and specificity. Although survey studies can overcome these 
weaknesses of interpretive studies, as Nathan and Shi acknowledge, "survey results
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can never take the form of generalizations about all Chinese and how they differ 
from all non-Chinese" (1993:116-117).
Given the limitations of both interpretive and survey studies, to simply use their 
conclusions to explain the problems of popular membership NGOs in China may 
not qualify as rigorous social science analysis. For example, to say the reason many 
NGOs have not been very effective advocates for the rights of their constituents is 
because their members are fatalistic, passive, and fearful of politics sounds both 
simplistic and vague, even if there is a good deal of truth in such a statement. 
Furthermore, the existence of cultural traits that are inconducive to civil society 
activism does not mean that such activism can never develop in China. Culture 
alone is often insufficient to explain human behaviour, therefore one should always 
be cautious about taking a cultural deterministic stand. However, if in analyzing the 
problems frequently encountered by Chinese membership NGOs one invokes the 
insights of studies of Chinese political culture and political behaviour, not in order 
to proffer ready-made explanations for these problems, but merely to point out that 
the cultural attributes and behavioural patterns identified by these studies do have 
some undeniable effect on NGO performance, then it is an entirely different matter. 
This latter approach is the one I follow. During my fieldwork, I found that popular 
membership NGOs (as well as group-based activities that had the potential of 
evolving into formal organisations232) in different sectors and different geographic 
locations all faced some similar obstacles which could not be blamed entirely on 
non-cultural factors. In relating these obstacles to the discussion of China's political 
culture, my aim is not to offer a superficial cultural explanation for them, but only to 
note the relevance of cultural explanations.
Among the members of NGOs and proto-NGOs I met during my research there 
appeared to be widespread pessimism (or realism) about what they could achieve
232 1 shall refer to them as proto-NGOs in the following paragraphs.
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with their actions. This pessimism was apparently responsible for many people's 
lack of interest in engaging in advocacy activities to challenge the status quo, 
especially current government policies and practices. Many people I interviewed 
stressed that NGOs should not set unrealistic goals for themselves and should be 
sympathetic to the government's position. For example, the leader of an association 
of parents of disabled children said:
When so many able-bodied people have been laid off, how can we realistically 
expect the government to give subsidies to families with disabled people, or find 
jobs for disabled people? My brother lives in New Zealand. I have heard from him 
that in New Zealand the government takes care of everything for disabled children. 
There are special provisions for them so they receive more benefits than normal 
children. If we want China to do the same, I am not even sure if it can be achieved 
50 years from now, so I don't blame the government. There is no point in 
pressuring it to do what it is incapable of doing.233
Another parent who served on the governing board of two popular disability NGOs 
told me:
I have said on many occasions that the economy of our country has not developed 
to a stage when we can expect the government alone to pay for the care of our 
disabled children, so let individuals, families, and society all contribute to it. I 
always say to other parents that we should face the reality and should not shout 
abuses in public whenever we are dissatisfied with things. Government officials 
also have their difficulties. We shouldn't go to government offices to make trouble 
whenever things don't go our way.234
A former director of a private non-profit school for mentally-disabled children said:
Government officials are not really unsympathetic to our cause, so I have much 
understanding for diem. For example, I ran into a retired director of the Education 
Bureau and he said to me: "Don't blame me for refusing to support you in the past. 
We really did not have enough money. You should have seen the condition of 
normal schools. When normal schools were still seriously under-funded, where
233 Interview, 28 March 2000.
234 Interview, 17 May 2000.
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could we find the resources for special education schools?" So I said to him: "Yes, I 
understand."235
Even if they are not completely pessimistic about their ability to make a difference, 
most people want quick solutions to their problems and are unwilling to devote 
time and energy to any activity that does not promise immediate returns or concrete 
benefits to themselves. Most revealing is the remark of a participant at a national 
conference of parents of mentally disabled children. The remark was made in 
response to another participant's suggestion that they contact representatives to the 
People's Congress to ask them to introduce new legislations concerning social 
service provision for disabled children:
It is too slow a remedy to be of any help. Even if we can make the People's 
Congress adopt new legislations to provide social services for disabled children, it 
may take five years for it to happen, but we cannot wait that long. By then our 
children will have become grown-ups. So let us focus on practical issues instead.236
At the same conference I talked to several parents from different cities who all 
mentioned that the preoccupation with their individual short-term needs had 
prevented many parents from taking part in collective actions to pursue long-term 
goals. In some of the cities, a few more active parents had tried to set up parents' 
organisations, but had failed to gather enough support from other parents who did 
not perceive any immediate benefits to themselves from the proposed organisations. 
In one city, some parents of autistic children did succeed in setting up an association 
which effectively lobbied government special education schools to accept their 
children, who used to be denied access. However, once the problem of their own 
children's schooling had been solved, some initial members of the association, 
including its two founders, started to pull out of the organisation's activities, which 
had continued to focus on the issue of educational access for autistic children
235 Interview, 22 May 2000.
236 Group discussion, 26 March 2000.
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because of the entry of many new parents who still faced this problem.237 In another 
city, a parents' association was set up with the encouragement of a local NGO 
leader who consciously tried to promote civil society activities. Its objective was to 
organize parents to influence government policies on welfare provision for disabled 
people, but it was unable to mobilize active participation from many parents. As the 
president of the association said: "The Chinese people are very practical. They only 
make investments when they are assured of returns. If there is going to be a 50% 
gain, people will give you 50% support, otherwise they give you nothing. Because 
they did not see any material benefits, parents were not keen on the association. The 
two vice presidents and I made ourselves very busy but achieved nothing."238
Fear of incurring the displeasure of authorities common among members and 
potential members of popular NGOs presents a further impediment to the 
development and effective functioning of these organisations. At the 
above-mentioned national conference of parents of mentally disabled children, 
when encouraged to organize themselves, some parents were apparently afraid that 
they would be accused of participating in illegal activities by the authorities. For 
example, at a group discussion, after hearing parents complaining that they 
received little support from either the government or society, a teacher from a 
special education school suggested that families which lived close to each other 
could form small groups and meet regularly to exchange information and engage in 
mutual aid. Even such an innocuous scheme scared some parents, who worried that 
they would be found guilty of setting up illegal organisations.239 In Chapter 3 I 
recounted the story of a very well-organized association of parents of autistic 
children which had carried out effective mutual-assistance and advocacy work for 
several years. However, the failure to gain official approval in the form of formal 
registration with civil affairs led to the demise of the association. Many of its
237 Interviews, March 2000.
238 Interview, 28 March 2000.
239 Group discussion, 27 March 2000.
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members feared being charged with running an illegal organisation, even though 
the association had been tolerated by the authorities for years despite its lack of 
legal status. The association was obvious apolitical and only focused on extremely 
narrow issues. Furthermore, it was a very small organisation with less than 100 
members. It seemed unlikely that the authorities would take action against such a 
grassroots self-help initiative even if it operated without a legal status. Nevertheless, 
its members seemed to live in constant fear of punishment from the government,240 
which eventually caused the demise of the organisation.
In a speech at an international forum in Beijing, Meng Weina, an NGO activist for 
nearly 20 years, argued that hindrance to the development of civil society in China 
might have come more from the people than from the government. As Meng Weina 
explained, over the years her organisation had used various means to push the 
government to provide more welfare for disabled people. Although the government 
was often annoyed by their sharp criticism, it had by and large responded favorably 
to the legitimate demands made by her and colleagues. On the other hand, her open 
criticism of the government and bold challenge of existing policies and practices 
had frightened many members of her own organisation as well as other NGOs, who 
had tried to distance themselves from her and accused her of being overly political. 
As a result, Meng Weina felt that she had faced more pressure from "the people" 
them from the government.241
Meng Weina's charges were at least partially borne out by my interviews with
240 As an example of its members' nervousness about the association's illegal status, I asked a 
member of the association whom I first met at the national parents' conference if the association 
had a constitution. She confirmed this and gave me a brief description of the constitution. 
However, she did not show me a copy of the constitution, explaining that because the 
association was not formally registered, they did not dare to show its constitution to others. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the members called their organisation a "club" to stress that it was not a 
formal organisation. Therefore, should the government charge them with setting up an illegal 
organisation they could argue that it was not really an organisation. Given the need to present 
the association as an informal club, naturally its members would hesitate to publicize its 
constitution.
241 Speech at Tsinghua University, 15 May 2002.
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people who had worked with her. In dealing with the government, Meng Weina 
had not shrunk from confrontational strategies. For example, she once led some 
parents of disabled children on a demonstration outside the municipal People's 
Congress to demand that the government provide financial assistance to disabled 
children in non-governmental schools.242 Some people who had taken part in the 
demonstration later argued that Meng Weina was wrong to involve them in such 
activities. One parent said: "In retrospect I think she had no consideration for the 
safety of us parents. China has its specific situation. What if the government 
arrested us? She should have thought about protecting us. If she organized the 
demonstration now I would not have taken part in it."243 A former colleague of 
Meng Weina7s said: "She is too emotional and tactless. We should take strong 
measures only after courteous ones fail. We should try to get what we want from 
the government through friendly negotiations rather than confrontational 
strategies."244
Such views were disputed by a disabled woman who set up a club for disabled 
youth with the help of Meng Weina. As this woman remarked: "Many people 
criticize her for using radical measures, but if she did not take radical measures the 
government would not have paid attention to her." Based on her experience of 
trying to make the government approve the club, this woman was convinced that 
they would not have received approval if they had not followed Meng Weina's 
advice and put some pressure on the government. As she said:
If we did not fight for our rights we would never have succeeded, because they told 
us we did not need to organize our own club. They said they would organize things 
for us through the disabled persons' federation. If we had listened to them, we 
wouldn't have the club today. After Meng Weina staged the demonstration the
242 Meng Weina told me that she applied for and obtained permission from the public security 
bureau to hold the demonstration beforehand, therefore it was perfectly legal. Interviews, March 
2000.
243 Interview, 23 May 2000.
244 Interview, 25 May 2000.
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government immediately sent over 10 officials to her school to discuss their 
demand and they agreed to give the school 100,000 yuan every year. If Meng Weina 
had not taken that action, how could they receive the money? When Meng Weina 
tried to set up the Zhiling school for mentally disabled children, she applied to the 
government for approval. She waited a long time, but did not receive any response 
from the government. Eventually she had a meeting with a vice mayor. The vice 
mayor simply told her that they had lost her application. Thereupon Meng Weina 
struck the table and reproached the vice mayor. Other people would have behaved 
very differently in that situation. If the vice mayor told you she had lost your 
application, most of us would just write a new one and re-submit it to the 
government. Meng Weina does things differently, but she has achieved results.245
Although there were people like this woman who expressed support for Meng 
Weina's "radical actions", the majority of my interviewees were afraid of taking 
part in such actions. Some people even maintained that Meng Weina's actions had 
had no positive effect on government policies and practices, despite evidence to the 
contrary. Others agreed with Meng Weina's argument that her efforts had forced 
the government to improve its care for disabled people, but nevertheless thought 
that her strategies were likely to cause "misunderstanding with the government" 
and were therefore not suited to "the political environment of China."246 To Meng 
Weina, fear of offending the government on the part of her NGO colleagues and 
clients had been a major constraint on her ability to engage in civil society activism. 
To respect their wishes, she had had to channel her energy to service delivery rather 
than advocacy work. Faced with similar problems, some other activists who shared 
Meng Weina's dauntless spirit had decided to abandon group-based actions 
altogether in favour of individual actions. Some anti-AIDS campaigners, for 
example, felt that as individuals they had less fear about criticising the government 
and exposing its mistakes, therefore they could carry out more effective advocacy 
than organisations. The conclusion they drew from this was that they did not need 
any organisation to support them 247 While this may be the case, it demonstrates 
once again how many disincentives for collective action and the formation of
245 Interview, 18 May 2000.
246 Interviews, March and May 2000.
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popular organisations there exist at the present time.
Another factor that often hinders the development of grassroots membership NGOs 
is the short supply of leaders. Although many people are willing to participate in 
mutual-benefit groups, few are prepared to assume leadership roles which 
inevitably require that they dedicate more time and energy to the groups than 
ordinary members. At the aforementioned national conference of parents of 
disabled children, one participant spoke eloquently about the importance of 
parents' organisations, then deplored the fact that no such organisation existed in 
his city. When others suggested to him that he could be the founder of such an 
organisation, this participant replied: "That I cannot do. I am the kind of person 
who only talks."248 In a southern city, I met a group of parents of autistic children 
who had planned to set up a day-care and training centre for autistic children 
themselves in response to the lack of such facilities in their city. One member of this 
group was a rich businessman who had offered to let the group use a property he 
owned for this purpose. The parents held several discussions amongst themselves 
but nothing came to fruition, as nobody was willing to take the responsibility of 
running the centre. One parent was a doctor who was considered by the other 
parents to be the most suitable person to lead the effort, given her medical 
background, but she was not interested. As this parent told me: "The person who 
manages the centre will probably need to work on it full-time, but I have a good job. 
I am doing well professionally. I don't want to give up my job to do this."249
Throughout my fieldwork I met many parents of disabled children who talked 
about organizing themselves. However, since few of them were willing to make the 
necessary personal sacrifices in order to lead collective actions and to help develop 
them into formal organisations, often no concrete outcomes result from such talks.
247 Interview, 9 October 2002.
248 27 March 2000.
249 Interview, 23 May 2000.
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Most of the existing parents' organisations came into being only after receiving a 
strong push and organisational support from outsiders. For example, an association 
of parents of mentally disabled children in Guangzhou was apparently formed 
largely as a result of Meng Weina's active promotion. The chairman of the 
association was a retired university professor whose child was living in the 
residential home managed by Meng Weina. As he explained to me why he agreed to 
lead the association:
I was doing part-time work for two publishing houses, so I was busy. I didn't want 
to take part in too many social activities. I preferred to concentrate on my own work 
so that I could accumulate some money to leave to my disabled child. If I served in 
the parents' association, then there would be a lot of demand on my time. However, 
Meng Weina asked me to help organizing the association. I considered her request 
for a week. I thought that people like Meng Weina who did not have disabled 
children themselves were doing things for us, so if we parents who had such 
children refused to lend a little help to them when they requested it, such 
behaviour was morally indefensible. So I reluctantly agreed to serve in the parents' 
association. Once I saw that the association did not have much impact, I became 
even less enthusiastic.250
As mentioned before, local officials in China often enjoy considerable discretionary 
power in implementing policies. As a result, ordinary citizens can often effectively 
pursue their private interests by taking individualized actions to persuade officials 
to make decisions that are in their favour. This further reduces the incentive for 
people to lead collective actions. An active member of a parents' association told me 
an experience she had which serves to illustrate this point. This parent and a fellow 
member of the association paid a visit to the municipal government's Charity Fund 
which had provided financial aid to various people in need, such as laid-off workers 
and university students from low-income families who were unable to pay tuition 
fees. However, it had not provided funding for families with disabled children, as it 
did not have such a funding category. These two parents argued that many families 
with disabled children also experienced financial difficulties, so the Charity Fund
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should create a new category for such families. The Charity Fund official who 
received them said that this was not possible. However, he offered to help these two 
parents with their individual needs.251 One can see from this example how tempting 
it is for ordinary people in China to approach officials with their individual 
problems rather than trying to obtain benefits for a whole group of people.
Even after popular membership NGOs or proto-NGOs have begun to take form 
after overcoming all the obstacles outlined above, they are often sapped by internal 
strife which tend to break out whenever the opinions or interests of their members 
are not in total alignment. Not a single NGO I encountered had been free from such 
strives. Two NGOs in the HIV/AIDS field I interviewed both saw their members 
disagreeing with each other as to the priority issues their organisations should be 
addressing. In each case, rather than trying to resolve their differences, members 
simply pursued their own interests with little regard for the unity of their 
organisation and the coherence of its goal.252 One NGO organized a national 
conference of people living with HIV/ AIDS (PLWHA) in order to bring such people 
in different parts of the country together for joint action. However, PLWHA without 
university education felt snubbed by those with higher levels of education, whom 
they said looked down upon them and did not want to work together with them.253 
Efforts by an internationally-funded HIV/AIDS prevention programme to 
encourage people with high risk of contracting HIV, such as homosexual men and 
commercial sex workers (CSWs), to form their own organisations also encountered 
much difficulty, as homosexual men tended to form many small circles based on 
similar educational background and socio-economic status, and did not wish to be 
associated with those outside their circles, while CSWs often saw other CSWs as 
competitors rather than allies.254
250 Interview, 28 March 2000.
251 Informal interview, 16 July 2000.
252 Interviews, October 2002.
253 Interview, 5 October 2002.
254 Interviews, October 2002.
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In another case, a British couple founded an organisation called Guangdong Special 
Children Parent Club in Guangzhou City. The couple obtained some overseas 
funding which they used to set up a resource centre for parents of mentally disabled 
children. The club's 100 or so members included parents of autistic children as well 
as parents of children with other types of mental disability, e.g., Down Syndrome 
and cerebral palsy. Although the club was intended to bring families in similar 
situations together so that they can join forces in "improving public perceptions, 
awareness and attitudes toward children with disabilities",255 instead of pulling 
together, the members of the club formed informal subgroups which quarrelled 
with each other over the use of the club's resources. The preoccupation with 
immediate needs as opposed to long-term goals drew parents of children with the 
same type of disability together. For example, parents of autistic children organized 
activities specifically targeting autism using the resources of the club. Other parents 
were disgruntled because they felt those families benefited more from the public 
resources of the club than they did. Parents of autistic children remained 
unrepentant, saying that the resources of the club were for everybody, so if other 
parents did not know how to make good use of the resources it was their problem. 
Meanwhile they also started to organize activities amongst themselves outside the 
club to avoid squabbles with other parents, which further weakened the sense of 
solidarity among members of the club 256
A veteran NGO manager told me how she easily defeated the attempt by some 
clients of her organisation to take over its management by exploiting the difference 
among them. The clients were dissatisfied with the quality of the NGO's services. 
Since they all paid fees to the NGO for the services, and furthermore, since the NGO 
was initially launched with funds pooled by them, the clients felt that they had the
255 This is taken from the club's mission statement.
256 Interviews, March 2000.
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right to ask the manager to hand over the organisation to them. The clients had 
managed to organize themselves so that they could present a united front in their 
negotiations with the manager. However, the manager knew that some of the clients 
were prepared to pay higher fees in future in order to improve the quality of the 
NGO's services while others were unwilling to do so, so she proposed that a parent 
who fitted the former description be made the new manager, knowing that parents 
in the latter category would not support this appointment, as it would result in the 
NGO raising its fees. Just as the manager expected, her proposal immediately split 
the clients, and their collective action to challenge her leadership swiftly 
collapsed.257
Conclusion
At present many factors are preventing Chinese NGOs from performing both 
service delivery and advocacy functions effectively. Given that NGOs only 
developed in China in the last two decades, it is perhaps not surprising that they 
still demonstrate many limitations. The emergence of an NGO sector in China has 
been the result of changes in state-society relations brought about by the reforms. 
The present state of Chinese NGOs also reflects the essential characteristics of 
state-society relations at the present time. What has this study of Chinese NGOs 
revealed about the nature of state-society relations in transitional China? How will 
the evolution of state-society relations affect the future of Chinese NGOs? I turn to 
these questions in the concluding chapter.
257 Interview, November 2002.
240
7. Conclusion
The Chinese state and society have undergone profound changes since the 
beginning of the reforms two and a half decades ago. The emergence of an NGO 
sector is a direct consequence of these changes. Reforms have not only led to a 
relaxation of state control over the economy and society, but have also seen the state 
actively creating and sponsoring NGOs in order to transfer to them certain 
functions which it used to perform itself under the command system. In the 
economic sphere, the state has sought to reduce its direct management role by 
establishing intermediary organisations, such as trade associations and chambers of 
commerce, to perform sectoral coordination and regulation functions. In the social 
welfare sphere, the state wants to foster an NGO sector to share its burden of service 
provision. In the social development sphere, the state hopes that NGOs can 
mobilize societal resources to supplement its own spending.
Meanwhile, societal actors have been quick to exploit the greater social space and 
the non-state-controlled resources now available to them to pursue their 
independent interests and agendas. NGOs provide an important channel for such 
pursuits. With the impetus to the‘formation of NGOs coming from both the state 
and society, the number of NGOs has increased rapidly in the reform era. Ministry 
of Civil Affairs statistics show that before 1978, there had only been about 100 
national-level social organisations258 in China. By the beginning of 1989, their 
number had reached 1,600. Meanwhile, the number of local-level social 
organisations grew from 6,000 to 200,000 (Wu and Chen 1996). Moreover, the social 
organisations that existed before the reforms were fully controlled by the state and 
mainly served the state's objectives,259 whereas many NGOs that have emerged 
since the reforms enjoy considerable autonomy and work to promote societal
258 As explained in Chapter 1, "social organisation" is the official Chinese term for membership 
organisations. It forms a sub-category of NGOs.
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interests. A good example of such NGOs are those that are "organized around 
marginalized interests" (Howell 2004), such as self-help groups formed by people 
living with HIV/AIDS, or organisations championing labour rights.
NGOs in reform-era China represent both change and continuity in state-society 
relations. Given that no "regime change" took place in China, rather, it has followed 
the path of gradual reform, to say that there is both change and continuity in 
state-society relations is to state the obvious. Beyond stating the obvious, scholars 
have the task of specifying the nature of the change and continuity, and, in case they 
detect multiple changes and continuities, to identify those that are the most 
fundamental. Scholars who have reflected on state-society relations based on their 
studies of NGOs typically see continuity in the semi-official nature of some NGOs 
and the state's tight formal control of the sector and change in the predominantly 
popular nature of other NGOs and a certain degree of autonomy which NGOs have 
enjoyed. Those who see more continuity than change turn to corporatist models to 
characterise state-society relations in the reform era, while those who see more 
change than continuity invoke the concept of civil society.
Although there is nothing wrong in viewing change and continuity in state-society 
relations in terms of how much control the state retains over society and how much 
control it has lost, it seems that scholars have not been able to accurately describe 
change and continuity so conceptualized based on their study of NGOs. There are 
two reasons for this. The first is that researchers are often unable to judge correctly 
the actual degree of control the state has over NGOs. They can easily get it wrong 
when trying to decide whether particular NGOs serve as proof of the continued 
supremacy of state power or the growth of social power. Consequently they may 
conclude that the state has NGOs firmly under its corporatist control when in fact 
NGOs are having their own way, or that civil society has developed when in fact
259 This has prompted one researcher to call them "governmental NGOs" (Ma 2002).
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state dominance is being reasserted. As Chapter 3 argued, just because NGOs are 
officially-organized, receive government funding, and have personnel from 
government agencies does not mean that they are necessarily under effective state 
control and serve the state's interests. Conversely, popular NGOs are not always 
signs of the expansion of social autonomy. I shall return to the subject of 
officially-organized NGOs later. Right now, consider the case of a popular 
membership NGO that was studied by the Chinese researcher Kang Xiaoguang 
(1999b).
Named the Gaoligong Mountain Peasants' Association for the Preservation of 
Bio-diversity (hereafter referred to as "the Association"), the NGO is a rural social 
organisation located in a nature reserve in Yunnan Province. It was bom out of a 
bio-diversity preservation project funded by the MacArthur Foundation in America 
and implemented by the Kunming260 Branch of the Chinese Academy of Sciences 
(CAS). While drawing up the project implementation plan, the leader of the project, 
a member of the Kunming Branch of CAS, thought of the idea of setting up a 
peasants' association. The idea won the support of the MacArthur Foundation. 
Subsequently it was entrusted to a member of the project management team who 
was an official in the Gaoligong Mountain Nature Reserve Administration to 
implement.
During a visit to Baihualing Village, the official discussed the idea of the Association 
with its cadres. As can be expected, the cadres had no objection to this proposal that 
came from a higher level official. After returning to his office, the official drafted a 
constitution for the proposed Association without any consultation with the village 
cadres. He then applied for and obtained official approval for the Association. Next, 
he and the village cadres decided on a member list for the Association which mainly 
included the "elites" in the village, such as cadres, teachers, and villagers of high
260 The capital city of Yunnan Province.
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social standing. In this way the Association acquired its first 50 members. In 
subsequent years, the Association's membership expanded, but the way it enrolled 
new members showed the same lack of due process which characterized the 
selection of the first members. For example, in 1997, the Association held an 
agrotechnique training in the village using funds provided by the MacArthur 
Foundation. Those who attended the training included both members and 
non-members. The Association reasoned that since it had organized the training, it 
must be for the benefit of its members. According to this logic, those who received 
the training must all be members. Therefore, the Association simply added the 
names of the non-member trainees to its membership roster. This was how about 30 
new members "joined" the association, who at the end of 1998 had still not received 
their membership cards.
At the time the official from the Nature Reserve Administration first put the idea of 
the Association to the village cadres, they had already agreed on the composition of 
its leadership. It was decided that the Village Party Secretary would serve as the 
Association's chairman. The Village Head would serve as deputy chairman, while 
another cadre, the Village Clerk, would assume the role of general secretary. In 
other words, before the Association acquired a single member, its leaders had 
already been chosen, even though according to the Association's constitution they 
should be elected by members.
After the Association was set up, the chairman arrogated all powers to himself. He 
controlled all the incomes and expenses of the Association, so much so that even the 
accountant was denied access to the account book. The official from the Nature 
Reserve Administration admitted that the chairman was his sole point of contact in 
the Association. All the activities which the Association undertook had been 
suggested by the official. He would communicate his ideas to the chairman, who 
then organized their execution in the village. Other members of the Association had
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no say whatsoever in its decision-making. The official was able to count on the 
chairman to follow his every suggestion not because of his identity as a member of 
the bio-diversity project's management team, but because he worked in a 
higher-level government office. Similarly, the ability of the chairman to control the 
Association and organize activities in the village was not owing to his chairmanship 
but his position as the village Party Secretary. In short, both the establishment and 
the operation of the Association were the result of the state administrative system at 
work. As Kang Xiaoguang (1999b) concluded, although a new organisation, the 
Association, was created in this case, it was merely an appendage to the existing 
state administrative system. In the village, rather than becoming a competitor of the 
existing village administration, the new organisation only served to strengthen the 
existing organisation by providing it with new resources, such as funding from the 
MacArthur Foundation.
The case of the Association is interesting, because since its founding in 1995 it has 
been widely publicized as a model of new-style social organisation—"a voluntary 
organisation of peasants' own". On the surface, it certainly meets all the criteria of 
an innovative grassroots popular NGO: it was not initiated by a government agency 
but was bom out of an overseas donor funded project; it does not receive any 
money from the government; it is not led by government officials and there is no 
official among its members;261 and it shows ordinary peasants who are usually 
preoccupied with their immediate livelihood needs able to organize themselves to 
pursue environmental protection activities. However, as far as state-society 
relations are concerned, the Association is essentially old wine in a new bottle. As 
Kang Xiaoguang's study reveals, beneath its innovative surface He the same old 
structures and processes. It does not represent any change in the distribution of 
power between the state and society. Nor does it show the power of the state being
261 The Association's top positions are occupied by village cadres, but they are not government 
officials, as villages are not considered a formal level of government in China.
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exercised in a new way.
Although the Association is just one example, it demonstrates the complexity of 
Chinese NGOs and the difficulty of determining the true nature of state-society 
relations embodied in particular NGOs from a distance. The criteria for judging the 
degree to which an NGO is "official" or "popular" do not always allow researchers 
to accurately infer the power relations between the NGO and the state. This is the 
first problem with the attempt by NGO scholars to characterize change and 
continuity in state-society relations in terms of the degree of state domination over 
NGOs. The second problem with this approach is caused by the diversity of the 
NGO sector. Chinese NGOs show varying degrees of autonomy from the state. At 
one extreme, there are officially-organized NGOs that are described as highly 
"bureaucratized". As discussed in Chapter 2, these are organisations that are 
comprehensively dependent on the state agencies that created them and behave 
more like subordinate units of the agencies than independent entities. Sometimes 
such organisations and their mother agencies are hardly distinguishable, hence the 
expression "one team, two signboards". Sometimes they are more distinct. Still, 
they are only able to function by drawing on the administrative authority of their 
mother agencies. At the other extreme, there are genuinely bottom-up NGOs that 
set their own agendas and seek to influence government policies and practices or to 
bring important issues to public attention. Examples include some popular NGOs I 
have studied that work to promote the rights and welfare of disabled people.
Because of the diversity of Chinese NGOs, scholars have had a hard time fitting this 
complex reality into one model of state-society relations, whether it is civil society or 
corporatism. No matter which model one proposes, it would not be difficult for 
others to challenge it by citing examples of NGOs whose relationship with the state 
follow a different pattern. Recognizing the heterogeneity of the NGO sector, some 
scholars have argued that instead of one model, several models of state-society
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relations are operating at the same time in China. For example, Ding Yijiang 
suggests that to explain associational activities at the present time one needs both 
the models of corporatism and civil society. Furthermore, one needs to invoke 
several subtypes and variations of the two models. On the corporatism side, three 
tendencies, state corporatism, societal corporatism, and local corporatism co-exist. 
On the civil society side, one can discern both a "civil society with corporatist 
inclination", which overlaps with societal corporatism, and a "civil society with 
pluralist inclination" (Ding 2001: 71-72). A most recent article by a leading scholar of 
Chinese NGOs, Jude Howell, concludes that "[i]t is thus no longer appropriate to 
think in terms of a single civil society or public sphere...In practice there are 
multiple civil societies and multiple emerging public spheres that are localized and 
specific, forming a tapestry of associations and, on occasions, voices that local 
governments sometimes encourage, sometimes ignore, sometimes contain, and 
sometimes repress" (2004:163).
In sum, the complexity and diversity of Chinese NGOs present two major 
challenges to scholarly analysis of change and continuity in state-society relations 
based on studies of NGOs, since whether particular NGOs represent change or 
continuity is not always straightforward, and many different types of NGO-state 
relationship co-exist. Does this mean that it is impossible to find a simple way of 
describing change and continuity in state-society relations through the study of 
NGOs that allows for the difficulty of establishing the actual degree of state control 
over individual NGOs and that does not require the employment of multiple 
models? I suggest that it is possible, if we put aside the frameworks of civil society 
and corporatism and characterize change and continuity in a different way. Based 
on my study of Chinese NGOs, I suggest that the most significant change and 
continuity in state-society relations can be summarized in a simple notion that can 
be broken down into two words —autonomy and dependence.
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The different way of conceptualizing change and continuity which I propose centres 
on the separation of the concepts of independence and autonomy, which have been 
used as interchangeable notions by NGO scholars. As I have argued, Chinese NGOs 
can be heavily dependent on the state yet enjoying an enormous amount of de facto 
autonomy. I suggest that this dependence on the state, which is common to different 
types of NGOs, is the most important element of continuity in state-society relations 
in the reform era. Admittedly, this dependence exists in varying degrees in different 
NGOs, but as Chapter 4 argued, at the present time it is inconceivable how any 
NGO of scale can function without drawing some crucial support from the state, 
since their dependence is created by the basic structural and institutional conditions 
of contemporary China. Although the transition to the market has resulted in a 
decline in state power and its domination over the economy and society, as studies 
that examine the conduct of private businesses demonstrate, bureaucratic control 
over the allocation of resources and opportunities remains extensive. Furthermore, 
many factors, such as the lack of clearly defined property rights, the lack of effective 
checks on the arbitrary use of administrative power by state agents, an incomplete 
and ineffective legal system, and constant fluctuations in government policies, have 
all contributed to an uncertain environment for private businesses. To operate in 
this environment, private entrepreneurs forge patron-client ties with government 
officials. They depend on official patronage for access to bureaucratically-allocated 
resources as well as political protection.
The relationship between Chinese NGOs and the state displays the same pattern. As 
Chapter 4 demonstrates, material resources is but one type of support which NGOs 
draw from the state. Even if NGOs are self-sufficient financially, they still depend 
on the state and its agents for many other things, ranging from legitimacy in the 
eyes of society, protection from predation and obstruction by individual 
government agencies or officials, to project implementation capacities, not to 
mention the sponsorship of state agencies, which is the precondition for their lawful
248
existence. This dependence on the state is shared by officially-organized and 
popular NGOs alike. Unlike officially-organized NGOs, popular NGOs have no 
natural ties to the state. Nevertheless, they have many of the same needs as their 
officially-organized counterparts and therefore seek the same assistance from the 
state. In fact, because of their common dependence on the state, the difference 
between popular and officially-organized NGOs is not always as clear-cut as their 
names might suggest. As mentioned in Chapter 4, many popular NGOs were 
started by "amphibious people" who remained state employees while pursuing 
their NGO activities. One NGOI studied was set up and run by an official in a local 
government bureau. This organisation falls into the category of popular NGO, 
because it was created at the individual initiative of the official rather than that of 
the bureau. However, because its founder had remained a bureau official, the NGO 
enjoyed the backing of the bureau and had access to both its physical and 
administrative resources. In other words, it resembled officially-organized NGOs in 
several important respects.
Just because NGOs are dependent on the state does not mean that the state can fully 
control them. This leads me to the most significant change in state-society relations, 
namely the weakening of the state's social control mechanisms, which explains the 
autonomy of NGOs. As a lot of evidence presented in Chapters 3, 5 and 6 makes 
clear, many Chinese NGOs have enjoyed a very high degree of de facto autonomy. 
In fact, in a large number of cases, there have been so little effective state 
supervision and control that NGOs have been able to carry out illegal activities 
unchecked. The state has failed to stop such activities even though they undermine 
its policies and harm its interest. A particularly noteworthy aspect of the autonomy 
of Chinese NGOs concerns their economic activities. To put such activities in 
perspective, it is necessary to refer to the scholarly discussion on "state 
entrepreneurialism" and corruption in post-reform China.
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As mentioned in Chapter 2, an important change undergone by the Chinese state 
since the reforms is the rise of state entrepreneurialism, i.e., the widespread 
involvement of state agencies in entrepreneurial activities. Although not always the 
case, such activities have often become linked to official corruption. Bearing this fact 
about the behaviour of reform-era state agencies in mind, many officially-organized 
NGOs are best seen as part of the entrepreneurial drive of their parent agencies if 
not outright incidences of organisational corruption by the agencies. Although not 
registered as for-profit businesses, they perform similar functions for the agencies. 
In a typical case that was exposed recently, the National Audit Office found that a 
large state-owned company had diverted some funds to illegal usage through seven 
subsidiaries it had set up. Of these, five were businesses, while two were non-profit 
organisations. All seven subsidiaries were "one team, two signboards" 
organisations, i.e., employees of the company served concurrently in these 
subsidiaries, therefore they did not have separate personnel. The company diverted 
funds to the five for-profit entities by awarding contracts through them. It gave the 
contracts to these subsidiaries first, which then handed them out to other 
contractors at a lower price, thereby making a profit. The company diverted funds 
to the two non-profit organisations in a more roundabout way. The two 
organisations, one of which was called Staff and Workers' Technology Association, 
charged consultancy fees from bidders for the company's contracts. If bidders paid 
these two organisations for their "technical advice", then the company would make 
sure that they were given contracts. Although the two non-profit entities made 
money in a different way from the for-profit entities, their profits were used the 
same way by the company. Most of the profits were distributed among company 
employees as bonus payments. After the seven subsidiaries were set up, the cash 
incomes of the company's permanent employees rose by 248%, while those of its 
temporary employees rose by 504%.262
0 Information on this case can be found at the following websites: 
http://news.sina.com .cn/c/2004-01-31/14211682696s.shtml, 
http: /  /  finance.sina.com.cn / g / 20040117/1249607672.shtml,
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In other cases, state agencies use NGOs to undertake entrepreneurial activities 
which they cannot undertake directly. Because state entrepreneurialism has served 
useful functions, notably making up for the budgetary shortfalls of state agencies 
and absorbing their redundant personnel, the central state has not taken consistent, 
resolute measures to eradicate this practice. However, it does recognize that 
unbridled state entrepreneurialism can cause serious problems, and has launched 
several campaigns since 1985 to curb it. In 1993, for example, it ordered all state 
agencies to de-link themselves from the economic entities they had established. 
After the central state issues such directives, state agencies may find it difficult to 
carry on running businesses directly. By engaging in businesses indirectly through 
the NGOs they set up and control, they can continue to pursue entrepreneurial 
activities without openly violating central state policies. In one example, the 
Industry and Commerce Bureau of Beijing's Chaoyang District used the 
Self-Employed Labourers Association under its aegis to establish a commercial 
company. The profits generated by the company could legitimately go towards 
paying the salaries and perquisites of the Association's officers. Since most of the 
Association's officers were in fact simultaneously Bureau officials, it was really the 
Bureau and its officials who benefited from the profit-making operation of the 
company (Unger 1996).
In the case of officially-organised NGOs that are deeply embedded in the state 
agencies that created them, the entrepreneurial activities of the NGOs should really 
be seen as the entrepreneurial activities of their sponsoring agencies. But there are 
also officially-organised NGOs that enjoy substantial autonomy from their sponsors. 
It is not uncommon for such NGOs to engage in entrepreneurial activities 
themselves. Similar to the entrepreneurialism of state agencies, many
http://news.sma.com.en/c/2004-01-31/02461677607s.shtmL as well as the website of the 
National Audit Office:
http://  www.audit.gov.cn/cysite/docpage/cl67/200401/0117 167 7742.htm.
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entrepreneurial activities of such NGOs have dubious legality and involve the 
exploitation of their connections and special access to the government For example, 
a short paper written by a China Literature Foundation (CLF) staffer describes some 
of the CLF's fundraising methods. One of these methods is to engage in commercial 
ventures in partnership with private companies. As the paper tells:
Many individuals or enterprises have economic resources but lack stature and 
"background". On the other hand, non-profit organisations often have some 
governmental background and enjoy close ties to officials.. .Therefore, the two have 
complementarity. For example, many small and medium-sized enterprises wish to 
collaborate with the CLF in business activities. In one successful case, in 1994, our 
foundation undertook the Guangwai real estate development project with a private 
company. Our foundation did a lot of work in obtaining the necessary approvals 
for the project and finding investment for it, but our actual financial input was 
almost zero. After the project was completed, the private company made over 20 
million yuan of profit. Our foundation also earned a handsome sum. This is the 
technique often referred to by people in our circles as "catching a wolf without 
bait." This mode of operation has been adopted by many foundations and there are 
frequently successful cases (Li 1999:4).
The freedom with which many officially-organized NGOs have pursued 
entrepreneurial activities that violate central government policies and rules is 
probably the most important manifestation of their autonomy. Such autonomy is 
not enjoyed by official-organized NGOs alone. Many popular NGOs also appear to 
have engaged in entrepreneurial activities with considerable freedom, often with 
the help of their contacts in the government. Most popular NGOs I studied either 
had undertaken entrepreneurial activities in the past, or were seriously considering 
embarking on such activities. One NGO was running several small businesses. 
When I visited the organisation, it was about to open another business, a night club 
cum salon cum massage parlour. A local official was apparently a good friend of the 
NGO and had been involved in the establishment of these businesses. I was present 
at a discussion between the official and the NGO about the new business, which 
was due to open soon. The person hired by the NGO to run the establishment was
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concerned that it had not obtained a business license yet, but the official told him 
not to worry and to open the place as scheduled, saying: "No need for you to be 
concerned when I am here to take care of things."263 Another popular NGO I 
studied was managed by a director who was perpetually thinking of launching new 
profit-making schemes. One such scheme involved a deal with the local court 
whereby the court would sell some confiscated properties to the NGO at a very low 
price rather than sell them to the highest bidder by auction. At one point, this 
director even thought of establishing a business in Japan with the help of some 
friends there. While the NGO would be the owner of the proposed business, she 
also hoped to invest some of her own money in the business, so that she could 
personally make some profit too.264 A third NGO formed a partnership with a 
private business. The NGO provided services for disabled people. As such its 
profit-making activities could enjoy tax exemption. By forming a partnership with 
the NGO, the private business became eligible for tax exemption too.265
The entrepreneurial activities of NGOs have often led to charges of corruption or at 
least the lack of financial transparency. Chapter 6 discussed the motives of leaders 
of popular NGOs. As I explained, NGO leaders are often accused by their staff, 
clients, and other people in NGO circles of using NGOs to advance their private 
interests. One reason this charge is so frequently levelled appears to be that many 
leaders of popular NGOs have gained fame and plenty of professional 
opportunities through their activism, but there is also another reason. NGO leaders 
are also frequently accused of gaining financially from their NGO work. The 
entrepreneurial activities of NGOs have no doubt contributed to such accusations. 
Because NGO directors often undertake business activities through the help of or in 
collaboration with their friends, and they often release little information about these 
business activities even to their own staff, it naturally arouses suspicion that they
263 April 2000.
264 Informal interviews, July 2000.
265 Interviews, May 2000.
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have made personal financial gains from these activities.
As I argued in Chapter 6, it is very difficult to pass judgement on charges of 
self-seeking against NGO leaders. What underlies such charges is the fact that 
reforms have created opportunities for individuals to seek self-realization by 
pursuing NGO activities, whether such self-realization lies in gratifying private 
needs or in championing a noble cause that advances public interest. While the 
motives of NGO practitioners are necessarily varied, sound legal and regulatory 
frameworks, their effective application, and reliable monitoring mechanisms can 
help to guard against the misuse of NGOs by individuals with self-serving purposes, 
just as they can help to check the abuse of NGOs by government organisations in 
pursuit of their particularistic interests. At present, however, these institutional 
safeguards are apparently not in place, hence the problems of NGO misconduct and 
dysfunction described in this thesis.
In conclusion, based on my study of Chinese NGOs, I propose that the most 
significant change and continuity in state-society relations in reform-era China can 
be summarized in the notion of dependent autonomy. This means that social forces 
have gained substantial autonomy from the state, but they continue to depend on 
the state for various support and resources. I suggest that this depiction of change 
and continuity has several advantages over conceptualizing them in terms of the 
loss and retention of state control over society. First, it avoids the two problems with 
the latter approach that were mentioned above. It does not require that we correctly 
judge the degree of state domination in individual cases of state-society interaction, 
which is by no means easy and straightforward, and it is able to abstract a single 
pattern out of multiple realities. More importantly, it serves to highlight the 
prevalent attitude of social actors towards the state that is characterised by 
opportunism and pragmatism rather than any desire to mount political challenges 
to the state. Thus the word "dependent" conveys both a reality and a mentality.
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Summarizing the works of the late China scholar Gordon White, Marc Blecher 
wrote that in White's analysis, in both the pre- and post-reform periods, Chinese 
society had always been politically engaged with the state, but social classes and 
groups engaged in the kinds of politics White studied in order to advance their 
interests, not to reshape the state (Blecher 2003). My research on Chinese NGOs 
leads to the same conclusion. In their interactions with the state, the vast majority of 
NGOs covered by my study are mainly interested in finding ways to exploit 
state-controlled resources, both material and non-material, for their own benefit, 
rather than playing the political role conventionally ascribed to civil society. This 
attitude of NGOs makes perfect sense, since it is not necessary for them to reshape 
the state first before they can advance their interests. There are easier and quicker 
ways for NGOs to advance their interests, such as forging patron-client ties with 
officials, operating through networks of personal relations that cross the 
state-society divide, or providing political support to the state in exchange for its 
endorsement and sponsorship.
Although social actors are not interested in reshaping the state, it does not mean 
that the state has them under its effective control. The notion of dependent 
autonomy corroborates the characterization of the post-reform Chinese state as 
"fragmented authoritarianism" (Lieberthal 1992). While the state has retained its 
dominant role in economic and social spheres, authority below the very peak of the 
system has become more fragmented and disjointed as a result of economic reform 
and administrative decentralization. Consequently, although the state remains 
strong in the sense that it still exerts extensive control over economic and social 
activities, it has also become weak owing to the fragmentation of its authority. In 
advancing their interests, NGOs have enjoyed far more autonomy than the stringent 
government regulations on NGO administration would suggest. Often, this is made 
possible by the assistance and patronage of NGOs1 friends and contacts in the 
government. Therefore, the considerable autonomy enjoyed by many NGOs is not
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simply a reflection of the Chinese state's weakened ability to control society. It 
points to a weakening of the state's ability to control its own bureaucrats. The two 
processes are inextricably linked. The greater autonomy of social actors in the 
reform era has gone hand-in-hand with the greater autonomy of state agencies and 
officials from the central state. The state's failure to discipline unruly NGOs boils 
down to its failure to discipline its own agents, whose protection and complicity 
enable these NGOs to evade supervision and to engage in inappropriate or even 
illegal activities.
Obviously not all NGOs use their de facto autonomy from state control to pursue 
illegitimate private interests. Even NGOs that have used their autonomy this way 
may not do so at all times. In the case of NGOs' entrepreneurial activities, for 
instance, some of them are no doubt intended to generate income to finance NGOs' 
public service programmes rather than to serve corrupt purposes. However, the 
weak state capacity for keeping such activities within bounds paves the way for the 
latter scenario. The unscrupulous and self-serving entrepreneurialism of NGOs (in 
some cases being part and parcel of the entrepreneurialism of their sponsoring 
agencies) has apparently been a fairly common problem, as attested by the frequent 
reference to it in both formal civil affairs documents and less formal comments and 
writings by civil affairs officials.266
This suggests that the growth of autonomous NGOs in China will not necessarily 
result in the development of civil society, at least not civil society defined as 
possessing the quality of "civility", such as being rule-abiding and concerned with 
public rather than private ends. As Saich commented on the prospects for civil
266 For example, after the central state ordered a nationwide overhaul of NGOs in 1996, the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs issued a guideline to local governments on how to implement the 
central state directive. The guideline laid particular emphasis on the need to rectify NGOs with 
economic problems. These include NGOs whose "financial management is chaotic", NGOs that 
"fail to properly manage the economic entities they set up, resulting in serious consequences", 
and NGOs that "run businesses or engage in fundraising, lending, and borrowing money in 
violation of state regulations" (General Office of the State Council 1997).
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society in China: "[I]t is clear that to thrive a lively civil society needs a competent 
state structure and impartial legal system. Without this the free-for-all is more likely 
to produce an uncivil society as in Russia" (Saich 2001: 206).267 Many studies of the 
political economy of reform era China have noted the formation of alliances 
between local officials and entrepreneurs to their mutual benefit at the expense of 
the policies of the central state and the interests of other social groups (see, e.g., 
Odgaard 1992; Solinger 1992; Bruun 1995; Pieke 1995; Wank 1995a, 1999). The 
growth of NGOs has added another dimension to the alliance between state officials 
and social actors, which may or may not serve public interest. Although NGOs need 
autonomy to perform their essential functions, a state that lacks the capacity to
267 Given that Russia and other former communist countries are often lumped together with 
China as "transitional countries", one might wonder if it would be a good idea to compare 
state-society relations in China and the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union. I think there are several important differences between China and these 
countries which make a comparison difficult. One difference is that the post-communist 
countries have undergone both political and economic transitions, but transition in China has 
not involved the change of its political system. As a result, whereas a study of state-society 
relations in China only needs to focus on the state and civil society, a similar study of Russia or 
Ukraine must also include in its investigation the role of political society, i.e., independent 
political organisations such as political parties. State-society relations in these countries involve 
the interactions between civil society, political society, and the state. Because it is a three-way 
relationship, it is more complicated than state-society interactions in China. For example, when 
trying to make the government take certain actions, Russian NGOs have the option of enlisting 
the support of political society to demand such actions from the government (through the 
parliament at the central level or Legislative Assemblies at the local level (see, e.g., Weigle 2000; 
Sokolov 2001). This option is not available to Chinese NGOs. The possibility of civil society— 
political society alliance and direct civil society involvement in electoral politics (see, e.g., 
Kubicek 2000) make it difficult to assess the degree of civil society dependence on/autonomy 
from the state in post-communist transitional countries, as it becomes much less straightforward 
than in China.
Because the former communist countries have experienced more fundamental changes than 
China (both political change and huge economic decline following the transition), the state in 
these countries appears to be much weaker than the Chinese state. In the Russian case, for 
example, because the state has lost its power to enforce the law in vast economic gray zones, 
organised crime has arisen as an “ alternative state” to perform some of the regulatory functions 
that are usually performed by the state (Sergeyev 2001). The existence of the alternative state 
must complicate state—civil society relations in Russia. In the final analysis, countries with a 
weak state whose economies have suffered huge decline and major crises are in a fundamentally 
different situation from a country with an authoritarian state that has enjoyed sustained rapid 
economic growth. It is not easy to compare state-society relations in countries with very different 
states and societies and such a comparison may not lead to many useful insights. In short, 
although China is considered a transitional country and is therefore put in the same category as 
the post-communist countries, a comparison between them may not always be a meaningful and 
worthwhile exercise.
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enforce rules within the NGO sector may impede rather than encourage the good 
performance of Chinese NGOs.
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Appendix
Of the 40 NGOs I studied, only some can be mentioned by name. I have withheld 
the names of the others to protect their identity. In describing the organisations, I 
give more details in some cases than others. This is again out of the need to protect 
the identity of some organisations that are either so well-known or so unique that 
any detailed information about their work will immediately lead to their 
identification. Even in the case of NGOs whose names can be mentioned, I describe 
some organisations in less detail than others to avoid their being identified as the 
organisations that are discussed in specific places in the thesis.
Except for a few cases involving organisations whose names are mentioned, I have 
not indicated the registration status of the NGOs, since many of them are not 
properly registered. Some organisations are not registered as all. Some have only 
registered parts but not the whole of their operations. Others are registered as 
businesses. Still others are second- or third-level NGOs "hanging under" other 
NGOs that are not properly registered themselves. I do not wish to draw attention 
to the illegal status of these organisations by giving their registration information. In 
any case, this information is not important in understanding the organisations, since 
an organisation's registration status often has little bearing on either its ability to 
function or the way it functions. Nor does it always accurately reflect the true nature 
of the organisation, as is demonstrated in the case of non-profit organisations 
registered as businesses, or non membership-based organisations registered as 
social organisations instead of private non-enterprise units.
NGOs that are named in  the thesis:
1. Shaanxi Province Returning to Society Research Association (SPRSRA): A
popular NGO founded in 1995 by Zhang Shuqin, a journalist working for a
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newspaper published by the Shaanxi Province Prison Bureau. Its mission is to 
help ex-convicts to reintegrate into society, but up to the time of my fieldwork 
the SPRSRA's activities had consisted mainly of establishing and managing 
three Prisoners Children's Villages (PCVs), which are residential homes for 
children of serving convicts who have no families or relatives to care for them. 
By the time of my fieldwork the three PCVs had provided care for a total of 
around 150 children aged between 6 and 15.
2. Help Centre for Special Children (HCSC): Set up in Beijing in 1999 by Zhang 
Shuqin in order to replicate the PCVs in Shaanxi to more places. The HCSC 
intended to open a demonstration PCV in Beijing, which would then be used as 
a model for other PCVs which Zhang Shuqin hoped to establish in other regions 
of China in the future. Since government regulations forbid NGOs to establish 
regional branches, the HCSC needed to operate as an independent organisation 
rather than as a branch of the SPRSRA. Zhang Shuqin was able to open the 
HCPC in Beijing after she persuaded the China Charities Federation to host it as 
a project under its aegis, but to gain full legal status the HCSC must be 
registered as an independent NGO. At the time of my fieldwork, Zhang Shuqin 
and her colleagues were spending a lot of time trying to find a government 
agency in Beijing that was willing to sponsor the HCSC so that it could be 
registered. When I returned for a follow-up visit in November 2001, the HCSC 
was still not registered. Nevertheless, it had went ahead and opened a PCV in 
Beijing with over 40 children. Two-thirds of the children were from Beijing. The 
rest came from other parts of China. The PCV was supported with donations 
from the public and businesses. Many foreign businesses such as General 
Electricity (GE) had made donations to it.
3. China Green Shade Children's Village (CGSCV): A private orphanage 
founded by Hu Manli in 1992 in Wuhan City, Hubei Province with support from
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the local government. At its height the CGSCV was home to over 70 orphans 
from different regions of China.
4. United Moms Charity Association (UMCA): Founded by Hu Manli and the 
Lijiang prefectural government in Lijiang, Yunnan Province in 1999 following a 
big earthquake that turned hundreds of local children into orphans. The UMCA 
opened a residential home, a boarding school, and a vocational training school 
for orphans. At the time of my fieldwork the three institutions together hosted 
over 200 orphans. Although the local government provided important support 
to the UMCA (e.g., it provided the building and teachers for the boarding 
school), the three institutions were largely maintained by funds raised by Hu 
Manli, who served as the UMCA's president. One important source of funding 
for the UMCA was a small charity based in the United States. In 2001, it sued the 
UMCA in a Lijiang court for misusing its donations and producing false 
financial reports. Afterwards a Chinese newspaper Southern Weekend 
investigated the UMCA and published several articles that supported the 
US-based charity's charges against the UMCA and Hu Manli. In 2002, the court 
ruled largely in favour of the US-based charity and ordered the UMCA to return 
some of the funds it had received to the charity.
5. Zhiling School for Mentally Disabled Children (Zhiling): The first 
non-governmental special education school in China, it was founded in 1985 in 
Guangzhou by Meng Weina and her friends with support from families with 
mentally disabled children. Zhiling has received much financial and technical 
assistance from Hong Kong, especially from the charity Caritas Hong Kong. 
Zhiling currently provides special education for mentally disabled children 
aged between 4 and 18. It charges fees for its services but remains a non-profit 
organisation.
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6. Huiling Service Organisation for Mentally Disabled People (Huiling): It was
founded by Meng Weina with support from families with mentally disabled 
children in 1990. Since the Zhiling School only caters to children aged between 4 
and 18, many parents hoped that there would be another institution to provide 
services for their children after they reached 18. In response, Meng Weina with 
the support of some parents and some Zhiling staff founded Huiling to provide 
long-term residential care for mentally disabled people. By the time of my 
fieldwork, in addition to a residential home, Huiling was also operating a 
special education school, a kindergarten that had both mentally disabled and 
normal children, and a vocational training centre for mentally disabled people. 
Although Huiling charges fees for its services, the income from the fees is not 
sufficient to cover its running costs. It therefore relies on charitable donations to 
make up the difference.
7. Guangdong Special Children Parent Club: Founded in 1997 in Guangzhou, the 
capital city of Guangdong Province, by a British couple who had worked as 
consultants in the Rehabilitation Department of the Guangzhou Maternal and 
Children's Hospital. The club aims to provide information and support for 
children with learning difficulties and their families. It operates a resource 
centre that provides a range of services from informal contact and exchange to 
diagnosis, advisory consultations and assessments. It also runs a small 
residential home for mentally disabled children that has four full-time staff. At 
the time of my fieldwork, about 100 families with disabled children had joined 
the club. The club organises regular activities for its members, such as 
workshops and social events. It also produces a quarterly newsletter. The club 
maintains active contact with similar organisations in other cities and provinces. 
In 2000 and 2001, it organised two national conferences which were attended by 
parents of mentally disabled children and professionals who worked with 
disabled children.
262
8. Global Village of Beijing (GVB): A popular environmental NGO that was 
founded in 1996. Its main activities include producing environmental education 
television programmes, publishing an environmental book series, promoting 
community-based garbage recycling, and organising environmental fora and 
other public events, such as Earth Day China celebrations. It also manages a 
training centre outside Beijing that covers 187 hectares of mountains, forests, 
springs, and wetlands. It uses the centre to provide participatory environmental 
education for the public.
9. China Youth Development Foundation (CYDF): An officially-organised NGO 
set up by the Communist Youth League's Central Committee in 1989. It raises 
money to fund basic education in underdeveloped regions of China. Its 
operation is described in detail in the thesis.
10. China Association of STD/AIDS Prevention and Control (CASAPC): An
officially-organised NGO founded in 1993 at the decision of the State Council. 
Initially it was treated as an official organisation and was given the task of 
coordinating the work of all the concerned central government departments in 
combating HIV/AIDS and sexually-transmitted diseases. In 1996, the State 
Council set up a special HIV/AIDS committee and transferred the coordination 
function from the CASAPC to the committee. Thereafter the CASAPC no longer 
performed any official functions. At the time of my fieldwork the CASAPC's 
activities mainly included organising HIV/AIDS conferences and workshops, 
publishing newsletters (funded by the Ministry of Health), and providing 
training for health professionals and people with high risk of contracting 
HIV/AIDS, such as homosexuals. It also regularly applied for funding from 
international donors to implement anti-AIDS projects in China. For example, it 
has received funding from the World Bank to implement a community care
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project for people living with HIV/AIDS in rural Shanxi Province.
NGOs that are not named in  the thesis but whose names can be given:
1. Yunnan Province Charities Federation (YPCF): An officially-organised NGO 
founded in 1996 to raise money for social welfare projects. It is sponsored by the 
Yunnan provincial Civil Affairs Bureau. The YPCF is able to enlist the help of 
senior government officials and the official media in its fundraising efforts. It 
has raised money to provide medical treatment for people who need the 
treatment but cannot afford it themselves, such as children born with cleft palate 
who are abandoned by their parents and poor people suffering from cataract. It 
also runs a sponsorship programme to raise money for orphans and donates 
money to victims of natural disasters.
2. Guangzhou Zhanzhi Residential Rehabilitation Centre for Disabled People 
(Zhanzhi): A small residential home for mentally disabled people set up by four 
parents of disabled children in 1997 as a self-help initiative. Its start-up cost was 
provided by a Hong Kong charity. It is housed in a low-rent flat provided by the 
Guangzhou government. Zhanzhi is supported by fees paid by the families of its 
clients. It has 5 staff and can care for up to 12 disabled people, but at the time of 
my fieldwork it only had 6 clients. This meant that the fees it collected were not 
sufficient to cover its expenditure. It therefore depended on charitable donations 
to make up the deficit.
3. Yong Men's Christian Association (YMCA) Guangzhou: A Christian charity 
supervised by the Guangzhou municipal Religious Affairs Bureau. In addition 
to organising cultural and recreational activities for youth, children, and elderly 
people, the YMCA has also carried out many social welfare programmes. For 
example, it has donated libraries to schools in poor rural areas, operated
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day-care centres for children during school holidays, and provided 
community-based service for elderly people. It also organises and trains 
volunteers who regularly work at various social welfare institutions in 
Guangzhou, such as orphanages and rehabilitation centres for disabled people.
4. Guangzhou Agape Social Service Centre (Agape): Founded in 1985 by the 
Christian church, Agape has carried out many social service programmes for 
elderly people, children, and youth. For example, it established a kindergarten 
for Hepatitis B seropositive children who were excluded from ordinary 
kindergartens and a club that organised social activities for elderly people. It 
also has a team of volunteers who provide services for elderly people. Although 
it is not a membership-based organisation, at the time of my fieldwork Agape 
was registered as a social organisation and was supervised by the government 
Religious Affairs Bureau. It receives no financial support from the government, 
but has received funding from overseas church groups. It also runs some 
commercial services to generate income for its social service programmes.
5. Beijing Xingxingyu Education Institute for Children with Autism: Founded in 
1993 by the mother of an autistic child, it is the first educational institute in 
China that caters specifically to children with autism. The institute provides 
training and counselling services for parents and produces information 
materials on autism. It charges fees for its services but offers some financial 
assistance to families that are unable to pay the fees. It has received funding 
from international sources. Although registered as a business, it is generally 
perceived as an NGO rather than a profit-making organisation.
6. Juvenile Legal Aid and Research Centre: Set up by a group of lawyers in
Beijing in 1999, the centre is affiliated with the China Society of Juvenile 
Delinquency Research. It aims to bring about better legal protection of juveniles7
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rights and interests. It has opened a national hotline for young people seeking 
legal advice and established a nationwide network of lawyers who provide legal 
aid for juveniles. It also conducts research on juvenile justice issues and carries 
out activities to popularise laws pertaining to youth. The centre was initially 
funded by the law firm where its founders worked. It has received financial and 
technical support from international NGOs.
7. China Non-Profit Organisation Network: Originally an informal coalition of 
NGOs sharing information and engaging in joint activities aimed at raising the 
status of NGOs and expanding their influence, it was formally established as an 
NGO capacity building institution in 2001. It is registered as a business but its 
activities are funded by international donor agencies. It carries out training for 
NGOs and organises NGO fora. It also uses its website and newsletters to 
disseminate capacity-building information to NGOs.
8. China AIDS Network: Founded in 1994 by academics at the Beijing Union 
Medical College, by the end of 2002 it had about 200 members across the country. 
Most members are medical professionals, but there are also members who work 
in government agencies and mass organisations that are involved in AIDS 
prevention work, such as public security departments, women's federations, 
and labour unions. The Network is affiliated with the CASAPC as a second-level 
NGO. It conducts HIV/AIDS research and training. Members share experience 
and exchange information through annual conferences and newsletters.
NGOs that cannot be named but whose activities are described in  detail in  the
thesis:
1. An association of parents of autistic children: A detailed description of the 
organisation is given in Chapter 3.
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2. A provincial children's NGO set up by the provincial women's federation: A 
detailed description is given in Chapter 5.
3. A women's NGO whose founder was originally interested in launching a 
profit-making service: Described in detail in Chapter 6.
4. A seriously mismanaged non-governmental residential home for disabled 
people that went bankrupt: Described in detail in Chapter 6.
NGOs that cannot be named and whose activities are not described in detail
in the thesis:
1. A popular environmental NGO founded in the mid 1990s. It organises 
environmental awareness raising activities, such as public lectures and 
discussions, publishes an environmental book series, and conducts research on 
environmental issues.
2. A legal research and legal aid centre founded in the mid 1990s. It aims to help 
improve the legislation process in China to make it more scientific and 
democratic. It pursues this goal by conducting research, then making 
recommendations to legislative bodies. It also organises workshops and training 
for law enforcement personnel in order to help improve the implementation of 
existing laws. Although its main focus is research, the centre also has a legal aid 
section that provides free legal services for needy people.
3. An officially-organised NGO sponsored by a central government ministry. It 
was created in the late 1990s by merging five NGOs under the ministry's 
sponsorship. Many of the NGO's staff are former employees of the ministry who
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were made redundant following a government streamlining campaign. Their 
salaries are still paid by the ministry. The ministry also gives the NGO a fixed 
amount of money every year to cover part of its administrative costs. The NGO 
covers the rest of its administrative budget by organising training and 
conferences from which it makes a profit by charging fees from the participants 
that exceed the cost of organising the events. The NGO publishes some 
newsletters and occasionally conducts some research but on the whole has 
remained rather idle. Its staff blame this idleness on the lack of support from the 
ministry rather than their own lack of initiative. They think that the ministry 
should transfer some of its functions to the NGO, so that it will have more 
authority and can mobilize more resources.
4. A private special education school for mentally disabled children founded in the 
early 1990s. The founder set up the school after retiring from a government 
special education school. The school caters to children who are not admitted into 
government special education schools because their disability is judged to be too 
severe. It maintains itself by charging fees from students' families. The school's 
enrolment at its height reached 30, but by the time of my fieldwork there were 
only four students left. The founder was to close down the school soon, since it 
could no longer collect enough fees to maintain itself. The founder attributed the 
demise of her school to the fact that several other private educational institutions 
for mentally disabled children had been set up in her city since the early 1990s. 
The founder pointed out that the other schools were better funded and had 
received more support from the government. They had taken away her students.
5. A residential training institute for mentally disabled youth founded in 1998. The 
institute targets youth whose disability is relatively mild. It aims to teach them 
some professional skills so that they may be able to find employment. At the 
time of the fieldwork it was too early to tell whether the institute's training
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programme would be successful. The institute has received very limited external 
funding and is largely supported by fees it charges from the families of its 
clients.
6. A popular association of parents of mentally disabled people founded in 1998. 
The organisation was established at the suggestion of the director of an NGO 
that provided residential care and training for mentally disabled people. The 
director encouraged the parents of her NGO's clients to form an association to 
bring together all the parents of mentally disabled people in the city so that they 
could advocate for the rights of disabled people. From the start the association 
was plagued by all sorts of collective action problems. For example, few parents 
had the skills and dedication to lead the association and turn it into an effective 
vehicle for promoting the interests of disabled people. Members wanted to see 
quick results and did not have the patience to engage in advocacy work that 
might not bring immediate benefits to themselves. Furthermore, the association 
suffered from the rivalry between different NGOs in the same city that provided 
similar services. Since it was formed at the suggestion of the director of one 
NGO, some parents whose children received services from the other NGOs 
identified the association with this particular NGO and were therefore not keen 
to participate in its activities.
7. A popular NGO founded in 2000 to provide community-based care and 
rehabilitation for mentally disabled children. It represented pioneering work in 
the field of care and rehabilitation for mentally disabled people since existing 
services in China were mostly provided through residential institutions. The 
organisation relies on overseas funding to carry out its services.
8. A popular association of physically disabled people established in 1986. The 
association organises mutual support activities among its members. It also
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carries out advocacy work to promote the welfare of disabled people. It had 
about 600 members at the time of my fieldwork. After the central government 
promulgated new NGO regulations in 1998, the local civil affairs bureau forced 
the NGO to merge with an officially-organised disabled persons7 association. At 
the time of my fieldwork the merge process had just begun, but there were 
already worrying signs that the NGOrs ability to advocate for the interests of 
disabled people would be compromised after the merge.
9. A popular NGO established in the mid 1990s to raise awareness of AIDS in 
China and to protect the rights of people suffering from HIV/ AIDS. Up to the 
time of my fieldwork in late 2002 the NGO had focused on advocacy rather than 
service delivery, but it had begun to plan some service delivery projects. The 
NGO is largely funded by international organisations.
10. A popular NGO founded in the late 1990s to help people suffering from 
HIV/AIDS. It aims to reduce discrimination against people infected with HIV 
and to provide them with better care. It engages in both advocacy and service 
delivery. It enjoys good relationships with government agencies and 
officially-organised NGOs such as the CASAPC but is largely funded by 
international organisations.
11. A popular organisation whose members are all people suffering from 
HIV/ AIDS. It aims to improve the lives of its members through such measures 
as helping them to start small businesses in order to raise incomes and 
organising mutual support activities amongst members. The organisation was 
formed chiefly at the instigation of the local government that had received 
international donor funding to implement a care project for AIDS patients. The 
organisation was largely led by the local government. Its members showed little 
initiative and were dependent on the local government for everything from
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financial, technical and logistical support, to ideas as to what kind of activities it 
could carry out.
12. A popular women's NGO founded in the mid 1990s that provides vocational 
training for women, implements small-scale poverty alleviation projects in rural 
areas that target women, and organises a support network for migrant women. 
It is largely funded by international donors.
13. A popular women's NGO founded in the mid 1990s that is dedicated to 
promoting women's rights. Its members are mostly women professionals such 
as academics, lawyers, and doctors. The organisation receives no money from 
the state and is supported by overseas donor funding. It enjoys good 
relationships with the All China Women's Federation as well as other relevant 
government and non-governmental organisations in China. It pursues its goal 
by carrying out gender-awareness training, conducting research, proposing new 
laws and revisions to existing laws, providing legal aid to women, and 
implementing pilot projects to improve the protection of women whose rights 
have been violated.
14. A society of traditional Chinese philosophy whose members are academics in 
universities and research institutes in different cities. The society convenes 
academic conferences and publishes the writings of its members. It survives 
mostly on funding from private businesses.
15. A technological society whose members include both researchers and 
enterprises (as institution members) that use the technology researched by the 
society. The society's activities are funded by its member enterprises. It 
publishes a newsletter and operates a web site. It also organises workshops for 
its members to inform them of the latest development in the technology and its
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industrial application. The society's daily affairs are largely controlled by its 
general secretary, who is a researcher. This has led to some serious problems. 
The biggest enterprise among its members has been very generous in financing 
the society's administrative costs, including the salaries of its administrative 
staff. As a result, the general secretary has not only allowed but also assisted the 
enterprise to use the society to promote itself and its products. This has caused 
much resentment among other enterprises that are members of the society. They 
have become less interested in participating in the society's activities.
16. A technological association similar to the society described above. It is a network 
of research institutes and enterprises in a particular industry. The association's 
activities are financed by membership fees. It publishes a newsletter and 
organises annual conferences to facilitate information exchange among its 
members.
17. An officially-organised NGO founded in the late 1980s whose board is 
composed of retired and incumbent senior officials. These officials use their 
connections and influence to raise funds for the organisation, both from the 
government and businesses. The organisation uses these funds to implement 
poverty alleviation projects in rural areas.
18. A private rural development research institute set up by academics with regular 
jobs in state universities or research institutes. The research institute carries out 
consultancy work for rural development projects funded by international donor 
agencies.
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